Sunday, November 21, 2010

No 498-A after Foreign Divorce - an abuse of the process of criminal law another misuse of 498a 406

No 498-A after Foreign Divorce - an abuse of the process of criminal law another misuse of 498a 406

 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
1. Criminal Misc. No. 37932-M of 2006
Partap Singh and another
Petitioners
Versus
State of Punjab and another
Respondents
2. Criminal Misc. No. 49931-M of 2006
Gurnam Singh
Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab and another
Respondents
3. Criminal Misc. No. 59336-M of 2006
Gurdit Singh and another
Petitioners
Versus
State of Punjab and another
Respondents
Date of decision: 4th October, 2010
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA Present: Mr. Tarunvir Vashist, Advocate for Mr. Rajesh Gupta, Advocate for the petitioners. Ms. Sudeepti Sharma, DAG Punjab,
for the State.
None for respondent No.2.
KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA, J. (ORAL)
By this common order, three petitions viz. (1) Criminal Misc. No.37932-M of 2006 preferred by Partap Singh-father-in-law and Kulwant Kaur-mother-in-law (2) Criminal Misc. No.49931-M of 2006 preferred by Criminal Misc. Nos. 37932-M; 49931-M and 59336-M of 2006 2 Gurnam Singh-brother of the husband and (3) Criminal Misc. No.59336-M of 2006 filed by Gurdit Singh-elder brother of father-in-law and Tejinder Singh-husband shall be decided together.
FIR in these cases was lodged by Kulwinder Kaur, who was a citizen of United Kingdom. As per the FIR, she was resident of 7, Scribers Lane, Har Green Birmingham B-280 NY. The marriage of complainant-Kulwinder Kaur was solemnized with Tejinder Singh at Ludhiana on 8th May, 2004. It is not disputed that for solemnizing the marriage, complainant-Kulwinder Kaur came to India only one month before her marriage and thereafter she left for United Kingdom. Thereafter, immigration of her husband-Tejinder Singh was sponsored and he also left for United Kingdom on 24th October, 2004. Counsel for the petitioners has referred to the divorce proceedings (Annexures P-10 to P-14) between the husband and wife initiated and concluded in the Uxbridge County Court and has stated that all property and entrustment disputes between the parties have been resolved by the Matrimonial County Court while granting divorce. The matter has been investigated by the Ludhiana police. It is stated that the only allegation against the petitioners is that the dowry articles were entrusted to them in India and during the stay of complainant-Kulwinder Kaur in India, her husband and his relations had misbehaved with the complainant and had demanded a car. It is stated in the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. (Annexure P-9) that Tejinder Singh reached United Kingdom on 24th October, 2004 and resided there with his father-in-law. On 24th February, 2005, he is stated to have left the house for an unknown place. For search of Tejinder Singh, the complainant- Kulwinder Kaur and her father came to India and a Panchayat was called, where on 17th August, 2005, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law and uncle-in-law of the complainant had demanded dowry articles. The Criminal Misc. Nos. 37932-M; 49931-M and 59336-M of 2006 3 police after enquiry, had deleted the offence punishable under Sections 364 and 382 IPC, however they came to a conclusion that offence punishable under Sections 406, 498-A and 323 IPC was made out against the accused.
This is one of those typical cases, where after the marriage, bride and bridegroom have gone abroad. The wife is a citizen of United Kingdom. She had facilitated immigration of her husband, who had married a Non-Resident-Indian wife only for the purposes of his settlement in a foreign country. Having reached abroad, he deserted his wife and had obtained a divorce. The hurt of a Non-Resident-Indian wife that she has been used as a conduit for immigration, can be well understood. In this context, the allegations in the FIR have been examined. This Court cannot become oblivious of the fact that the husband and wife, after obtaining divorce, parted their ways and are residing happily in United Kingdom. The property and entrustment of the articles was a subject matter before the Uxbridge County Court, which has granted divorce. A similar controversy was examined by Hon'ble the Apex Court in 'Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia and others v. State of Punjab and others' (2009) 7 Supreme Court Cases 712, wherein it was held as under:
"32. Furthermore, the larger part of offence, if any, has been committed only in Canada. Why the father of Respondent 3 had to come from Canada to Jalandhar to lodge an FIR is difficult to comprehend. Respondent 3 and the first informant do not say that the inquiry report submitted by the Superintendent of Police on the representation made by Appellant 2 was incorrect. It has also not been stated that as to on what material, the chargesheet had been submitted. we, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, have absolutely no doubt in our mind that the allegations contained in the FIR had been made with an ulterior motive to harass Criminal Misc. Nos. 37932-M; 49931-M and 59336-M of 2006 4 the appellants. Continuance of the criminal proceeding against them would, therefore, amount to abuse of process of the Court."
Admittedly, Tejinder Singh had left the house in United Kingdom, thereafter, as to why the complainant-Kulwinder Kaur and her father came to India in search of Tejinder Singh and then they met the relations of husband where they made a demand of dowry articles? This is something which this Court cannot comprehend. This kind of allegations are not only unnatural, improbable and unconvincing but have been coined only as an abuse of the process of criminal law. It is another case where provisions of Sections 406 and 498-A IPC have been misused. The very fact that complainant aggrieved wife had stayed in India for less than one month and husband cohabited with complainant wife for a period of about six months i.e. from October 2004 to February 2005 in United Kingdom and thereafter, obtained divorce from County Court in United Kingdom settling all disputes is sufficient to hold that proceedings in the present case should be quashed. Hence, the above said three petitions are hereby accepted and the impugned FIR along with all subsequent proceedings is quashed.

[KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA]
JUDGE
October 4, 2010

http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1318745/

Advisary,Circular,Directions from High Courts of various states for 498a arrest guidelines

Advisary,Circular,Directions from High Courts of various states for 498a arrest guidelines

http://498amisuse.wordpress.com/category/resource/ipc-498a/advisarycirculardirections-from-court/

Sunday, November 14, 2010

Delhi district court-Three acquitted in dowry death case. Suicide due to Illicit relationship given color of dowry demand and death by Girl’ family

Three acquitted in dowry death case

New Delhi, Nov 14 (PTI) A Delhi court has acquitted a man and his parents of the charges of causing death of the former''s wife for dowry, noting that the accused were financially well-off to raise such demands.
Additional Sessions Judge Kamini Lau absolved Pankaj Raj, his father Surender Kumar and mother Kamlesh of the charges under Section 304 B (dowry death) and 498 A (cruelty) of the IPC.
The court took into account a number of facts like Raj''s earnings, the gifts he had given to his wife Ritu, the places he took her to on their honeymoon, besides the financial condition of Kumar and the victim.
It said that Ritu was maintaining an independent bank account and had even paid Rs 40,000 to her brother for buying a motorbike after her marriage with Raj on December 9, 2005 to conclude that she herself was capable of taking care of her financial requirements.
The court further said the demands for articles like TV and AC do not appear "plausible" as Raj was the only son of his parents and his sister was settled in the USA as professor at Harvard University.
It also said that besides the mother and brother of the deceased, no one else from her family including the father was cited as witness by the prosecution to prove their charges.

"It is clear from the evidence of the witnesses that the deceased has committed suicide but it cannot be related to any dowry-related harassment by the accused as apparently there is no proximity or link between her death and the alleged misconduct by the accused persons," the court said.
During the trial, the accused tried to point out to the court that the victim could not reconcile with her marriage as she got attached with a boy with whom she was earlier engaged and was even in touch with before committing suicide on April 10, 2006 at her matrimonial home in Janak Puri here within five months of her marriage.
"The prosecution story does not inspire confidence and is not worthy of credence, especially in view of the glaring contradictions and overwhelming inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses," the court said, acquitting the accused.

http://news.in.msn.com/national/article.aspx?cp-documentid=4576032

Saturday, November 13, 2010

SC acknowledges Gross Abuse of ANTI DOWRY LAWS 498a 304B by wife’s parents

Bench: P Sathasivam, B Chauhan

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 891 of 2004

Dr. Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta & Ors. ...Appellants Versus

State of Maharashtra ...Respondent JUDGMENT

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay, dated 29.4.2004, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 865 of 1987, by which the High Court has reversed the judgment and order of the Trial Court acquitting the appellants of the charges under Sections 306/34 and 498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as `IPC').

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that appellant No.1 got married to one Neeru Gupta (hereinafter called as `the deceased') on 1.12.1978 by way of an arranged marriage. Out of the said wedlock, a female child named Mili was born in 1981. There had been some disputes between the husband and wife on petty matters. Neeru committed suicide on 28.9.1985 by hanging herself in the bathroom when all the other family members had gone outside. Rajesh (PW.2), brother of the deceased, filed a complaint dated 30.9.1985, against the appellants i.e. the husband and parents in law of the deceased, alleging that they had been demanding dowry and had given ill treatment to the deceased, and that is why Neeru committed suicide. The police investigated the matter and filed the charge sheet against all the three appellants on 9.1.1986 under Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC. The prosecution examined a large number of witnesses to substantiate its case. After the conclusion of the trial, the Sessions Court vide its judgment and order dated 21.5.1987, held that the deceased had committed suicide. However, no role could be attributed to any of the appellants for the same, and the prosecution failed to prove any of the charges beyond reasonable doubt against the appellants. The witnesses examined by the prosecution improved their version with regard to claims of the alleged demands, particularly in respect of the gold ornaments and ill treatment of the deceased. The Trial Court came to the conclusion that the deceased was suffering from epilepsy, psychosis and depression and had been getting regular treatment for the same. Therefore, it was not a case of dowry demand or treating her with cruelty.

3. Being aggrieved, the State of Maharashtra preferred Criminal Appeal No.865 of 1987 before the High Court of Bombay and the High Court reversed the order of acquittal, convicted the appellants vide its judgment and order dated 29.4.2004 and imposed the punishment of 3 years RI on the husband, appellant No.1, and 2 years on the other appellants i.e. the in-laws of the deceased. Hence, this appeal.

