Showing posts with label misuse. Show all posts
Showing posts with label misuse. Show all posts

Sunday, July 27, 2014

Govt mulls amendments to anti-dowry law to add clause for misuse of ipc 498a

Govt mulls amendments to anti-dowry law to add clause for misuse of ipc 498a

As on PTI | Jul 27, 2014, 10.26 AM IST

NEW DELHI: Keeping in view the rising number of complaints regarding the misuse of anti-dowry law, Centre is mulling to introduce penal provisions in the act that will ensure punishment or penalty to those who make false charges.

The Union ministry of women and child development is also contemplating giving more teeth to the Dowry Prohibition Act by strengthening the existing provisions and widening the definition of 'dowry'.

"Recently, a rise in the incidents of misuse of the anti-dowry law has come to the notice of the ministry. In some cases, women falsely implicate their husbands and in-laws for various other reasons.

"If the allegations turn out to be false, the case gets closed. So there are discussions going on about changing some provisions under which the misuse of the act may invite punishment or penalty," an official in the ministry said.

Earlier this month, the Supreme Court had directed the state governments to instruct police "not to automatically arrest when a case under Section 498A of IPC (dowry harassment) is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down flowing from Section 41 of Criminal Procedure Code".

While giving the direction, the apex court had expressed concern over the misuse of the anti-dowry law by "disgruntled" wives against her husband and in-laws and noted that the act was being increasingly used to harass in-laws.

According to ministry officials, the amendments may include widening the definition of 'dowry' by changing the words 'in connection with marriage' to 'given before the marriage, at the time of marriage and at any time after the marriage'.

 The officials said that there was also "a proposal to link certain provisions of the Domestic Violence Act to the Dowry Prohibition Act to provide quick relief".

Notifying the list of gifts exchanged during the wedding may also be made a mandatory and failure to do so could invite heavy penalties including a three-year jail term not only to the bride and the groom but also to their parents.

"Notification of the gifts during the wedding will help in checking any claim from being made later that they were part of dowry," the officials said.

In addition to this, a new clause may be incorporated which will provide an aggrieved woman the opportunity to file her case either at the place where the offence was committed or where she permanently or temporarily resides, they said.

The National Commission for Women (NCW) had also proposed recommendations to amend the Dowry Prohibition Act in 2009.

Source-http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Govt-mulls-amendments-to-anti-dowry-law/articleshow/39095407.cms


Sunday, November 24, 2013

Delhi High Court - Truth losing significance because of the ego of the litigants to see that in-laws should be hanged - Misuse abuse of 498a 304B

Delhi High Court - Truth losing significance because of the ego of the litigants to see that in-laws should be hanged - Misuse abuse of 498a 304B  



IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

BAIL APPLN.1036/2013
Reserved on : 29 th October, 2013
Date of decision : 19 th November, 2013

BISHAN DASS DURGA    ..... Petitioner
Through :  Mr. Anurag Jain, Adv.

versus

STATE NCT OF DELHI      ..... Respondent
Through :  Mr. Karan Singh, APP.
Mr. Sanjay Suri, Adv. for complainant.
S.I. Gopal, P.S. Shakar Pur,  Delhi.

CORAM :-HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.R. MIDHA

JUDGMENT

1.  The petitioner  is seeking regular bail in FIR No.835/2012 under  Sections 498A/304B/34 IPC and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

2.  The petitioner is the father-in-law of  Payal.  On 12 th November, 2012  at about 6:00 am, the petitioner  found Payal hanging from the ceiling fan whereupon he  immediately  informed the complainant, Naresh Batra (father of Payal) who  along with his wife,  son  and  daughter  reached the petitioner‟s house. The deceased was taken to Shanti Mukund Hospital where she was declared dead.  The complainant lodged the FIR in which he made allegations of harassment and demands against the accused persons. It was alleged that the deceased was beaten by her husband and  mother-in-law. It was further alleged that money and gifts were demanded within 10-15 days of marriage; separate house was demanded  for son-in-law and recently Renault Duster  was demanded.  As per the post-mortem report, the cause  of death is asphyxia due to ante-mortem hanging.

3.  On 1st May, 2013, the police filed the chargesheet after investigation against the petitioner  and the aforesaid family members of the petitioner. 

4.  The hearing of this  bail application  was deferred from time to time  till  the  recording of the  statements  of the six material witnesses by the Trial Court. The statement of all the six material witnesses have now  been recorded. Copies of the statements have been placed on record by the petitioner. 

5.  PW-1, Jasvinder Maakheja, an independent material witness,lives on the second floor of the building in which the accused persons  are  residing. On the fateful morning of 12th November, 2012, PW-1 went to the third floor and saw Payal hanging from the ceiling fan. PW-1 told the accused persons to bring down the body whereupon the accused  -  Saurabh cut  the  „chunni‟ and brought down the dead body and kept it on the bed.  PW-1  tried to revive the deceased by pressing her chest while accused - Gaurav gave her mouth to mouth  resuscitation. PW-1  informed the police.  The parents and the other family members of Payal reached the accused persons‟  residence  within five minutes. PW-1  accompanied the body of Payal to the hospital.  PW-1 deposed that Gaurav (husband of the deceased) tried to revive Payal many times on the way to the hospital.

6.  PW-1 to PW-6 have made some important admissions in their cross-examination.  PW-2 to PW-5  deposed  that Payal knew Gaurav before marriage and they worked together on various projects of interior decoration before and after marriage. PW-6, Jagdeep Madan,  deposed that  Payal and Gaurav  had a  love affair which resulted in their marriage. PW 6 deposed that Payal told her that she had not told anything to her parents and she had married Gaurav against their wishes. PW-1  deposed  that accused had a Honda City Car, two motorcycles and a scooter prior to the marriage of Payal. The motorcycles and scooter were used by the sons of the petitioner and one more bike was purchased by the petitioner after the marriage of Payal. PW-2 also  deposed  that the accused had a Honda City car and bikes. PW-2  deposed  that Gaurav was having a furniture showroom in Geeta Colony.  PW-1 deposed  that Payal never complained of dowry demands, harassment or torture though she demanded separation from her in laws one-and-a-half months before her death. PW-1 further deposed  that he never saw any quarrel between the deceased and her in-laws and Payal being beaten up by the accused persons. PW-2 further deposed that he never made any complaint during the lifetime of Payal to any authority for harassment or demands.    