4. Shri K.T.S Tulsi, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, has submitted that the High Court failed to appreciate the medical evidence and depositions of the prosecution witnesses in the right perspective, as the same could not establish conclusively that the suicide by the deceased could be attributed to the appellants to any extent. It was a clear cut case of suicide because of depression, as the deceased had been suffering from epilepsy and other mental disorders. The deceased had developed an illicit relationship with a family friend, Kake, and a letter written by the said Kake had been in the possession of the other family members and, therefore, they had informed her parents and brother about the said illicit relationship. The medical evidence, particularly, the deposition of Dr. Daulatram Nekumal Gurbani (PW.10) made it clear that the deceased had been suffering from serious depression and such a patient often develops suicidal tendencies. The deceased had also made an attempt earlier to commit suicide in 1985 and she had been taken to the local hospital. Subsequently, she had also been treated at Kanpur. The findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court that there was neither any demand of gold ornaments or any kind of dowry, nor had the deceased been subjected to cruelty, could not be held to be perverse by the High Court to bring home the charges against the appellants under Sections 306 or 498A IPC. The parents-in-law of the deceased were not living at Kalyan, as the appellant No.2 had been transferred to Kurudwadi in 1983 and the deceased was living with her husband i.e. appellant No.1, at Kalyan. The High Court committed an error in shifting the burden of proof to the defence as the court observed that the defence failed to prove its version. In fact the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the failure of the defence to prove the defence version cannot be a ground for conviction. More so, as there has been no abetment to suicide, the provisions of Section 306 IPC could not be attracted. Thus, in view of above, the appeal deserves to be allowed.

5. On the contrary, Shri Sushil Karanjakar, learned counsel appearing for the State has vehemently opposed the appeal contending that the High Court's judgment is based on cogent reasons and on a proper appreciation of the evidence on record. The High Court has correctly reached the conclusion that the findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court were perverse. The High Court is the final court of facts, its findings do not deserve to be disturbed by this Court in a routine manner. There is sufficient evidence on record to prove the demand of dowry and abetment to suicide. Therefore, no interference is required by this Court with the findings of fact recorded by the High Court. The appeal lacks merit and, thus, is liable to be dismissed. 5

6. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

7. Before proceeding further, it may be pertinent to mention here that Shri K.T.S Tulsi, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, has informed us that appellant No.3, Sou. Pushamalati Sambhudayal Gupta died in the month of February, 2010. In view thereof, the appeal by appellant No.3 stands abated and we only have to consider the case of appellant Nos. 1 and 2, i.e., the husband and the father-in-law of the deceased.

8. The Trial Court after appreciating the depositions of the witnesses and examining the documentary evidence on record came to the conclusion that the alleged demand of gold ornaments or ill- treatment of the deceased could not be established and none of the letters produced by the prosecution has been suggestive of either of ill-treatment or demand of dowry. None of the prosecution witnesses, i.e. the family members of the deceased, made such allegations either while lodging the FIR or in their statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called `Cr.P.C.'). Such allegations had been made for the first time while making statements before the court during trial. There were material contradictions and improvements, which were not mere elaborations of their statements already made. Thus, their statements in regard to those allegations were liable to be discarded.

9. The High Court reversed the findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court, mainly relying upon the evidence of Dr. Daulatram Nekumal Gurubani (PW.10), as he had deposed that when he had examined the deceased, she told him that she had been deprived of love and affection by her family members. She had no faith in any member of her family. He had also opined that it was not a case of psychosis, but the deceased had been suffering from a mental disorder. The High Court also reached the conclusion that the defence failed to establish that the deceased was suffering from epilepsy before her marriage. The stay of the deceased along with her parents in a Guest House for two-three days after going from Kanpur to Kalyan has also been taken by the High Court as a circumstance adverse to the appellants. The High Court also came to the conclusions that the intimacy between the deceased and Kake did not mean that she had illicit relationship with Kake; and there had been a demand of a gold chain by appellant No.3.

10. As the High Court has reversed the order of acquittal and taken a view contrary to the view taken by the Trial Court, we have taken upon ourselves the task of appreciation of evidence and considered the legal and factual issues involved in the case.

11. Letters written by the parties to each other:

(A) A large number of letters had been placed on record before the Trial Court by both the parties. Letter dated 24.2.1979 (Ext.P-26), written by the deceased to her husband, about 3 months after the marriage reveals that there was no problem in the relationship between the husband and wife. In fact, it suggests that they had deep love and affection for each other.

(B) Letter dated 3.4.1985, written by appellant no. 2 to the father of the deceased, makes it evident that something had gone wrong and the behaviour of the deceased had been totally unwarranted, as it revealed that she had gone out of the house i.e. on the main road, half-naked and she had brought disrepute to the family of her in-laws. However, they had been tolerating such behaviour. She had lowered their prestige so much that they had not been able to show their faces to anyone. It suggested an illicit relationship between the deceased and one family friend, Kake. It also suggested that the deceased wanted to live with the said Kake, as she had developed love for him and she was willing to elope with him. It also suggested that it was wrong on the part of Smt. Shanti (mother of the deceased) to have been giving wrong advice to the deceased and making false allegations that her in- laws were not treating her properly. According to this letter, the deceased had declared that she was no longer interested in Sunil, her husband, as she did not like him any more and in the end appellant No.2 had expressed great concern about his grand daughter Mili and stated that he was willing to keep her in a hostel so that she could be spared humiliation because of the illicit relationship between the deceased and Kake. The author of the letter suggested to the father of the deceased that he should call the deceased to Kanpur as there could be some untoward/disastrous incident in future. (C) The undated letter (Ext. P-2) purported to have been written by Kake to the deceased, gives an impression that the deceased had not only deep intimacy, but something more with Kake. Kake was also in possession of some of her photographs which he claimed to be his fortune and said that the same would not be returned to her as she had requested and would be burnt only with the end of his life. This letter also suggested that he had the opportunity to have a physical relationship with her.

(D) There are several other letters on record showing that after the development of the intimacy between Kake and the deceased, both families were disturbed and attempts had been made from both the sides to patch up the matter. However, none of the letters suggests any demand of dowry or ill treatment to the deceased amounting to cruelty by the appellants.

(E) The letter dated 7.7.1985 written by the complainant, Rajesh, brother of the deceased to appellant No.1, is suggestive in nature. It suggests that appellant no. 1 should try to save the prestige of the family at any cost and forget all that had happened in the past, as the deceased was willing to improve herself and accept any advice given by her husband. Another letter dated 9.7.1985, written by the informant, Rajesh, brother of the deceased to the appellant No.2 revealed that the entire family of the deceased had been making serious attempts at re-conciliation. Even in this letter there was not even a whisper/mention of any demand of dowry or of ill treatment.

(F) The letter dated 18.7.1985 written by the father of the deceased to his son Rajesh (PW.2) from Kalyan made it clear that the author along with the deceased had gone to Kalyan to meet the family of the appellants, and they were not welcomed by the mother-in-law of the deceased at the initial stage. They had been staying in Modern Guest House in the same colony. Appellant No.1, the husband of the deceased suggested that the deceased should meet her mother-in-law and apologies, which was accepted by the deceased. The deceased met her mother-in-law and apologized. After some time, the mother-in- law became quiet and calm and started behaving properly and all the appellants treated them well.

(G) The un-dated letter (Ex.P-21) written by the deceased to her father revealed that her mother-in-law wanted her to separate herself from the other members of the family and her parents. It also gave the impression that her mother-in-law was asking for a gold chain ("zanzir ke liye keh rahi thi") and created problems for her in meeting her husband and daughter. After the arrival of her brother-in-law to Kalyan, the behaviour of her mother-in-law had improved a lot, but her husband being busy in his practice and did not have sufficient time to be with her.

(H) From the original record, a letter dated 1.4.1985 (Ext. 16), by the mother-in-law to the father of the deceased seems to have been written after losing hope completely and concluding that the deceased had become incorrigible. The said letter suggests that the relationship between the deceased and her husband had come to an end. The deceased had become a woman of bad character. They had tolerated her to a great extent. The deceased had been tutored by her mother; she had been misbehaving with them and it had become difficult for them to tolerate her any more. The deceased had been using abusive language to all the family members. She had lowered their reputation and they had been very unlucky to have such a daughter-in-law. As she wanted to live with Kake and not with her husband, they did not want to have any relationship with her. [Appellant No. 3 had denied writing the said letter].

(I) Another letter dated 22.5.1985, is on record written by Jai Narain Gupta from Sandila, U.P. (who seems to be relative of the deceased) wherein a suggestion had been made to patch up the matter. The author has drawn the inference that the problems were being created for the deceased, and she has been treated with cruelty as her in-laws did not receive dowry according to their expectations, though, there is no allegation that there has been any demand of dowry and for not giving the same.

(J) The undated letter written by the deceased to her aunt Manorma Gupta at Barabanki does not suggest anything against the accused, as the deceased had written that everything was fine and that she would discuss things when they met. The undated letter written by her aunt in reply, suggests that there was something amiss. She had mentioned that the whole family was very disturbed, but they were not able to suggest any solution. There was nothing to worry or fear as all of them were with the deceased and she also told the deceased to face things with courage, as she had equal rights to stay in the house and to fight for justice.

12. Depositions of Prosecution witnesses (Relevant parts): (I) Dr. Mohan Kulkarni, a practicing doctor residing in the same building (PW.1)-

"I know both accused Nos. 2 and 3 used to occasionally visit their block at Waldhuni (Kalyan) after transfer of accused No.2 at Kurduwadi.....I have no any personal knowledge about the relations in between accused No.1 and his deceased wife.....It is true that I was told by accused No.1 some four or five month before the incident that his wife Guddi was getting the attacks of epileptic fits. The ailment of epileptic fits is of neurological problems. I say that these medicines namely used in neurological problems as gardenal, have their side effects on the patient. E.C.T. (Electro Convulsive Therapy) treatment is given to mental patients of some sort. If a person shows abnormal signs then he is branded as a mental patient. I say that those who have tendency of mental depression they tend to commit suicide. It is true that mental disorder in some cases creates mental depression."