7.  PW-2 to 5 are the father, mother, brother and sister of the deceased, made material improvements in their deposition made before the Court vis-à-vis the statement made to the police/SDM earlier. They were confronted with their previous statements at the time of cross-examination.  The following improvements were made by the aforesaid witnesses:-

-  The demand of more gifts was made on Holi as the gifts were not enough to distribute among relatives on Holi.
-  The mother-in-law taunted  Payal that her family  just came to have dinner on her birthday without any gifts for them
-  On the occasion of “Nirjala Ekadashi”,  the  mother-in-law was not happy on seeing the  fruits, clothes and cash  sent by the father of the deceased  and she questioned  the deceased  what Gaurav saw in  Payal  and that she could get 20 others like her for Gaurav.
-  The deceased was beaten up by her husband on the road and that the deceased came to her parent‟s house and two days  later,the petitioner with Gaurav came to the parent‟s house   and apologized and assured that demands of car and bikes would not be made and took the deceased back.
-  Three to four months after the marriage,  on  Raksha Bandhan suits,  diamond ring and  Rs.5,100/-  were given to Payal and Gaurav whereupon  Payal‟s  brothers-in-law argued and quarreled with her that they had not got anything for them.
-  The petitioner, his wife and Gaurav demanded  a Duster Car and brothers-in-law demanded motor cycles.
-  PW-4 took dry fruits, sweets, Rs.2,100/-  for Gaurav,  Rs.1,100/-for other family members and a fully automatic washing machine on Diwali to which the mother-in-law quarreled with Payal about gold coins and clothes not being given and that PW 4 assured that the same would be given next morning. 

8.  The defence  set up by  the accused  in  the cross-examination of the six witnesses is that Gaurav and Payal were having a love affair for more than three-and-a-half years; Payal‟s father came to know of the said love affair about  two to  three months before the marriage; Gaurav‟s family approached Payal‟s family for marriage in pursuance to which  Gaurav and Payal got married on  23
rdFebruary, 2012;  Payal was insisting her husband to separate from the joint family house  immediately  to which Gaurav was  not agreeable  as he wanted to  separate  after Diwali;  Payal was a stubborn,  aggressive and emotional girl;  Payal wanted to lead an independent modern life with her husband separate from her in laws;  Payal attempted to commit suicide  twice  before;  Payal purchased Phenyl for committing suicide if Gaurav did not separate from the joint family;  Payal committed suicide because of her obstinacy for shifting immediately; Payal‟s sister also threatened to
commit suicide as she did not want to stay with her husband;  the accused  persons have  furniture showrooms  at Geeta Colony,  New Lahore Colony, Shastri Nagar,  a house at Anarkali  and a plot allotted by DDA at Rohini  besides the 200 sq. yard house at Bank Enclave; the interior decoration of the house of accused was done by Payal;  the  relationship between Payal and the accused were cordial;  the atmosphere at the joint family house was calm and cordial;  photographs show Payal being happy with Gaurav and the other accused persons in various events;  Payal is shown feeding cake to Himanshu  in  a  clipping of Himanshu‟s (one of the coaccused and brother-in-law of Payal) birthday on 21st August, 2012;  Payal stayed with her mother-in-law for her cataract operation at the Centre for  Sight  for three days;  the complainant and his family have  leveled false allegations against the accused persons regarding demand of dowry and torture out of emotion and vengeance;  the complainant engaged a private counsel from the very beginning; the complainant‟s family gave statements to the police after consulting a lawyer and taking advise from the police.

9.  In  Narender Singh Arora  v.  State, 2010 (173) DLT 244, this Court noted that whenever a woman dies an unnatural death within seven years of her marriage at in-laws' house, whatever be the cause of death, the  parents of the deceased want the  in-laws  to be hanged. This Court observed truth is losing significance because of the ego of the litigants to see that in-laws should be hanged.This Court further observed that normally in-laws are convicted on the  testimonies of parents of the girl who, in a fit of anger or because they had lost their daughter, are not prepared to believe that their daughter could commit suicide for any other reason. The testimony given by the complainant in such cases is not a normal testimony. The deceased‟s father and other family members who deposed in the court testified after the death of their daughter and their testimony is coloured with the loss they suffered due to sudden death of the daughter little realizing that she committed suicide not because of dowry demands but could be because of her fragile and sensitive nature.This Court  further  observed  that suicide is a known phenomenon of human nature. Suicides are committed by living human beings for various reasons, some are  not able to bear the normal stresses which are common in life; some are not able to cope up with the circumstances in which they are placed; and some commit suicide because of frustration of not achieving the desired goals. There are many cases where students commit suicide because they failed to achieve certain percentage of marks. Some commit suicide because they are not able to retain top position, some commit suicide because they are not able to cope with the demands of life. Some commit suicide because they suffer sudden loss, some commit suicide out of fear of being caught. There are various reasons for which suicides are committed by men and women. All suicides are unnatural deaths. Suicide is a complex phenomenon. One, who commits suicide, is not alive to disclose as to what was going on in his or her mind when he or she committed suicide. There is no presumption that every suicide committed by a married woman in her in-laws' house or at her parents' house has to be because she was suffering harassment at the hands of her husband or her in-laws.
10.  In  Hari Gopal Wadhwa  v.  State, (143) 2007 DLT 210, this Court observed that no doubt, an unnatural death is always a cause for concern and if proved that the daughter-in-law of the family was compelled to take her own life as it was rendered not worth living by the in-laws, they must suffer. But personal liberties have to be preserved, meaning thereby, in an appropriate case, accused has to be set free till trial concludes.

11.  On careful examination of the statements of the six witnesses, this Court is of the prima facie view that although it is difficult to say ultimately what shape  the trial would take after completion of the entire evidence, but if ultimately it is found on evidence that Payal was a very sensitive person and committed suicide because she could not bear the pressure of living in joint family, the possibility of the  petitioner succeeding in establishing their defence cannot be ruled out.

12.  The petitioner as well as four other family members namely, his wife  and  three  sons  including the husband of the deceased  are in custody since 13th November, 2012.

13.  The petitioner  himself had informed the complainant about the demise of Payal without any delay.

14.  There was no ante-mortem injury on the  body  of the deceased.

15.  There is no possibility of the petitioner influencing any witness  since the statements of the six material  witnesses have already been recorded by the learned Trial Court.

16.  There is no material to show that if released on bail, the petitioner will misuse the liberty granted to him to subvert the justice.

17.  In view of the aforesaid, the bail application is allowed  and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail on his furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs.1,00,000/-  with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the concerned Court. The petitioner is directed to surrender his passport, if any, with the Trial Court and  he  shall not leave the country  without  prior permission of the Court.

18.  All  observations made hereinabove for the purpose of dealing with the bail application  and  shall not  be considered at the time of trial of the case.

19.  Dasti.
J.R. MIDHA, J.
NOVEMBER 19, 2013

Tuesday, October 29, 2013

Supreme court Quashes says Courts should be cautious in implicating family members’ in dowry case

Supreme court Quashes says Courts should be cautious in implicating family members’ in dowry case 

Supreme Court of India Geeta Mehrotra & Anr. vs State Of U.P. & Anr. on 17 October, 2012

Author: G S MisraBench: T.S. Thakur, Gyan Sudha Misra, , , ,

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCRIMINAL

 APPEAL NO. 1674 OF 2012(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 10547/2010)

Geeta Mehrotra & Anr. ..Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. . Respondents

Geeta Mehrotra & Anr. vs State Of U.P. & Anr. on 17 October, 2012
Head Note:-
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 482 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 323, 498A, 504 and 506 - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - Sections 3 and 4 - Quashing of FIR - Family members of a person should not be implicated in a dowry case just because their names have been mentioned in the complaint without any specific allegation levelled against them.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 482 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 323, 498A, 504 and 506 - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - Sections 3 and 4 - Quashing of FIRMere casual reference of the names of the family members in a matrimonial dispute without allegation of active involvement in the matter would not justify taking cognizance against them.  
Held:- The courts are expected to adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing specially in cases of matrimonial dispute whether the FIR in fact discloses commission of an offence by the relatives or the FIR prima facie discloses a case of over-implication by involving the entire family at instance of the complainant, who is out to settle her scores arising out of teething problem or skirmish of domestic bickering while settling down in her new matrimonial surrounding.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 482 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 323, 498A, 504 and 506 - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - Sections 3 and 4 - Quashing of FIR - Family members should not be implicated unless FIR discloses specific allegations against the relatives who are prima facie not found to have indulged in physical and mental torture of the complainant-wife. 
Held:- If the FIR as it stands does not disclose specific allegation against accused more so against the co-accused specially in a matter arising out of matrimonial bickering, it would be clear abuse of legal and judicial process to mechanically send the named accused in the FIR to undergo trial.
Practice and ProcedureQuashing of FIR - If the FIR did not disclose the commission of an offence, the court would be justified in quashing the proceedings preventing the abuse of the process of law.
J U D G M E N T

GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J .
1. This appeal by special leave in which we granted leave has been filed by the appellants against the order dated 6.9.2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Crl. Miscellaneous Application No.22714/2007 whereby the High Court had been pleased to dispose of the application moved by the appellants under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance against the appellants under Sections 498A/323/504/506 IPC read with Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act with an observation that the question of territorial jurisdiction cannot be properly decided by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for want of adequate facts. It was, therefore, left open to the appellants to move the trial court for dropping the proceedings on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The High Court however granted interim protection to the appellants by directing the authorities not to issue coercive process against the appellants until disposal of the application filed by the appellants with a further direction to the trial court to dispose of the application if moved by the appellants, within a period of two months from the date of moving the application. The application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was thus disposed of by the High Court.
2. The appellants in spite of the liberty granted to them to move the trial court, have filed this appeal for quashing the proceedings which had been initiated on the basis of a case lodged by the respondent No.2 Smt. Shipra Mehrotra (earlier known as Shipra Seth) againsther husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-inlaw and sister-in-law. This appeal has been preferred by the sister-in-law, who is appellant No.1 and brotherin- law of the complainant, who is appellant No.2.
3. The case emerges out of the first information report lodged by respondent No.2 Smt. Shipra Mehrotra under Sections 498A/323/504/506 IPC read with Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act bearing F.I.R.No. 52/2004. The F.I.R. was registered at Mahila Thana Daraganj, Allahabad wherein the complainant alleged that she was married to Shyamji Mehrotra s/o Balbir Saran who was living at Eros Garden, Charmswood Village, Faridabad, Suraj Kund Road at Faridabad Haryana as per the Hindu marriage rites and customs. Prior to marriage the complainant and her family members were told by Shyamji Mehrotra and his elder brother Ramji Mehrotra who is appellant No.2 herein and their mother Smt. Kamla Mehrotra and her sister Geeta Mehrotra who is appellant No.1 herein that Shyamji is employed as a Team Leader in a top I.T. Company in Chennai and is getting salary ofRs.45,000/- per month. After negotiation between the parents of the complainant and the accused parties, the marriage of the complainant Shipra Seth (later Shipra Mehrotra) and Shyamji Mehrotra was performed after which the respondent-complainant left for the house of her in-laws.
4. It was stated that the atmosphere in the house was peaceful for sometime but soon after the wedding, when all the relatives left, the maid who cooked meals was first of all paid-off by the aforesaid four persons who then told the complainant that from now onwards, the complainant will have to prepare food for the family. In addition, the above mentioned people started taunting and scolding her on trivial issues. The complainant also came to know that Shyamji was not employed anywhere and always stayed in the house. Shyamji gradually took away all the money which the complainant had with her and then told her that her father had not given dowry properly, therefore, she should get Rupees five lakhs from her father in order to enable him to start business, because he was notgetting any job. When the complainant clearly declined and stated that she will not ask her parents for money, Shyamji, on instigation of other accused-family members, started beating her occasionally. To escape every day torture and financial status of the family, the complainant took up a job in a Call Centre at Convergys on 17.2.2003 where the complainant had to do night shifts due to which she used to come back home at around 3 a.m. in the morning. Just on her return from work, the household people started playing bhajan cassettes after which she had to getup at 7’o clock in the morning to prepare and serve food to all the members in the family. Often on falling asleep in the morning, Shyamji, Kamla Devi and Geeta Mehrotra tortured the complainant every day mentally and physically. Ramji Mehrotra often provoked the other three family members to torture and often used to make the complainant feel sad by making inappropriate statements about the complainant and her parents. Her husband Shyamji also took away the salary from the complainant.
5. After persistent efforts, Shyamji finally got a job in Chennai and he went to Chennai for the job in May, 2003. But, it is alleged that there was no change in his behaviour even after going to Chennai. The complainant often called him on phone to talk to him but he always did irrelevant conversation. He never spoke properly with the complainant whenever he visited home and often used to hurl filthy abuses. The complainant states that she often wept and tolerated the tortures of the accused persons for a long time but did not complain to her family members, as that would have made them feel sad. At last, when the complainant realized that even her life was in danger, she was compelled to tell everything to her father on phone who was very upset on hearing her woes. On 15.7.2003 complainant heard some conversation of her mother-inlaw and sister-in-law from which it appeared to her that they want to kill the complainant in the night only. Thereupon the complainant apprised her father of the situation on phone to which her father replied that he will call back her father-in-law and she should go withhim immediately and he will come in the morning. The father-in-law Satish Dhawan and his wife who were living in NOIDA thereafter came in the night and somehow took the complainant to their home who also came to know of everything. The complainant’s father and brother later went to her matrimonial home on 16.7.2003. On seeing her father and brother, Kamla Mehrotra and Geeta Mehrotra started speaking loudly and started saying that Shyamji would be coming by the evening and so he should come in the evening for talking to them. Her father and brother then went away from there. That very day, her husband Shyamji and brother-in-law Ramji also reached home. On reaching there, Shyamji abused her on phone and told her to send her father.
6. When father and brother of the complainant went home in the evening, they were also insulted by all the four and video camera and tape were played and in the end they were told that they should leave from here. Insulted, they came back from there and then came back to Allahabad with the complainant. For manydays the complainant and her family members hoped that the situation would improve if the matter was resolved. Many times other people tried to persuade the in – laws but to no avail. Her brother went to their house to talk to her in – laws but it came to his knowledge that the in – laws had changed their house. After much effort, they came to know that the father-inlaw and mother-in-law started living at B-39, Brahma cooperative group housing society, block 7, sector-7, Dwarka, Delhi. On 19.09.04 evening, her father talked to Kamla Mehrotra and Geeta Mehrotra regarding the complainant using bad words and it was said that if her daughter came there she will be kicked out. After some time Shyamji rang up at complainant’s home but on hearing the complainant’s voice, he told her abusively that now she should not come his way and she should tell her father not to phone him in future. At approximately 10:30 pm in the night Ramji’s phone came to the complainant’s home. He used bad words while talking to her father and in the end said that he had got papers prepared in his defence and he may dowhatever he could but if he could afford to give Rs.10 lakhs then it should be conveyed after which he will reconsider the matter. If the girl was sent to his place without money, then even her dead body will not be found.
7. On hearing these talks of the accused, the complainant believed that her in-laws will not let the complainant enter their home without taking ten lakhs and if the complainant went there on her own, she will not be safe. Hence, she lodged the report wherein she prayed that the SHO Daraganj should be ordered to do the needful after registering the case against the accused Shyam Mehrotra, Ramji Mehrotra, Kamla Mehrotra and Geeta Mehrotra. Thus, in substance, the complainant related the bickering at her matrimonial home which made her life miserable in several ways and compelled her to leave her in-law’s place in order to live with her father where she lodged a police case as stated hereinbefore.
8. On the basis of the complaint, the investigating authorities at P.S. Daraganj, Allahabadstarted investigation of the case and thereafter the police submitted chargesheet against the appellants and other family members of the complainant’s husband.