(II) Rajesh (PW.2) (Brother of the deceased)- "It is true that there was nothing wrong in between the accused and Neeru till the delivery of a female child and everything was smooth and cordial, in between them......I cannot say why it is not disclosed specifically in my complaint that as accused no.3 instructed Neeru to fetch golden ornaments on account of my marriage ceremony, my father presented with four golden bangles in the ceremony....... I cannot say why it is not stated in my complaint that after the birth of her daughter we presented Neeru with two golden ear rings and golden chain of two tolas because those were demanded by her husband's family members..... As I did not remember the exact account of the remaining ornaments presented to Neeru by us as and when demanded by her in laws. I did not narrate about them in the complaint. Except my words I have no documentary evidence to show how many golden ornaments were presented to Neeru and when...... There is no reference to golden chain any other letters except letter (Exh.21) sent by Neeru to my parents and myself. That golden chain we give to Neeru in 1985 was weighing 2 and = tolas..... The only reference about the golden chain asked for by accused no.3 appears in letter (Exh.21) sent by Neeru to us after she was reached at her in laws place on 24.8.1985."

(III) Manorma (PW.7) Aunt of deceased-

"She told me that accused persons had demanded a golden chain from her and hence she was not being called back now shown  inland letter dated 10.7.1985 which is written by me to Neeru alias Guddi at Kanpur.....I have not stated before the police that when I met Neeru in March 1985 she told me that accused persons were demanding more golden ornaments from her and that they were keeping her starving and were not allowing her to meet her daughter Mili, and that she was craving to meet Mili. As I was not well at that time I forgot to narrate the things before the police. I have told this fact for the first time to the court...... I have not written specifically in my two letters (Exh.39 and 40) addressed to my brother and sister in law that Neeru told me that she was subjected to physical assault by the accused and that she was kept starving by the accused and further accused demanded golden ornaments from her."

(IV) Ramkishan Gupta (PW.8) Father of deceased- "I then arranged for a golden chain and sent Rajesh along with Neeru with a golden chain to Kalyan on 24.8.1985. Rajesh handed over golden chain to accused, and left Neeru in her in laws house and returned back to Kanpur. After 15 days we received a telegram sent by brother of accused no.1 Pradeep Kumar that all was well in the house at Kalyan. On 29.9.1985 we received a phone call informing us the said news of death of Neeru..... I have not stated in letter (Exh.23/1) that while we were standing out side the house of accused and requesting them to accept Neeru, accused no.3 demanded a golden chain from us and refused to allow Neeru to see her daughter in side the house, because Rajesh already knew all these things at Kanpur. I have no documentary evidence except my words to show that I had written to my sister Manorama and to my brother that accused persons were demanding...... I have not stated in either of my two statements before the police that when accused no.3 came to attend the wedding of my son Rajesh she demanded golden ornaments for herself (Accused no.3). I have not stated in either of my two statements before the police that even after the delivery of Neeru in 1981 none of the accused persons came to Kanpur to visit her. I have not stated in my first statement dated 1.10.1985 before the police that when Neeru came for delivery at Kanpur she informed us that accused no.3 was demanding golden ornaments from her..... I have not stated in either of my two statements specifically that when I and my wife went to the house of accused on 17.2.1985 we met all three accused at the entrance and all of them asked me whether I had brought golden ornaments or had come empty handed, and that they had already asked Rajesh to bring along golden ornaments and whereupon I told all three accused that I had not brought along golden ornaments as I was not having them and where upon all three accused pointed out towards Neeru and said as to how all those accused had driven Neeru to such a condition and that they would further make her condition miserable. I have not stated in either of my two statements before the police that when Neeru returned back to our house in March 1985 she told us that all accused told her that till their demand for cash and ornaments was not made, they would not allow Mili to go along with Neeru. I have not stated in either of my two statements before the police that when accused nos.2 and 3 had come to attend the marriage ceremony at Kanpur in the month of March 1985 accused nos.2 and 3 did not allow me to meet Mili. I had not stated in either of my two statements before the police that when Rajesh brought back Neeru in the month of June 1985 at Kanpur Neeru told me that she was not allowed to meet her daughter Mili in the house of her husband and accused no.3 asked her if she had brought golden chain or not."

(V) Daulatram Nekumal Gurubani (PW.10), Doctor- "In the mid of February, 1985 accused No.1 told me that his wife has become aggressive and was not co-operative and also used to become violent. When I reached the house of accused No.1, there I met accused No.2 and Accused No.3. I examined Neerubai, the wife of accused No.1. She was lying in store room and was not in a  mood to talk anything with me even she become aggressive with me in the sense she was not co- operative with me. Accused No.1 told Neerubai that I was psychotherapist of Thane Mental Hospital and then Neeru asked me whether I treated my wife in the same way she was being treated by her husband accused No.1. She showed me injury marks bruises on her both knees and a small injury on the lower lip and also bruises on the back. She also told me that she was beaten by her family members and by a ward boy of hospital. She also told me that she had been maltreated by her husband, by her mother in law. She also told me that, her ornaments were being worn by accused No.3. On seeing the injury marks on her person I talked with accused No.1 and asked for details. Accused No.1 told me that as Neeru had become violent and we were controlling her it was possible that she sustained small bruises..... Accused No.1 told me that his wife was suffering from epileptic fits since before her marriage and that she was on Geroin tablets. I told him that there were side effects of this drug and the drug should be stopped after 3 years. He told me that she was on drug for so many years and she is maintained on that drugs. I told him to continue with above tablets and consult Neurologist if she is suffering from the above ailments. I visited her place for 4 times in the same month i.e. February, 1985. During all those visits I never found any signs of epileptic fits......

Cross examination:

I started my practice in January 1985 at Ulhasnagar and handed the case of Neeru in February 1985 after I passed my M.D. Degree in Psychiatry in July 1984 though I joined mental hospital at Thane as Medical Officer...... I agree that even in major epilepsy this medicine Geroin is prescribed. It will not be correct to say that because I prescribed medicine Geroin I was convinced that the patient was suffering from major epilepsy. Even though I knew that drug Geroin carried side effect yet I prescribed it though I knew she had no sign of epilepsy because once the drug is started it cannot be abruptly discontinued otherwise the patient may get fits. I stick to the proposition that if an anti- convulsent drugs such as Geroin is given for long period and withdrawn abruptly then she may get convulsions. I am backed by authority. Clinical examination alone cannot decide whether a patient is suffering from epilepsy or not. Patient of epilepsy may have a grand-mal or petit-mal. It is true that dose of Geroin daily is more in case of grand-mal than in the case of petit-mal. It is true that a maximum dose of Geroin tablets is 4 tablets 3 times a day. I agree that brain scan, EEG and X- ray of all the skull are required for investigations in cases of epilepsy....

It is true that drugs at Sr. Nos. 1 to 5 prescribed by me to Mrs. Neeru wife Exh.46 are normally prescribed in a case of epilepsy with psychoses and in depressive state....I have prescribed to Neeru E.C.T. treatment.....It is not stated in my prescription letter (Exh.46) that if the drug as Sr. Nos. 1 to 5 prescribed to Neeru do not work out, then E.C.T. therapy should be started to her, though verbally told her so. It is true that I have not specifically stated in my prescription letter (Exh.46) at any time during my visits to Mrs. Neeru on 4 or 5 occasions that as the drugs at Sr.Nos. 1 to 5 in (Exh.46) were working, E.C.T. therapy was not essential.....I have not stated in my police statement that the room in which Neeru was found was an unkept room or a store room. I have not stated before the police that when I was introduced to Neeru as a psychiatrist, Neeru asked me whether I treat my wife in the same way as she was treated by her husband. I have not stated before the police that before Neeru was examined by me she told me that she was harassed by accused persons and that her ornaments were worn by accused No.3......

I have not stated before the police that I examined Neeru and found that there was not any gross psychological problem but she was mentally disturbed and I found that she had no faith in any of the members of the family and I found that she was deprived of love, affection and sympathy of her family members. I have not stated before the police that accused No.1 told me she was also epileptic but I did not find any signs and symptoms of that disease with her. I have not stated before the police that I requested accused No.1 where was the X-ray of skull and other investigation papers and accused No.1 told me that his wife was suffering of epileptic fits since before her marriage and that she was on geroin tablet. I have not stated before the police that I told him that there were side effects of this drug and the drug should be stopped after 3 years..... I agree that Mrs. Neeru did not meet me in April 1985 but she brought the letter of April 1985 of Dr. S. Mahendru in the month of June 1985. I have not stated before the police that Neeru either met me in April 1985 or in June 1985. Beyond my word there is no any other evidence to show that in September 1985 accused Nos. 1 and 2 came to me. I have not stated before the police that both accused Nos. 1 and 2 later on told me that Neeru committed suicide and that they needed certificate about her mental condition....."

(VI) Dr. Ramesh Kumar Mahendru (PW.12) - Doctor from Kanpur :

xxx

".....I say that the experts prescribed E.C.T. (Electro Convulsive treatment) in cases of retarded

depression and, manic depressive psychosis. I am shown the chart today by the learned Defence counsel in which the prescription of medicines advised by Dr. Gurubani for Niru and by me are practically same except with a difference that the medicines mentioned at Sr.No.4 does not potentiate as anti depressants but it prevents the reactions caused by the medicines stated at Sr.No.3 in the chart.....

Narco therapy is a kind of suggestive psycho therapy under the influence of narcotic drugs such as barbiturates."

13. The above referred letters and the depositions of the witnesses have to be understood/appreciated within the four corners of law, particularly dealing with the issues of reversal of the order of acquittal by the appellate court and discrepancies/improvement/embellishment and contradictions in the statements of the witnesses.

14. Material Contradictions:

While appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions had been of such magnitude that they may materially affect the trial. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters without effecting the core of the prosecution case should not be made a ground to reject the evidence in its entirety. The Trial Court, after going through the entire evidence, must form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses and the appellate Court in normal course would not be justified in reviewing the same again without justifiable reasons. (Vide: State Represented by Inspector of Police v. Saravanan & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 152).

15. Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of a witness and other witness also make material improvements before the court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it cannot be safe to rely upon such evidence. (Vide : State of Rajasthan v. Rajendra Singh, (2009) 11 SCC 106).