9. Hence, the appellants who are sister and brother of the complainant’s husband filed petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the chargesheet and the entire proceedings pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Court No.IV, Allahabad, inter-alia, on the ground that FIR has been lodged with mala fide intentions to harass the appellants and that no case was made out against the appellants as well as other family members. But the principal ground of challenge to the FIR was that the incident although was alleged to have taken place at Faridabad and the investigation should have been done there only, the complainant with mala fide intention in connivance with the father of the complainant, got the investigating officer to record the statements by visiting Ghaziabad which was beyond his territorial jurisdiction and cannot be construed as legal and proper investigation. It was also alleged that the father of thecomplainant got the arrest warrant issued through George Town Police Station, Allahabad, in spite of the cause of action having arisen at Allahabad.
10. This appeal has been preferred by Kumari Geeta Mehrotra i.e. the sister of the complainant’s husband and Ramji Mehrotra i.e. the elder brother of the complainant’s husband assailing the order of the High Court and it was submitted that the Hon’ble High Court ought to have appreciated that the complainant who had already obtained an ex-parte decree of divorce, is pursuing the present case through her father with the sole purpose to unnecessarily harass the appellants to extract money from them as all efforts of mediation had failed.
11. However, the grounds of challenge before this Court to the order of the High Court, inter alia is that the High Court had failed to appreciate that the investigation had been done by the authority without following due process of law which also lacked territorial jurisdiction. The relevant documents/parcha diary for deciding the territorial jurisdiction had been overlookedas the FIR has been lodged at Allahabad although the cause of action of the entire incident is alleged to have taken place at Faridabad (Haryana). It was, therefore, submitted that the investigating authorities of the Allahabad have traversed beyond the territorial limits which is clearly an abuse of the process of law and the High Court has failed to exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the facts and circumstances of this case and allowed the proceedings to go on before the trial court although it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
12. It was further averred that the High Court had failed to examine the facts of the FIR to see whether the facts stated in the FIR constitute any prima facie case making out an offence against the sister-inlaw and brother-in-law of the complainant and whether there was at all any material to constitute an offence against the appellants and their family members. Attention of this Court was further invited to the contradictions in the statement of the complainant and her father which indicate material contradictionsindicating that the complainant and her father have concocted the story to implicate the appellants as well as all their family members in a criminal case merely with a mala fide intention to settle her scores and extract money from the family of her ex-husband Shyamji Mehrotra and his family members.
13. On a perusal of the complaint and other materials on record as also analysis of the arguments advanced by the contesting parties in the light of the settled principles of law reflected in a catena of decisions, it is apparent that the High Court has not applied its mind on the question as to whether the case was fit to be quashed against the appellants and has merely disposed of the petition granting liberty to the appellants to move the trial court and raise contentions on the ground as to whether it has territorial jurisdiction to continue with the trial in the light of the averment that no part of the cause of action had arisen at Allahabad and the entire incident even as per the FIR had taken place at Faridabad.
14. The High Court further overlooked the fact that during the pendency of this case, the complainantrespondent No.2 has obtained an ex-parte decree of divorce against her husband Shyamji Mehrotra and the High Court failed to apply its mind whether any case could be held to have been made out against Kumari Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra, who are the unmarried sister and elder brother of the complainant’s ex-husband. Facts of the FIR even as it stands indicate that although a prima facie case against the husband Shyamji Mehrotra and some other accused persons may or may not be constituted, it surely appears to be a case where no ingredients making out a case against the unmarried sister of the accused Shyamji Mehrotra and his brother Ramji Mehrotra appear to be existing for even when the complainant came to her in-law’s house after her wedding, she has alleged physical and mental torture by stating in general that she had been ordered to do household activities of cooking meals for the whole family. But there appears to be no specific allegation against the sister and brother of thecomplainant’s husband as to how they could be implicated into the mutual bickering between the complainant and her husband Shyamji Mehrotra including his parents.
15. Under the facts and circumstance of similar nature in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2005) SCC (Crl.) 735 at 738 allegations were made in a complaint against the husband, the in-laws, husband’s brother and sister who were all the petitioners before the High Court wherein after registration of the F.I.R. and investigation, the charge sheet was filed by the Inspector of Police in the court of Judicial Magistrate III, Trichy. Thereupon, the learned magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued warrants against the appellants on 13.2.2002. Four of the accused-appellants were arrested and released on bail by the magistrate at Mumbai. The appellants had filed petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. before the Madras High Court for quashing the proceedings in complaint case on the file of the Judicial Magistrate III, Trichy. The High Court by the impugnedorder dismissed the petition observing that the grounds raised by the petitioners were all subject matters to be heard by the trial court for better appreciation after conducting full trial as the High Court was of the view that it was only desirable to dismiss the criminal original petition and the same was also dismissed. However, the High Court had directed the Magistrate to dispense with the personal attendance of the appellants.
16. Aggrieved by the order of the Madras High Court dismissing the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the special leave petition was filed in this Court giving rise to the appeals therein where threefold contentions were raised viz., (i) that the allegations are frivolous and without any basis; (ii) even according to the FIR, no incriminating acts were done within the jurisdiction of Trichy Police Station and the court at Trichy and, therefore, the learned magistrate lacked territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and (iii) taking cognizance of the alleged offence at that stage was barred under Section 468(1) Cr.P.C. as it wasbeyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 468(2) Cr.P.C. Apart from the subsequent two contentions, it was urged that the allegations under the FIR do not make out any offence of which cognizance could be taken.
17. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in this matter had been pleased to hold that the bald allegations made against the sister in law by the complainant appeared to suggest the anxiety of the informant to rope in as many of the husband’s relatives as possible. It was held that neither the FIR nor the charge sheet furnished the legal basis for the magistrate to take cognizance of the offences alleged against the appellants. The learned Judges were pleased to hold that looking to the allegations in the FIR and the contents of the charge sheet, none of the alleged offences under Section 498 A, 406 and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act were made against the married sister of the complainant’s husband who was undisputedly not living with the family of the complainant’s husband. Their Lordships of theSupreme Court were pleased to hold that the High Court ought not to have relegated the sister in law to the ordeal of trial. Accordingly, the proceedings against the appellants were quashed and the appeal was allowed.
18. In so far as the plea of territorial jurisdiction is concerned, it is no doubt true that the High Court was correct to the extent that the question of territorial jurisdiction could be decided by the trial court itself. But this ground was just one of the grounds to quash the proceedings initiated against the appellants under Section 482 Cr.P.C. wherein it was also alleged that no prima facie case was made out against the appellants for initiating the proceedings under the Dowry Prohibition Act and other provisions of the IPC. The High Court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction in so far as the consideration of the case of the appellants are concerned, who are only brother and sister of the complainant’s husband and are not alleged even by the complainant to have demanded dowry from her. The High Court, therefore, ought to have considered thateven if the trial court at Allahabad had the jurisdiction to hold the trial, the question still remained as to whether the trial against the brother and sister of the husband was fit to be continued and whether that would amount to abuse of the process of the court.
19. Coming to the facts of this case, when the contents of the FIR is perused, it is apparent that there are no allegations against Kumari Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra except casual reference of their names who have been included in the FIR but mere casual reference of the names of the family members in a matrimonial dispute without allegation of active involvement in the matter would not justify taking cognizance against them overlooking the fact borne out of experience that there is a tendency to involve the entire family members of the household in the domestic quarrel taking place in a matrimonial dispute specially if it happens soon after the wedding.
20. It would be relevant at this stage to take note of an apt observation of this Court recorded in the matter of G.V. Rao vs. L.H.V. Prasad & Ors. reportedin (2000) 3 SCC 693 wherein also in a matrimonial dispute, this Court had held that the High Court should have quashed the complaint arising out of a matrimonial dispute wherein all family members had been roped into the matrimonial litigation which was quashed and set aside. Their Lordships observed therein with which we entirely agree that:
“there has been an outburst of matrimonial dispute in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate the disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it outin a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their cases in different courts.”
The view taken by the judges in this matter was that the courts would not encourage such disputes.
21. In yet another case reported in AIR 2003 SC 1386 in the matter of B.S. Joshi & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Anr. it was observed that there is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XXA containing Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punish the husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. But if the proceedings are initiated by the wife under Section 498A against the husband and his relatives and subsequently she has settled her disputes with her husband and his relatives and the wife and husband agreed for mutual divorce, refusal to exercise inherent powers by the High Court would not be proper as it would prevent woman fromsettling earlier. Thus for the purpose of securing the ends of justice quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It would however be a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not to exercise such a power.
22. In the instant matter, when the complainant and her husband are divorced as the complainant-wife secured an ex-parte decree of divorce, the same could have weighed with the High Court to consider whether proceeding initiated prior to the divorce decree was fit to be pursued in spite of absence of specific allegations at least against the brother and sister of the complainant’s husband and whether continuing with this proceeding could not have amounted to abuse of the process of the court. The High Court, however, seems not to have examined these aspects carefully and have thus side-tracked all these considerations merely on the ground that the territorial jurisdiction could be raised only before the magistrate conducting the trial.
23. In the instant case, the question of territorial jurisdiction was just one of the grounds for quashing the proceedings along with the other grounds and, therefore, the High Court should have examined whether the prosecution case was fit to be quashed on other grounds or not. At this stage, the question also crops up whether the matter is fit to be remanded to the High Court to consider all these aspects. But in matters arising out of a criminal case, fresh consideration by remanding the same would further result into a protracted and vexatious proceeding which is unwarranted as was held by this Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Tamil Nadu (supra) that such a course of remand would be unnecessary and inexpedient as there was no need to prolong the controversy. The facts in this matter on this aspect was although somewhat different since the complainant had lodged the complaint after seven years of delay, yet in the instant matter the factual position remainsthat the complaint as it stands lacks ingredients constituting the offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act against the appellants who are sister and brother of the complainant’s husband and their involvement in the whole incident appears only by way of a casual inclusion of their names. Hence, it cannot be overlooked that it would be total abuse of the process of law if we were to remand the matter to the High Court to consider whether there were still any material to hold that the trial should proceed against them in spite of absence of prima facie material constituting the offence alleged against them.
24. However, we deem it appropriate to add by way of caution that we may not be misunderstood so as to infer that even if there are allegation of overt act indicating the complicity of the members of the family named in the FIR in a given case, cognizance would be unjustified but what we wish to emphasize by highlighting is that, if the FIR as it stands does not disclose specific allegation against accused more so against the co-accused specially in a matter arising outof matrimonial bickering, it would be clear abuse of the legal and judicial process to mechanically send the named accused in the FIR to undergo the trial unless of course the FIR discloses specific allegations which would persuade the court to take cognisance of the offence alleged against the relatives of the main accused who are prima facie not found to have indulged in physical and mental torture of the complainant-wife. It is the well settled principle laid down in cases too numerous to mention, that if the FIR did not disclose the commission of an offence, the court would be justified in quashing the proceedings preventing the abuse of the process of law. Simultaneously, the courts are expected to adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing specially in cases of matrimonial dispute whether the FIR in fact discloses commission of an offence by the relatives of the principal accused or the FIR prima facie discloses a case of over-implication by involving the entire family of the accused at the instance of the complainant, who is out to settle her scores arising out of the teething problem or skirmish ofdomestic bickering while settling down in her new matrimonial surrounding.
25. In the case at hand, when the brother and unmarried sister of the principal accused Shyamji Mehrotra approached the High Court for quashing the proceedings against them, inter-alia, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction as also on the ground that no case was made out against them under Sections 498A,/323/504/506 including Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, it was the legal duty of the High Court to examine whether there were prima facie material against the appellants so that they could be directed to undergo the trial, besides the question of territorial jurisdiction. The High Court seems to have overlooked all the pleas that were raised and rejected the petition on the solitary ground of territorial jurisdiction giving liberty to the appellants to approach the trial court.
26. The High Court in our considered opinion appear to have missed that assuming the trial court had territorial jurisdiction, it was still left to be decided whether it was a fit case to send the appellants for trial when the FIR failed to make out a prima facie case against them regarding the allegation of inflicting physical and mental torture to the complainant demanding dowry from the complainant. Since the High Court has failed to consider all these aspects, this Court as already stated hereinbefore, could have remitted the matter to the High Court to consider whether a case was made out against the appellants to proceed against them. But as the contents of the FIR does not disclose specific allegation against the brother and sister of the complainant’s husband except casual reference of their names, it would not be just to direct them to go through protracted procedure by remanding for consideration of the matter all over again by the High Court and make the unmarried sister of the main accused and his elder brother to suffer the ordeal of a criminal case pending against them specially when the FIR does not disclose ingredients of offence under Sections 498A/323/504/506, IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
27. We, therefore, deem it just and legally appropriate to quash the proceedings initiated against the appellants Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra as the FIR does not disclose any material which could be held to be constituting any offence against these two appellants. Merely by making a general allegation that they were also involved in physical and mental torture of the complainant-respondent No.2 without mentioning even a single incident against them as also the fact as to how they could be motivated to demand dowry when they are only related as brother and sister of the complainant’s husband, we are pleased to quash and set aside the criminal proceedings in so far as these appellants are concerned and consequently the order passed by the High Court shall stand overruled. The appeal accordingly is allowed.