16. The discrepancies in the evidence of eye-witnesses, if found to be not minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving and discrediting their evidence. In such circumstances, witnesses may not inspire confidence and if their evidence is found to be in conflict and contradiction with other evidence or with the statement already recorded, in such a case it cannot be held that prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. (Vide: Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 11 SCC 334).

17. In case, the complainant in the FIR or the witness in his statement under section 161 Cr.P.C., has not disclosed certain facts but meets the prosecution case first time before the court, such version lacks credence and is liable to be discarded. (Vide: State Represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu v. Sait @ Krishnakumar, (2008) 15 SCC 440).

18. In State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 1390, while dealing with this issue, this Court observed as under: "In the depositions of witnesses there are always normal discrepancies, however honest and truthful they may be. These discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of the occurrence, and the like. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person."

19. The courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy belongs. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material discrepancies do so. (see: Syed Ibrahim v. 23 State of A.P., AIR 2006 SC 2908; and Arumugam v. State, AIR 2009 SC 331).

20. In Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh & Ors., (2004) 9 SCC 186, this Court examined the issue and held: "Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle. But it can be one of the factors to test credibility of the prosecution version, when the entire evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility."

21. While deciding such a case, the Court has to apply the aforesaid tests. Mere marginal variations in the statements cannot be dubbed as improvements as the same may be elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier. The omissions which amount to contradictions in material particulars i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the trial or core of the prosecution's case, render the testimony of the witness liable to be discredited.

Appeal against Acquittal:

22. It is a well-established principle of law, consistently re-iterated and followed by this Court is that while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, an appellate court must consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. Even though the appellate court is entitled to consider, whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had placed the burden of proof incorrectly or failed to take into consideration any admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration evidence brought on record contrary to law; the appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. The trial court which has the benefit of watching the demeanor of the witnesses is the best judge of the credibility of the witnesses.

23. Every accused is presumed to be innocent unless his guilt is proved. The presumption of innocence is a human right. Subject to the statutory exceptions, the said principle forms the basis of criminal jurisprudence in India. The nature of the offence, its seriousness and gravity has to be taken into consideration. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused, and further, that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference with the decision of the Trial Court in a casual or cavalier manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for such interference.

24. In exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. A finding may also be said to be perverse if it is `against the weight of evidence', or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (See: Balak Ram & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 2165; Shailendra Pratap & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 2003 SC 1104; Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 2006 SC 2500; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 2066; Arulvelu & Anr. v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206; Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 445); and Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189).

25. The instant case is required to be examined in light of the aforesaid legal principles.

Undoubtedly, the record reveals that at an initial stage the relationship between husband and wife had been very cordial and they had love and affection for each other. At a later stage when the family suspected an illicit relationship between the deceased and Kake, the appellants were very much disturbed. Both the families made serious attempts to re-concile and patch up the matter and the appellants agreed that the deceased may be given an opportunity to improve her behaviour. Thus, admittedly there was a doubt that the deceased had developed serious intimacy with Kake, which was much more than what happens in normal course with a family friend. Therefore, the finding recorded by the High Court that the intimacy between them to the extent of having an illicit relationship was not there, loses its significance, for the reason that even the suspicion of such a matter becomes the talk of the town and the reputation of the family remains at stake. The protests on the part of the appellants even on a mere suspicion and asking the deceased to keep distance from Kake or improve her behaviour is not something which can be termed to be unwarranted or uncalled for.

26. There is ample evidence on record to suggest that the deceased had been suffering from psychosis/mental dis-order. According to Dr. Daulatram Nekumal Gurubani (PW.10) the ailment was not of a very serious nature. However, the prescriptions given by Dr. Gurubani (PW.10) reveal that the deceased had been suffering from serious mental dis-order, otherwise such medicines could not have been prescribed by him. He has prescribed the deceased the medicine Geroin because he was convinced that the deceased was suffering from major epilepsy, in spite of the fact that he was fully aware that the said drug has side effects. He also deposed that mere clinical examination alone is not sufficient to decide whether the patient is suffering from epilepsy. He further deposed that such medicine can be given to a person suffering from grand-mal epilepsy. More so, had it not been the case of serious ailment of mental dis-order, the question of prescribing and giving E.C.T. to the deceased could not arise.

27. There had been a lot of improvements and contradictions in his statements. The witness deposed for the first time in the court during the trial, that when he went to examine the deceased, she was found in an unkept room/store room and that he was introduced to the deceased as a Psychiatrist and that the deceased had asked him whether he treated his wife in the same way as she had been treated by her husband. None of this was mentioned in his statement recorded by the police. Nor it had been recorded therein that the deceased had told him that she was harassed by the appellants and her ornaments were taken away/worn by her mother in law (A.3). More so, he had not stated in his police statement that the deceased was merely mentally disturbed and not suffering from a gross psychological problem. Nor had he stated therein that the deceased had told him that she was not having any faith in any of her family members and she was deprived of their love, affection and sympathy. Such contradictions in his statements cannot be held to be mere explanations or elaborations of his version, but are tantamount to material contradictions or vital omissions. The Rules of appreciation of evidence requires that court should not draw conclusions by picking up an isolated sentence of a witness without adverting to the statement as a whole. In such a fact- situation, it is not safe to rely on his testimony for the simple reason that he had made a lot of improvements/embellishments while deposing in court and vital contradictions exist with his earlier recorded statement. Thus, no reliance can be placed on his depositions to hold that appellants had ill-treated the deceased or that appellant No.3 had taken away/worn her ornaments or that she had been deprived of their love and affection or that she was not suffering from epilepsy etc.

28. The deposition of Dr. Mohan Kulkarni (PW.1) reveals that E.C.T. treatment is given only to mental patients, who have mental depression and tend to commit suicide; the ailment of epileptic fits is a neurological problem. His statement also suggests that her in-laws had not been living with her after 1983, as the appellant No.2 stood transferred to Kurudwadi and had shifted to the said transferred place and her in-laws had been visiting Kalyan occasionally. This view stands fully corroborated by the deposition of Dr. Ramesh Kumar Mahendru (PW.12), Reader in Psychiatric Medicine, Mental Hospital, Kanpur, as referred to herein above. He had examined the deceased and prescribed medicines for manic depressive Psychosis. The prescription of this witness substantially remained the same as of Dr. Daulatram Nekumal Gurubani (PW.10). The cumulative effect of the medical evidence given by three Doctors leads us to the conclusion that deceased had been suffering from manic depression and certainly had some mental/epileptic/ psychosis problem.

29. So far as the other witnesses are concerned, they are the father, brother and aunt of the deceased. Thus, being close relatives, in such facts and circumstances they might have developed inimical feelings towards the appellants, since they came to the conclusion that the appellants were responsible for the death of the deceased. However, their depositions are full of contradictions and have marked improvements from their statements recorded earlier. The exaggerations and improvements are of such a nature that they make their whole statements in respect of the demand for gold ornaments and/or the ill-treatment of the deceased liable to total disregard on these counts. Gold ornaments had been given by the complainants to the deceased out of love and free will at the time of the marriage of Rajesh (PW.2) and at the time of delivery of her daughter Mili. Undoubtedly, Rajesh (PW.2) had alleged in the FIR that there had been demand of gold ornaments by the appellants without any details of the same, however, he could not furnish any explanation as why this fact had not been disclosed to the police when his statement and supplementary statement was recorded. Also no such inference can be drawn from any of the letters on record. Only one un-dated letter (Ext.P-21) written by the deceased to her father suggests that her mother in-law had been asking for a chain. More so, as the chain had been given by the complainants to the deceased just 2/3 months before her death, and there is no evidence that any further demand had been there, the issue became totally irrelevant in terms of proving the motive, and it cannot be presumed that any demand had been made. More so, even if it is presumed that there was some demand by appellant No.3, as she is no more, and her appeal stands abated, this issue becomes totally irrelevant for the reason that no such allegation had ever been made against the remaining two appellants.

30. So far as the stay of the deceased with her parents after coming from Kanpur to Kalyan at the guest house is concerned, admittedly at that time the relations between the parties were strained because of the suspicion that the deceased was having an illicit relationship with Kake. However, it has been admitted by Ramkishan (PW.8), father of the deceased, that subsequently the relations became normal and they were invited at the house of the appellants after the deceased tendered an apology to her mother-in- law. The said witness did not state in his statement before the police that when he went to see the appellants on 17.2.1985, they had asked him whether he had brought gold ornaments or had come empty handed or that he was told that the deceased would not be allowed to live there and they would make her condition even more miserable. Such an improvement was made while deposing in court and no explanation could be furnished by him as to why such vital facts were not stated by him at the time of recording his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. This statement is to be discarded as it is not safe to hold the appellants guilty of the offences alleged against them on such an improved version.

31. The deposition of Manorma (PW.7), aunt of the deceased is by no means different, as she had also made major contradictions and improvements in her statement made in court. She had not stated in her police statement that the appellants were demanding gold ornaments from the deceased and her family or that the appellants were keeping the deceased starving and were not allowing her to meet her daughter, Mili. The explanation furnished by her that she had not been feeling well and had forgotten to narrate such material facts, cannot be believed.

32. The statement of Rajesh (PW.2), the brother of the deceased is also full of contradictions and suffers from major improvements. The contradictions are of such a nature that they impair the whole of his evidence. The same cannot be held to be clarificatory. He was not in a position to state what ornaments his family had presented to the deceased on different occasions. More so, it was not even stated in his police statement that after the birth of Mili, his family had given gold ornaments as demanded by the appellants. He could not even furnish an explanation as to why the demand of a gold chain is not evident from any of the letters between the parties, except in the letter (Ext. P- 21).