……………………………J(T.S. Thakur)
……………………………J(Gyan Sudha Misra)
 
New Delhi,October 17, 2012

SOURCE :- http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=39680

Saturday, December 4, 2010

Del HC-Justice Dhingra aquits Mother in-law of dowry death, slamming the trial court and public prosecutor for callousness. 'Criminal Justice System in India Needs Overhauling'

Crl. Appeal No. 93 of 2004                                                                  

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Reserve:  1st October, 2010  Date of Order: 2nd December, 2010  +Crl. Appeal No. 93 of 2004                    
02.12.2010


RANI                                              ... Appellant 
      Through: Mr. Bhanu Pratap Singh, Advocate

Versus

THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI           ... Respondents
      Through: Mr. O.P. Saxena, Addl. PP for the State

JUSTICE SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA

1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?  Yes.
2. To be referred to the reporter or not?            Yes.
3. Whether judgment should be reported in Digest?        Yes.

JUDGMENT
1.  Present Appeal has been preferred against the Judgment dated 1st October,  2003, and order on Sentence dated 13th October, 2003, whereby the Appellant was  convicted under Section 304B/498-A IPC read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of 7 years with fine of `1,000/-.  

2.  Janki was married to son of the  Appellant on 5th  December, 2000.  She  committed suicide by hanging herself on 1st   March, 2001.  After  her  death,  her brother Ved  Prakash, PW-2 gave a statement to SDM  that  he  had  visited  Janki’s  house on 23rd February, 2001 and found her in a sad mood.  She told him that her in- laws were asking for ` 50,000/- and a scooter as they wanted to open a shop and the  scooter was required for roaming around.  Ved Prakash stated that thereafter he talked to in-laws of her sister and told them that he would respond after thinking over.  He asked them to send Janki with him.  On this, he was told that they would take her to his house after 2-3 days.  After that he received information that Janki had died. He expressed his doubt that his sister had been killed by her husband, parents of her husband and husband’s sister Kiran. 

3.  In the name of investigation, police  took photographs of deceased,  recorded statement of brothers of Janki, collected postmortem report about the cause of her death, and FSL report of viscera. Even the site plan of the place of suicide and of the house was not prepared. The postmortem report shows that there was no external injury on the body of Janki.   The cause of death was given due to asphyxia. Ligature mark present on the neck showed that there was no ligature mark on left side of neck showing that ligature was caused due to hanging.  FSL report showed presence of insecticide  in the body.  No  investigation was  done by the police on the aspect of purchase of  insecticide or  administration of insecticide etc.   Charges against the accused persons were framed under Section 304B read with Section 498-A IPC read with Section 34 of IPC.  

4.  Prime witnesses in this case are PW-2 Ved Prakash and PW-7 Jai Prakash, the two brothers of the deceased Janki.  Ved Prakash is the one who claimed to have visited Janki on 23rd February, 2001 and stated that Janki was in sad mood and she complained that her in-laws were demanding  ` 50,000/- and a scooter.  PW-7 Jai  Prakash stated that Janki had come to his house in the village after about a week of her  marriage and had told  him that her in laws were demanding scooter and `  50,000/-.  He then sent his brother Jaidev @ Ali to the house of his sister Janki and this demand was repeated to him and Jaidev informed him about the demand. 

5.  PW-4 Laxman is 3rd brother of Janki.  He testified that he had visited his sister  at her matrimonial house after about a month of her marriage.  He stayed there for few moments  and  at  that time he had no  talks  with his sister.  Thus, as per his  testimony, no complaint was made to him by his sister about demand of `50,000/- and a scooter. 

6.  These three witnesses were practically not cross examined on the charges framed against the accused persons.  The  only cross examination done  by the defence counsel was putting to the witnesses statement recorded under Section 161 Cr. P.C. and giving suggestion regarding denial of the demand. 

7.  On the basis of the testimony of two  brothers  i.e. PW-2 and PW-7, the appellant and other two accused persons were convicted under Section 304B/ 498-A/34 IPC. 

8.  It is apparent that the allegations were very vague in nature.  Who demanded ` 50,000/- and scooter, whether it was the demand of husband or of mother-in-law or of  father-in-law, when was it made  –  answers to all these questions are  absent.  Even if it is presumed that demand was made,  the ingredients of Section 304B IPC were  totally absent in this case as there was  no evidence on record to show that cruelty  of any kind was  perpetuated on Janki for this demand.  Section 304B IPC reads as under:

  “(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any  burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her  marriage and it is shown that soon before her death  she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her  husband  or any relative of her husband for, or in  connection with, any demand for dowry, such death  shall be called "dowry death" and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less  than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.”


To bring home an offence under Section 304-B IPC it is  an  obligation of the  prosecution to prove in those cases where death of a woman occurs within 7 years of her marriage, that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any other relative,  in connection with a demand of dowry.  Mere making of demand is not the only pre-requisite for proving an offence under Section 304B IPC.  The prosecution was  thus supposed to prove that the demand made by the accused was coupled with  a  harassment or cruelty in connection with the demand. Unnatural death can be called a dowry death only if, after making a demand of dowry, the accused perpetuates cruelty on the victim so that the demand made by him is got fulfilled by perpetuation of cruelty on  the victim.  If the alleged demand of dowry is not coupled with cruelty, harassment or any other  such act on the part of accused, Section 304B of IPC would not be made out.  In this case, none of the three brothers stated that cruelty was perpetuated on Janki or she was  harassed by  the appellant or  by  any other relative for not fulfilling the demand. I consider in these circumstances conviction of the appellant under Section 304B IPC was totally  illegal and unjust. The conviction seems to be the result of a callous criminal justice system where neither the defence counsel prepared the case nor the prosecutor discharged his duty  in an impartial manner nor the Judge considered it as his duty to see what offence was made out and everyone acted in a mechanical manner. 

9.  The other question arises whether the appellant could be convicted under  Section 306 IPC i.e.  for the offence  of abetment  of suicide, since the deceased  committed suicide within three months of her marriage.  In order to convict a person
for abetment of suicide,  apart from proving suicide, it has to be proved that the appellant or accused was instrumental in commission of suicide.  Section 113A of  Evidence Act which raises a presumption regarding abetment of suicide in respect of
a married woman reads as under: 

  “113A. Presumption as to abatement of suicide by a  married women  - When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a women had been abetted by  her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband has subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.”


A perusal of above section would show that abetment of suicide of a married woman by relatives would be presumed by the Court if it is shown that her husband or such other relative of husband had subjected her to cruelty.  In the present case, there is not  an iota of evidence in respect of cruelty perpetuated upon the victim, either medical evidence or oral evidence.  I, therefore, consider that that the appellant could not have been convicted even under Section 306 IPC. 