33. The complainants have denied the receipt of letter dated 3.4.1985 written by the appellant No.2 to the father of the deceased, referred to hereinabove. However, the appellants have produced the correspondence with the post office and proved the postal stamp to show that the said letter had been sent by registered A.D. to Ramkishan Gupta (PW.8). The law in this regard is well settled. In Gujarat Electricity Board & Anr. v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani, AIR 1989 SC 1433, this court examined the issue regarding the presumption of service of letter sent by registered post under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and held as under: "There is a presumption of service of a letter sent under registered cover.... No doubt the presumption is rebuttable and it is open to the party concerned to place evidence before the court to rebut the presumption by showing that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the postal authorities never tendered the registered letter to him.....The burden to rebut the presumption lies on the party challenging the factum of service." (Emphasis added)

A similar view has been re-iterated by this court in Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (Administration), Bangalore v. V.K. Gururaj & Ors., (1996) 7 SCC 275; and Shimla Development Authority & Ors. v. Santosh Sharma (Smt.) & Anr., (1997) 2 SCC 637.

In Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi Roy, AIR 1918 PC 102, a similar view had been taken by the Privy Council, referring to Illustration (f) of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In view of the above, it was the responsibility of the complainants to prove by adducing evidence of the official of the Post Office, Kanpur that the said letter had not been delivered to them. However, for the reasons best known to the prosecution such an exercise has not been undertaken.

34. The instant case is required to be examined from another angle also. The marriage took place on 1st December, 1978. The complainant party could not place any correspondence on record prior to February 1985 except letter dated 24th February, 1979 written by the deceased herself to her husband. However, it goes in favour of the appellants. Therefore, it is evident that the controversy arose only after the expiry of the period of more than 6 years from the date of marriage. It is quite possible that the dispute arose between the parties only because of the suspicion that the deceased had developed an illicit relationship with Kake. Had there been a demand of dowry or ill-treatment to her on any other ground by the appellants, there could have been some correspondence between the parties during the aforesaid long period of more than 6 years. None of the prosecution witnesses had made any allegation of any demand of dowry or ill treatment during the said earlier period. It is unnatural that after expiry of such a long period, the appellants suddenly became greedy and started demanding ornaments and for not meeting their demand, started ill treating the deceased to the extent that she had to commit suicide. Thus, the allegations made by the complainant party remained unnatural and improbable. More so, the demand had been only of a thin gold chain which could not be very expensive in those days, especially given the socio-economic status of all the parties. For the gold ornament worth such a petty amount after the expiry of a long period of about 6 = years, from the date of marriage, it is not natural that the appellants could treat the deceased with such cruelty that she was drawn to commit suicide.

35. It is a clear cut case of gross abuse of the dowry laws. We find it difficult to sustain the conviction of the appellants on the aforesaid counts based upon the inconsistent, embellished and improved statements of the witnesses, which materially contradict their respective statements recorded earlier. The High Court did not dislodge the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal. The High Court did not make any reference to the deposition of Dr. Daulatram Nekumal Gurubani (PW.10) in the cross-examination and dealt with the case very casually, adopting a very superficial approach to the whole matter and brushed aside the allegation of an illicit relationship for which there had been documentary evidence on record without recording any cogent reasons for the same. The High Court did not make any attempt to appreciate the evidence with accuracy and reversed the findings of the trial court which were based on the evidence on record and for which detailed reasons had been assigned.

36. In view of the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay, dated 29.4.2004, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 865 of 1987 is set aside. The judgment and order of the Trial court in Sessions Case No. 25/1986 dated 21.5.1987 is hereby restored. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds stand discharged..................................J.

(P. SATHASIVAM)

..............................

...J.

(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

New Delhi,

November 11 , 2010

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http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/664488/

Thursday, November 11, 2010

SC explains Double Jeopardy - Double jeopardy applies to same offence, not same facts

Bench: B S Reddy, S S Nijjar

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 782 OF 2007

Monica Bedi ...Appellant Versus

State of A.P. ...Respondent WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 784 OF 2007

Shaik Abdul Sattar ...Appellant Versus

State of A.P. ...Respondent WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 783 OF 2007

D. Gokari Saheb ...Appellant Versus

State of A.P. ...Respondent WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1357 OF 2007

Mohd. Yunis ...Appellant Versus

2

State of A.P. ...Respondent JUDGMENT

B. Sudershan Reddy, J :

1. These criminal appeals which are to be disposed of by a common order are directed against the common judgment of the High Court whereunder the High Court confirmed the conviction of the appellants under Section 120-B, 419 and 420 IPC and other provisions including under Section 13 (1) (d) read with 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. We shall later notice in detail the conviction and sentence as awarded by the courts below.

2. The Central Bureau of Investigation, SPE, Hyderabad, laid charge sheet against altogether 10 accused persons before the Special Judge for C.B.I. cases, Hyderabad in which Abu Salem Abdul Qayoom Ansari @ Abu Salem(A-1), Sameera Jumani w/o Abu Salem(A-2), Monica Bedi (A-3), 3

Chamundi Abdul Hameed (A-6) and Faizan Ahmed Sultan (A-10) were shown as absconders. The learned Special Judge took the charge sheet on file as C.C. No. 3 of 2005 and issued non-bailable warrants against A-1, A-2, A-3, A-6 and A-10. Case against A-1, A-2, A-6 and A-10 came to be separated and case proceeded against A-3, A-4, A-5, A-7, A- 8 and A-9.

3. The learned Special Judge upon consideration of the material made available framed the following charges against the accused persons:

i) for the offence under Section 120-B IPC against A-3 to A-5, A-7 to A-9;

ii) for the offence under Section 419 IPC against A-3; iii) for the offence under Section 419 r/w 109 IPC against A-4, A-5 and A-7 to A-9;

iv) for the offence under Section 468 IPC against A-5; v) for the offence under Section 420 IPC against A-8; vi) for the offence under Section 468 IPC against A-7; 4

vii) for the offence under Section 13 (1) (d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act against A-4, A-5, A-7 and A-8;

viii) for the offence under Section 12 of the Passports Act, 1967 against A-3;

ix) for the offence under Section 420 IPC against A-3; x) for the offence under Section 420 r/w 109 IPC against A-4, A-5, A-7 to A-9.

4. The prosecution in order to substantiate the charges examined altogether 38 witnesses and proved 79 documents. Exhibit D-1 to Exhibit D-4 were marked on behalf of the defence.

5. The learned trial judge upon appreciation of the evidence and material available on record found Monika Bedi (A-3 ) guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 120- B, 419 and 420 IPC but acquitted of the charge under Section 12 of the Passports Act, 1967; Shaik Abdul Sattar 5

(A-5) guilty of the offences under Sections 120-B, 419 r/w 109, 420 r/w 109, 468 IPC and Sections 13(1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act; Mohammed Yunis (A-7) guilty of the offence under Section 468 IPC and D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) guilty of the offences under Section 120B, 420, 419 r/w 109 IPC, 420 r/w 109 IPC and under Sections 13 (1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. A-3 was accordingly sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 120-B IPC; rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 420 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month and for the offence under Section 419 IPC; A-5 to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for 6

the offence under Section 120-B IPC; rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 419 r/w 109 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 420 r/w 109 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 468 IPC, and rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Sections 13 (1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. A-7 to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 468 IPC; A-8 to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence 7

under Section 120-B IPC; rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 419 r/w 109 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 420 r/w 109 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 420 IPC and rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Sections 13 (1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. All the substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently.

6. On appeal the High Court of Andhra Pradesh upon re- appreciation of evidence available on record confirmed the conviction of A-3 for the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 419 and 420 IPC but reduced the sentence from three years rigorous imprisonment to two years rigorous 8

imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 120B IPC, from five years rigorous imprisonment to three years rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 420 IPC and from three years rigorous imprisonment to two years rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 419 IPC while maintaining the fine imposed by the trial court. The High Court also confirmed the conviction of A-5 under each count but reduced the quantum of imprisonment from three years to one year for offences under each count under Sections 120- B, 419 r/w 109, 420 r/w 109, 468 IPC. However, his conviction and sentence imposed for the offences punishable under Section 13 (1) (d) read with 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was confirmed. That so far as A-7 is concerned the High Court while partly allowing the appeal modified the conviction from Section 468 IPC to that of one under Section 465 IPC and accordingly sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for three 9

months. That so far as A-8 is concerned the High Court confirmed his conviction under all counts but reduced the quantum of imprisonment from three years to one year for offences under each count under Section 120-B, 420, 419 r/w 109, 420 r/w 109, 468 IPC. However, his conviction and sentence imposed for the offences punishable under Section 13(1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was confirmed. Hence, these appeals.

Case of Prosecution:

7. In order to consider as to whether the High Court committed any error in convicting and sentencing the appellants as noted herein above, it may be just and necessary to briefly notice the case of the prosecution. The allegation against Accused No. 3 (appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 782/2007) is that she obtained a second passport in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal from the Regional Passport Office, Secunderabad by submitting false documents like residence certificate, educational certificate 10

with the help of A-4 to A-9. She used the passport to travel Lisbon, Portugal. The owner of M/s. Faizan Enterprises, Mumbai (A-10) is involved in the business of recruiting people for jobs in foreign countries. He gave 10 passport size photographs of A-1 to A-3 and fake names and documents to A-9 to secure passports falsely showing them as residents of Kurnool in the State of Andhra Pradesh. A-9 has relatives in Kurnool. He visited Kurnool in the month of March, 2001 and entrusted the work of securing passports of A-1 to A-3, to A-6 an unauthorized passport agent. At the instance of A-6, A-7 Mohammed Yunis, Mandal Revenue Inspector of Mandal Revenue Office, Kurnool issued a false residential certificates in the assumed names intended for the benefit of A-1 to A-3. A-6 procured fake transfer certificates purported to have been issued by the Headmaster, Zila Parishad High Court, Peddapadu, Kurnool District in the name of Ramil Kamil Malik and two fake memorandum of marks sheets in the names of Neha Asif Jafari and Sana Malik, purported to have been issued by the 11

Headmaster, Higher Elementary School, Kurnool, as a proof in support of date of birth. One Abdul Gaffar (PW-1) filled up three passport applications of A-1 to A-3 at the instance of A-6 and they were accordingly submitted in the Regional Passport Office, Secunderabad. The authorities accordingly sent the particulars mentioned in the forms to the office of Superintendent of Police, Kurnool which were received in the office on 16.5.2001 vide exhibit P-28 covering letter. A-5 (appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 784/07) at the relevant time was working as Writer-Head Constable in special branch. He submitted fake verification reports along with statements of six persons in support of character and conduct of A-1 to A-3 by portraying them as if they were the neighbours of A-1 to A-3. On receipt of reports, A-4 despatched them to Regional Passport Office, Secunderabad. It is on the basis of these reports, passports were accordingly issued to A-1 to A-3 in their assumed names and they were despatched by speed post to their respective address at Kurnool as indicated in the passport 12

applications. The passports were received at the Head Post Office, Kurnool through speed post. On 23.8.2001 two speed post articles addressed to the assumed names of A-2 and A- 3 were entrusted to PW-11 Babu Miah, a postman of Beat 2, for delivery of the same to the addressees. A-8 (D. Gokari Saheb appellant in criminal appeal no. 783/07) Postman, Head Post Office, Kurnool, approached PW-11 Babu Miah and collected the two speed post articles by giving his acknowledgement on the delivery slip list falsely representing that he knew the addresses and he would personally deliver the articles. On 27.8.2001 another speed post article containing passport in the assumed name of A-1 was entrusted to A-8 for delivery who in turn delivered it to one Aslam Khan, Cashier of Hotel Elite, Kurnool where A-6 was also working. A-6 sent two covers to A-9 on 23.8.2001 and 27.8.2001 in courier service.

8. We shall notice further details only so far as the appellants before us are concerned. Exhibit P1 is the index card of Sana Malik Kamal. ( assumed name for Monika 13

Bedi). PW-1 is the author of exhibit P1. PW-1 filled up exhibit P1 at the request of C.A. Hameed (A-6). PW-4 is the Superintendent in the Regional Passport Office, Secunderabad. He speaks of issuance of the passports in pursuance of passport application in the name of Sana Malik. PW-5 P. Krishna Mohan Reddy was the Mandal Revenue Officer, Kurnool Mandal who issued residence certificate dated 9.4.2001 in the name of Sana Malik Kamal based on false verification reports submitted by A-7 Mohammad Yunis. That as per exhibit P9 residence certificate, Sana Malik Kamal (assumed name of Monica Bedi) is stated to be residing at Babu Gounda Street, Kurnool. PW-6 at the relevant time was working as Deputy Educational Officer, Nandyal, Kurnool District who stated that there was no school by name of Hanuman Higher Elementary School, Kurnool wherein Sana Malik Kamal was alleged to have studied. PW-7 M. Lakshminarayana at the relevant time was the Junior Assistant in the District Police Office, Kurnool and he speaks of receiving applications for 14

verification of contents therein. According to him, A-4 ( G. Srinivas) who attended to passport inquiries, received the passport application of Sana Malik Kamal. After receipt of exhibit P15 enquiry report along with exhibits P16 and P17 statements submitted by A-5 S.A. Sattar, A-4 prepared the relevant report and forwarded the same to the Regional Passport Office, Secunderabad. Exhibit P18 is the letter addressed by the Superintendent of Police to the Regional Passport Office, Secunderabad reporting no objection for the grant of passport to the applicant. Rest of evidence relates to handing over of speed post articles relating to Babu Miah as per the instructions of the Head Post Master, Kurnool from whom A-8 Gokari Saheb took the speed post articles from him for being delivered to the addressees. PW-13 is the owner of the residential apartment wherein Monica Bedi (A-3) is alleged to have resided as tenant during the years 1995-1997. Rest of the details are not required to be noticed.

15

9. The learned Special judge for C.B.I. on a careful and meticulous appreciation of the evidence and material made available on record convicted the appellants as noted herein above. The High Court on re-appreciation of the evidence confirmed the conviction but modified the sentence as noted herein above.

Submissions:

10. Now we shall proceed to consider the submissions made by the learned senior counsel Shri K.T.S. Tulsi appearing on behalf of the appellant - Monica Bedi (A-3). The learned senior counsel submitted that the appellant has been tried and convicted by a competent court of jurisdiction at Lisbon for being in possession of fake passport and, therefore, her trial and conviction for possessing the same passport before the C.B.I. Court at Hyderabad amounts to double jeopardy and in violation of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and as well under Section 300 Cr.P.C. The learned senior counsel further submitted that there is no 16

evidence of appellant's involvement in any of offence whatsoever. His further submission was that the appellant has been denied the benefit of Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in as much as she has neither been given the benefit of the period of sentence undergone by her in Portugal nor has she been given the benefit of the complete period pursuant to sentence in Portugal i.e. after 18th September, 2004, which she is legally entitled to.

11. We have also heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Shaik Abdul Sattar (A-5), Mohd. Yunis (A-7) and D. Gokari Saheb (A-8).

12. Shri P.P. Malhotra, learned Additional Solicitor General and Shri I. Venkata Narayana, learned senior counsel supported the impugned judgment. Both of them have submitted that Article 20 (2) has no application whatsoever to the facts on hand.

Double Jeopardy

17

13. Now we shall take up the first contention of Shri Tulsi as to whether the appellant's guaranteed fundamental right under Article 20 (2) has been infringed? Article 20 (2) of the Constitution provides that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.

14. Article 20 (2) embodies a protection against a second trial and conviction for the same offence. The fundamental right guaranteed is the manifestation of a long struggle by the mankind for human rights. A similar guarantee is to be found in almost all civilised societies governed by rule of law. The well known maxim `nemo delset bis vexari pro eadem causa' embodies the well established common law rule that no one should be put on peril twice for the same offence. BLACKSTONE referred to this universal maxim of the common law of England that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence.

18

15. The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20 (2) has its roots in common law maxim nemo debet bis vexari - a man shall not be brought into danger for one and the same offence more than once. If a person is charged again for the same offence, he can plead, as a complete defence, his former conviction, or as it is technically expressed, take the plea of autrefois convict. This in essence is the common law principle. The corresponding provision in the American Constitution is enshrined in that part of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. The principle has been recognised in the existing law in India and is enacted in Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. This was the inspiration and background for incorporating sub- clause (2) into Article 20 of the Constitution. But the ambit and content of the guaranteed fundamental right are much narrower than those of the common law in England or the doctrine of `double jeopardy' in the American Constitution. 19

16. In Maqbool Hussain vs. The State of Bombay1, this Court explained the scope of the right guaranteed under Article 20 (2) and as to what is incorporated in it as "within its scope the plea of autrefois convict as known to the British jurisprudence or the plea of double jeopardy as it known to the American Constitution but circumscribed it by providing that there should be not only a prosecution but also a punishment in the first instance in order to operate as a bar to a second prosecution and punishment for the same offence." That in order for the protection of Article 20 (2) to be invoked by a person there must have been a prosecution and as well as punishment in respect of the same offence before a court of law of competent jurisdiction or a tribunal, required by law to decide the matters in controversy judicially on evidence. That the proceedings contemplated therein are in the nature of criminal proceedings before a court of law or a judicial tribunal and the prosecution in this context would mean an initiation or 1

(1953) SCR 730

20

starting of the proceedings of a criminal nature in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute which creates the offence and regulates the procedure. This principle is reiterated in S.A. Venkataraman vs. The Union of India & Anr.,2 wherein this Court observed that the words "prosecuted or punished" are not to be taken distributively so as to mean prosecuted or punished. Both the factors must co-exist in order that the operation of the clause may be attracted."

17. What is the meaning of expression used in Article 20 (2) "for the same offence"? What is prohibited under Article 20 (2) is, the second prosecution and conviction must be for the same offence. If the offences are distinct, there is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable. In Leo Roy Frey vs. Superintendent District Jail, Amritsar3, petitioners therein were found guilty under Section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act and the goods recovered from their possession were confiscated and heavy 2

(1954) SCR 1150

3

(1958) SCR 822

21

personal penalties imposed on them by the authority. Complaints thereafter were lodged by the authorities before the Additional District Magistrate under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code read with provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947 and the Sea Customs Act. The petitioners approached the Supreme Court for quashing of the proceedings pending against them in the court of Magistrate inter alia contending that in view of the provisions of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution they could not be prosecuted and punished twice over for the same offence and the proceedings pending before the Magistrate violated the protection afforded by Article 20 (2) of the Constitution. This Court rejected the contention and held that criminal conspiracy is an offence under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code but not so under the Sea Customs Act, and the petitioners were not and could not be charged with it before the Collector of Customs. It is an offence separate from the crime which it may have for its object and is complete even before the crime is attempted or completed, and even when 22

attempted or completed; it forms no ingredients of such crime. They are, therefore, quite separate offences. The Court relied on the view expressed by the United States, Supreme Court in United States vs. Rabinowith4. In The State of Bombay vs. S.L. Apte5, this Court laid down the law stating that if the offences were distinct there is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy as embodied in Article 20 (2) of the Constitution being applicable. It was the case where the accused were sought to be punished for the offence under Section 105, Insurance Act, after their trial and conviction for the offence under Section 409, Penal Code, this Court held that they were not sought to be punished for the same offence twice but for two distinct offences constituted or made up of different ingredients and therefore the bar of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution or Section 26 of the General Clause Act, 1897, was not applicable. This Court made it clear that the emphasis is not on the facts "alleged in the two complaints but rather on the 4

(1915) 238US 78.

5

(1961) 3 SCR 107

23

ingredients which constitute the two offences with which a person is charged." The ratio of the case is apparent from the following:

"To operate as a bar the second prosecution and the consequential punishment thereunder, must be for `the same offence'. The crucial requirement therefore for attracting the Article is that the offences are the same, i.e., they should be identical. If, however, the two offences are distinct, then notwithstanding that the allegations of fact in the two complaints might be substantially similar, the benefit of the ban cannot be invoked. It is, therefore, necessary to analyse and compare not the allegations in the two complaints but the ingredients of the two offences and see whether their identity is made out."

That the test to ascertain is whether two offences are the same and not the identity of the allegations but the identity of the ingredients of the offences.

It is thus clear that the same facts may give rise to different prosecutions and punishment and in such an event the protection afforded by Article 20 (2) is not available. It is settled law that a person can be prosecuted and punished more than once even on substantially same facts provided the ingredients of both the offences are totally different and 24

they did not form the same offence. In Bhagwan Swarup vs. State of Maharashtra6, the accused was convicted with regard to a conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust in respect of the funds of one Jupiter company. There was another prosecution against the accused for the conspiracy to lift the funds of another company, though its object was to cover the fraud committed in respect of the Jupiter company. This Court held that the defalcations made in the Jupiter may afford a motive for new conspiracy, but the two offences are distinct ones. Some accused may be common to both of them, "some of the facts proved to establish the Jupitor conspiracy may also have to be proved to support the motive for the second conspiracy. The question is whether that in itself would be sufficient to make the two conspiracies the one and the same offence. The ingredients of both the offences are totally different and do not form the same offence within the meaning of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution and, therefore, that Article has no relevance." 6

AIR 1965 SC 682

25

18. In State of Rajasthan vs. Hat Singh & Ors.7, this Court held that the Rajasthan Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987 provided for different offences and punishment for glorification of sati and for violation of prohibitory order against glorification of sati. They are not the same offences. While Section 5 of the said Act makes the commission of an act an offence and punishes the same; the provisions of Section 6 are preventive in nature and make provision for punishing contravention of prohibitory order so as to make the prevention effective. The two offences have different ingredients. This Court held:

"It is, therefore, concluded that in a given case, same set of facts may give rise to an offence punishable under Section 5 and Section 6 (3) both. There is nothing unconstitutional or illegal about it."

19. This appears to be the consistent view of the Supreme Court of the United States. In T.W. Morgan vs. Alfonso J. Devine @ Ollie Devine8, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that the court has settled that the test of identity of 7

(2003) 2 SCC 152

8

(1915) 237 U.S. 1153

26

offences is whether the same evidence is required to sustain them; if not, then the fact that both charges relate to and grow out of one transaction does not make a single offence where two are defined by the statutes.

20. In United States vs. Vito Lanza9, it is held that an act with respect to intoxicating liquor which is denounced as a crime by both the National and State sovereignties may be punished under the law of each sovereignty without infringing the provision of the 5th Amendment to the Federal Constitution against double jeopardy for the same offence. It is observed:

"An act denounced as a crime by both National and State sovereignties is an offence against the peace and dignity of both, and may be punished by each ..... We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject matter within the same territory. Each may, without interference by the other, enact laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation that no legislation can give validity to acts prohibited by the Amendment. Each government, in determining what shall be an offence against its peace and dignity, is 9

(1922) 260 U.S. 314

27

exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other."

21. Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior counsel in the present case before us mainly contended that the facts based on which the appellant (Monica Bedi) was prosecuted and punished by a competent court of jurisdiction at Lisbon and the facts based on which prosecution has been initiated resulting in conviction are the same and, therefore, the conviction of the appellant is in the teeth of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution and Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The submission is not well founded for the simple reason that the same set off facts can constitute offences under two different laws. An act or an omission can amount to and constitute an offence under IPC and at the same time constitute an offence under any other law. It needs no restatement that the bar to the punishment to the offender twice over for the same offence would arise only where the ingredients of both the offences are the same. 28

22. The question that falls for our consideration is, whether the appellant can be said to have satisfied all the conditions that are necessary to enable her to claim the protection of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution. The charges upon which the appellant has been convicted now, for the charges under the Indian Penal Code, we will presume for our present purpose that the allegations upon which these charges are based, proved, resulting in conviction and punishment of the appellant are substantially the same which formed the subject matter of prosecution and conviction under the penal provisions of Portugal law. But we have no doubt to hold that the punishment of the appellant is not for the same offence.

23. Be that as it may, there is no factual foundation laid as such by the appellant taking this plea before the trial court. Nothing is suggested to the Investigating Officer or to any of the witnesses that she is sought to be prosecuted and punished for the same offence for which she has been 29

charged and convicted by a competent court of jurisdiction at Lisbon. She did not even make any such statement in her examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. It is true that the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20 (2) of the Constitution is in the nature of an injunction against the State prohibiting it to prosecute and punish any person for the same offence more than ones but the initial burden is upon the accused to take the necessary plea and establish the same.

24. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edition, Volume-IX, the law is succinctly summarised on this aspect of the matter as:

"If the defendant pleads autrefois convict or autrefois acquit, the prosecution replies or demurs. If the prosecution replies, which is the usual course, a jury is sworn to try the issue(x). The onus of proving the plea is on the defendant (a). He may prove it by producing a certified copy of the record or proceedings of the alleged previous conviction or acquittal (b), and showing by such copy or by other evidence, if necessary, that he has been convicted or acquitted of the same, or practically the same, offence as that on which he has been arraigned (c), or that he 30

might on his former trial have been convicted of the offence on which he has been arraigned (d). The question for the jury on the issue is whether the defendant has previously been in jeopardy in respect of the charge on which he is arraigned (e), for the rule of law is that a person must not be put in peril twice for the same offence. The test is whether the former offence and the offence now charged have the same ingredients in the sense that the facts constituting the one are sufficient to justify a conviction of the other, not that the facts relied on by the Crown are the same in the two trials (f). "

25. However, having regard to the nature of the guaranteed right we have examined the judgment passed by a Constitutional Court, Lisbon ( a typed copy of the same made available by the learned senior counsel for the appellant - Monica Bedi which we believe to be a true copy) does not support the plea of the appellant. The Constitutional Court while considering the issue of extradition of the appellant and the nature of the trial undergone by her in Portugal observed:

[*]

"It is a fact that the appellant has been trialled in Portugal for committing an offence provided and punishable under article 256 of the penal 31

code. However, should any facts be found in that process and in that trial that would release her of any guilt regarding offences based upon which she is wanted by the requesting state, then it is not acceptable by means of a

restrictive and formal interpretation of a principle which is deemed to assume wider configurations to authorize her extradition to trial her for facts strongly linked and which may even coincide with those same offences.

In other words, it is not acceptable and it cannot be admitted that the appellant has been trialled and convicted in Portugal for the commission of the offence of use of forged documents, namely in a decision which

revealed in the analysis of the facts regarding the attainment of such documents (allegedly subsumed by India in the offences of corruption and association) that the appellant was not involved in those fact. Furthermore, it cannot be admitted that her extradition is authorized in order to trial her for committing such act. Extradition process which brings in contact a variety of legal systems and different forms of legal classification and of behaviour punishments, but which does not allow going deeper in those laws, as well as in the evidence based upon which the requests for extradition were made requires a wider interoperation of the principle of ne bis idem."

It is further observed:

32

"The Indian Union claims extradition of the appellants to trial her for the commission of an offence of criminal conspiracy. We consider that this offence has no correspondence in our legal and penal system and that it is not the object of an autonomous incrimination. As a matter of fact, it constitutes a from that could be classified as joint authorship;

...As a matter of fact, we consider that such arguments have no legal basis. Because the requesting state wants at any cost the

appellants extradition, it is clear that it is justifying its request by stating that criminal conspiracy as opposed to what the person to be extradited claims constitutes an autonomous incrimination.

However, careful analysis of the original version of article 120 B of the Indian Penal Code (included in the records, but attached herewith as documents no. 1 and which is incorrectly translated into Portuguese) allows one to conclude, with safety, that the type of

conspiracy described therein as being the conduct of someone who commits an offence associated with someone else (complicit), is not coincident with the incorporation of a stable organization, hierarchically defined and whose object is the commission of offences.

...Given that our judiciary authorities are convinced that the question under consideration is the charge against the appellant regarding offence subsumable under an offences of

criminal association which does not correspond to the Indian charges.

33

...it is not up to the constitutional court to interpret and set out the meaning of any provisions contained in the Indian Penal Code and establish on a final basis the scope of criminal conspiracy, given that this would transcend the object of constitutional rules control.

Taking into consideration the reasons stated in the appealed decision, one cannot accept the argument that the appealed courts interpretation of article 31, no. 2 of law 144/99 of 31st August was in the sense that the judge is not obliged to substantiate and explain (in the decision to extradite someone claimed for the commission of offences which do no fall within the range of offences provided under our legal system) the reasons why the offence should be appealed decision, the appellant could not have raised this unconstitutionality based on the different of legal qualification of the offences that the was charged with by both legal systems in concurrence. As a matter of fact, the question under consideration is the charge with different offences, one should note that, besides the fact that this statement does not faithfully reproduce what is said in the summary decision, the two subsequent paragraphs demonstrate that the real problem does not involve the facts but rather the different legal classification thereof." [* There are number of typographical errors and mistakes in construction of sentences and we did not correct the same and extracted as it is from the copy supplied.] 34

26. In the light of these findings and conclusions reached by the Constitutional Court at Lisbon and on a careful consideration of the entire matter and the facts placed before us, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant's plea of double jeopardy is wholly untenable and unsustainable. This point is accordingly answered against the appellant.

Merits:

27. Now we shall proceed to consider as to whether the courts below committed any error in convicting and sentencing the appellant for the charged offences? Is there no evidence against the appellant as contended by the learned senior counsel? It is fairly settled that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India normally does not interfere with the concurrent findings of facts arrived at by the courts below on proper appreciation of evidence. It is not the function of this Court to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute the 35

findings for that of the courts below unless it is clearly established that the findings and the conclusions so arrived at by the courts below are perverse and based on no evidence.

28. The simple case of the prosecution is that all the appellants entered into a conspiracy in order to secure a passport in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal, for the benefit of Monica Bedi so as to enable her to utilize the same to leave the country and travel abroad. There is no controversy whatsoever that Monica Bedi travelled abroad on the strength of the passport secured by her in the assumed name. She entered Portugal with the aid of passport standing in the name of Sana Malik Kamal for which she has to face the prosecution and suffer conviction and sentence in Portugal.

29. It is evident from the record that the involvement of the appellants is at two stages. Stage one is where Monica Bedi (A-3) and Mohd. Yunis (A-7) are involved in the pre- 36

passport application at the threshold and even before the preparation of application seeking the passport in the assumed name. Stage two is the involvement of Monica Bedi (A-3), Shaik Abdul Sattar (A-5) and D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) after the submission of passport application before the authorities. Exhibit P2 is the passport application submitted in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal which contains the photograph of Monica Bedi (A-3). Essential requirements for obtaining the passport are: (1) passport application; (2) proof of residence and (3) date of birth certificate as spoken to by PWs. 2, 3, 21 and 31. How these documents are obtained for the benefit of Monica Bedi has been clearly brought on record through a number of witnesses whose evidence remained unimpeached. It is Mohd. Yunis (A-7), the Mandal Revenue Inspector who verified the residence particulars of Sana Malik Kamal on the instructions of PW-5, Mandal Revenue Officer, Kurnool and submitted a false verification report based on which exhibit P9 residence certificate was issued by PW-5. PW-17 on 37

requisition from C.B.I officials once again got verified and issued exhibit P30 certificate to the effect that no person by name Sana Malik Kamal resides in the house as earlier submitted by Mohd. Yunis (A-7). PW-37 is the Investigating Officer who in his evidence stated that he verified the particulars of occupants of the said house in the presence of PW-27 (D.V. Ratnamaiah), Assistant Superintendent of Post Offices, Kurnool and found no such person named Sana Malik Kamal ever resided therein. It is based on this evidence the trial court and appellate court came to the right conclusion that the prosecution established its case that it is Mohd. Yunis (A-7) who gave false verification based on which exhibit P9 residence certificate was issued by PW-5 in the name of Sana Malik Kamal. The trial court convicted Mohd. Yunis (A-7) for the offence under Section 468 IPC which reads as under:

"468. Forgery for purpose of cheating. - Whoever commits forgery, intending that the document or electronic record forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall be 38

punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine." Section 463 defines forgery, which reads as under: "463. Forgery.- Whoever makes any false documents or false electronic record or part of a document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery."

30. The High Court came to the conclusion that in submitting the false verification report in respect of residence of Sana Malik Kamal he may not have been aware and knew that the certificate so obtained would be used for the purpose of securing the passport in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal. At any rate there is no evidence on that aspect of the matter. The High Court also came to the conclusion that by the time Mohd. Yunis (A-7) submitted a false verification there is nothing on record that he was hand in glove with the other accused for the purpose of 39

cheating. Be it noted that the High Court confirmed the acquittal of A-7 of the charge under Section 120B IPC. The High Court, accordingly, found that the proper offence made against him would be one for making forged document simplicitor punishable under Section 465 IPC. In our considered opinion, the High Court was not justified in convicting Mohd. Yunis (A-7) at all for it had found no case against the appellant made out under Section 120B IPC and further found that there is no evidence to assume that he was hand in glove with the other accused for the purpose of cheating. That there is no evidence that A-7 prepared false document with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud. The ingredients of Section 463 are not satisfied. In such an event the conviction of the appellant under Section 465 IPC is unsustainable.

40

31. That so far as D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) is concerned there is a clear evidence which has been properly appreciated by the courts below that he who took the article (envelop contained the passport) addressed to Sana Malik Kamal from PW-11 representing that he knew the addressee and deliver the same. The said article was actually entrusted to PW-11 for its delivery but D. Gokari Saheb (A- 8) took the same from PW-11 for delivery to Sana Malik Kamal - assumed name of Monica Bedi (A-3). The courts below found that D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) was aware of the contents of the article. It is under those circumstances the courts below came to the right conclusion that evidence available on record clearly establish that he participated in the conspiracy in securing the passport for Monica Bedi in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal. Thus the conviction of D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) for the charged offences is accordingly upheld. We do not find any reason whatsoever to interfere with the view taken by the High Court. However, the sentence of one year rigorous 41

imprisonment under each count awarded while maintaining the fine imposed by the trial court is reduced to that of 6 months rigorous imprisonment under each count while maintaining the fine amount.

32. Shaik Abdul Sattar (A-5) is the Head Constable who submitted exhibit P15 report. PW-7, PW-8 and PW-14 are the material witnesses examined by the prosecution to prove the accusations leveled against A-5. PW-7 at the relevant time was Junior Assistant in the District Police Office, Kurnool who speaks about entrustment of the verification of the passport application in respect of Sana Malik Kamal to A-5. He also speaks about A-5 submitting Exhibit P15 inquiry report together with statements of persons purported to have been recorded by him in exhibit P16 and P17. There is absolutely nothing on record to disbelieve the evidence of PW-7 who stated in his evidence that A-5 submitted exhibit P15 report knowing it to be a false one apart from certifying that Sana Malik Kamal was residing at that particular house in Kurnool and was not 42

involved in any civil and criminal cases and there was nothing adverse against her. PW-8 was working as Inspector of Police, District Special Branch, Kurnool who prepared exhibit P18 letter on the basis of exhibit P15 inquiry report submitted by A-5. PW-14 is the Sub-Inspector, District Special Branch, Kurnool who testified that A-5 submitted exhibit P15 report and it bears signature of A-5. The courts below held that the evidence of PW-7, PW-8 and PW-14 is cogent and consistent which in clear and categorical terms prove the fact that A-5 is the person who verified the passport application particulars of Sana Malik Kamal and submitted exhibit P15 inquiry report along with exhibit P16 and exhibit P17 enclosures. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that A-5 submitted a false report in order to enable Monica Bedi to secure a passport for herself in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal. His conviction for the charged offences is accordingly upheld. The High Court however, reduced the sentence awarded by the trial court to one year rigorous imprisonment under each count while 43

maintaining the fine imposed by the trial court. The sentence awarded under Section 13 (1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act has been confirmed. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we however, reduce the sentence to that of six months rigorous imprisonment under each count while maintaining the fine imposed by the trial court and the sentence to suffer imprisonment, in default, of payment of fine. Sentences are directed to run concurrently.

Case of Monica Bedi - Appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 782/2007:

33. So far as the appellant - Monica Bedi is concerned she is involved in the conspiracy as proved at both stages i.e. pre-passport application stage and post-passport application stage. The conspiracy itself has been hatched only with a view to secure a passport for Monica Bedi in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal. We do not find any merit in the submission of Shri Tulsi, learned senior counsel that there is 44

no evidence whatsoever against Monica Bedi to prove her involvement for the offence punishable under Sections 120B, 419 and 420 IPC. The sequence of events as unfolded by the evidence, which we do not want to recapitulate once again as we have noticed the same in detail in the preceding paragraphs, clearly prove the charges levelled against Monica Bedi. It is for her benefit that the entire conspiracy has been hatched involving more than one individual in order to secure a passport for her benefit enabling her to travel abroad in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal. There is no material based on which this Court is to differ with the findings and conclusions concurrently arrived at by the courts below.

Shri Tulsi, however, reiterated the submission which he made before the High Court that exhibit P50 is a Photostat copy of the passport in the name of Sana Malik Kamal and the same is inadmissible document as it is not authenticated by legal keeper as provided under Section 78 (6) of the Indian Evidence Act. The submission was that based on 45

such inadmissible document no prosecution could be launched and once it is to be held that the said document is not admissible the whole case of the prosecution collapses like a pack of cards. The High Court after elaborate consideration of the matter came to the right conclusion that Section 78 (6) of the Evidence Act, 1872 deals with public document of any other class in a foreign country. In the present case, the original of exhibit P50 is the passport issued by the competent authorities in this country and, therefore, Section 78 (6) has no application whatsoever to the facts of this case. The issuance of original of exhibit P50 passport is clearly proved. It is based on that passport Monica Bedi travelled abroad and entered Portugal for which she has to face a prosecution and suffer conviction and sentence. The prosecution cannot be held to be vitiated. We accordingly reject the contention and uphold the conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 120B, 419 and 420 IPC. The High Court, however, reduced the sentence of imprisonment imposed on the 46

appellant - Monica Bedi (A-3) as noticed in the preceding paragraphs. The High Court also held that she is entitled for set off of the periods of detention suffered by her in Lisbon i.e. from 18.9.2004 to 4.6.2005 and 3.11.2005 to 10.11.2005.

However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that she had undergone more than 2 = years of sentence, we consider it appropriate to reduce the sentence to that of already undergone by her while maintaining fine amount imposed by the courts below.

34. In the view we have taken it is not necessary to go into the question as to the interpretation of Section 428 Cr.P.C and her entitlement to set off against the sentence imposed on her.

Conclusion:

35. Criminal Appeal NO. 782 of 2007 ( Monica Bedi - A-3)

47

For all the aforesaid reasons, we confirm the conviction of Monica Bedi (A-3) under Sections 120B, 419 and 420 IPC. The sentence awarded under each count directed to run concurrently is reduced to that of the period already undergone by her while maintaining the sentence of fine awarded by the courts below. The bail bonds shall stand cancelled.

The appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed. Criminal Appeal NO. 784 of 2007 ( Shaik Abdul Sattar - A-5)

The conviction of Shaik Abdul Sattar (A-5) under Sections 120B, 419 r/w 109, 420 r/w 109 and 468 IPC and as well as under Section 13 (1) (d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is, accordingly, upheld. However, the sentence awarded under each count is reduced to that of six months rigorous imprisonment while maintaining the fine imposed by the courts below. Sentences 48

are directed to run concurrently. He shall surrender before the trial court to serve the remaining sentence, if any. The appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed. Criminal Appeal NO. 1357 of 2007 ( Mohd. Yunis - A- 7)

Mohd. Yunis (A-7) is acquitted for the offence under Section 465 IPC and sentence awarded is set aside. The bail bonds shall stand cancelled.

The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.

Criminal Appeal NO. 783 of 2007 ( D. Gokari Saheb - A-8)

The conviction of D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) under Sections 120B, 419 r/w 109, 420 r/w 109 and 468 IPC and as well as under Section 13 (1) (d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is, accordingly, upheld. However, the sentence awarded under each count is reduced to that of six months rigorous imprisonment while 49

maintaining the fine imposed by the courts below. Sentences are directed to run concurrently. He shall surrender before the trial court to serve the remaining sentence, if any. The appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed. ..................................

........J.

(B. SUDERSHAN REDDY)

..........................................J. (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)

New Delhi,

November 09, 2010.

http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1104661/