10.  It is seen that the Appellant herein belonged to a very poor family of vegetable seller.  She had three young daughters and two sons.  She herself was a house-wife and not working and that seems to be reason that during trial she and her husband and son could not engage a counsel with some experience who could have done justice to the brief. The witnesses were not cross-examined in a proper manner and cross-examination done to the witness was only to confront them with their statements under Section 161 Cr. P.C. Along with the Appellant, her husband and her son were also convicted.  Even during Appeals, this  family could not engage an efficient counsel and that is why her husband and son remained in JC during entire  Appeal period.  After  undergoing entire  sentence, they appeared in the court and stated that they do not wish to pursue their Appeals, so, the Appeals were dismissed. 

11.  A perusal of record shows  that  the deceased’s brother had made application before the Court for return of dowry articles and  Istridhan during trial and gave a list of the articles given at the time of engagement ceremony (sagai) and marriage.   The
list reads as under;


(i) One Silver Coin, (ii) One Three Piece Suit for Boy, (iii)
One Gold Ring, (iv) 51 Utensils, (v) Fruits and Dry Fruits,
(vi) Nine Sarees, (vii)  Nine Gents Shirts, (viii) Four Pairs of
Clothes for Children and (ix) ` 501/-.    At marriage the dowry list is as under;
(i) One Silver Coin, (ii) 5 Units of Clothes for Boy, (iii) One
HMT Wrist Watch, (iv) 27 Utensils (of Steel and Brass), (v)
Ear-ring (Kundal) +  „LONG‟  of Gold for Girl, (vi) A set of
Silver pajeb + Key Ring, (vii) One Double-Bed with
Matress, Quilt and Pillow, (viii) One Chair, One Table, One
Stool, One Dressing Table, One Cooler, One Godrej
Almirah and One Small Box.

  This list, prepared at the time of marriage was duly signed by husband Raju.  The list would show that both parties belonged to poor strata of society and except     ` 501/-, there was no cash transaction as dowry between the parties and the parties knew each-other’s  financial position well.  No question was asked about the list nor the investigating agency made the list as a part of their investigation nor the dowry list attracted attention of the Judge concerned.  This list would have shown that it was not a case where dowry has been demanded.  Where the parties knew that the status of girl  was such that even at marriage and engagement ceremonies only    ` 501/-  cash was given, the husband  of relatives  would not have thought  of  demanding ` 50,000/- and scooter within few days of marriage.  The most disturbing factor is that no evidence, whatsoever, was collected by the police about the real facts.  No effort was made by learned Public Prosecutor or by Trial Judge to even go through the evidence and consider what charges were made out.  Charges seemed to have been framed in a mechanical manner.  No effort is seem to have been made by the Trial Judge either at the time of framing charge or later on as to what offence was made out. 

12.  Every suicide after marriage cannot be presumed to be a suicide due to dowry demand.  The tendency of the Court should not be that since a young bride has died after marriage, now somebody must be held culprit and the noose must be made to fit some neck.

13.  There is an unfortunate development under criminal justice system that even in those cases where accused should be examined as a witness by the defence, the accused persons are not examined as a witness.  In matrimonial offences, it is the accused and his family members who know what transpired within the family and they should always volunteer themselves as witnesses in the Court so that the Court gets their side of the version by way of evidence and testimony.  Under Section 106 of Evidence Act, when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.  When a death takes place within the four walls of matrimonial home, the  husband and  in-laws should come forward and depose as to what was the real cause of death.  The criminal practice in India has been on the lines of old track that accused must not speak and he should not be examined as a witness.  I do not know  why this practice developed but in all matrimonial offences, this practice is shutting the doors of the Court, to the version of the other side, by their advocates.  

14.  Adversarial system of trial being followed in this country has turned most of the trial court judges into  umpires and despite having sufficient power to ask questions to the witnesses and to find out truth, most of them do not ask questions to the witnesses to know the truth.  In fact, the witnesses are left to the Advocates and the Judges  just sit and watch.  This tendency of being only umpires works  heavily against the poor who are normally not defended by Advocates of competence and standing, as they cannot afford their fee.  The Trial Courts, therefore, must shed their inertia and must intervene in all those cases where intervention is necessary for the ends of justice.


15.  In this case the High Court did not find time to hear the appeals of other two appellants, who continued to remain in jail during trial period as well as appeal period for no crime.   In all such cases where  appellants are in jail and sentence is not suspended,  the High Court should fix a time limit for disposing of such appeals.  Neither the criminal should be let off by default as High Court has no time to hear appeals  nor should the innocents rot in jail by default.  The whole criminal justice system needs overhauling so that the constitutional mandate of equality before law is made meaningful and it should not be the case that higher courts are kept occupied by the person with money or power, as is the case today. 

16.  The appeal is allowed.  The appellant is acquitted.

DECEMBER 02, 2010            SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA, J.
acm

 

http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/SND/judgement/03-12-2010/SND02122010CRLA932004.pdf

Sunday, November 21, 2010

No 498-A after Foreign Divorce - an abuse of the process of criminal law another misuse of 498a 406

No 498-A after Foreign Divorce - an abuse of the process of criminal law another misuse of 498a 406

 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
1. Criminal Misc. No. 37932-M of 2006
Partap Singh and another
Petitioners
Versus
State of Punjab and another
Respondents
2. Criminal Misc. No. 49931-M of 2006
Gurnam Singh
Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab and another
Respondents
3. Criminal Misc. No. 59336-M of 2006
Gurdit Singh and another
Petitioners
Versus
State of Punjab and another
Respondents
Date of decision: 4th October, 2010
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA Present: Mr. Tarunvir Vashist, Advocate for Mr. Rajesh Gupta, Advocate for the petitioners. Ms. Sudeepti Sharma, DAG Punjab,
for the State.
None for respondent No.2.
KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA, J. (ORAL)
By this common order, three petitions viz. (1) Criminal Misc. No.37932-M of 2006 preferred by Partap Singh-father-in-law and Kulwant Kaur-mother-in-law (2) Criminal Misc. No.49931-M of 2006 preferred by Criminal Misc. Nos. 37932-M; 49931-M and 59336-M of 2006 2 Gurnam Singh-brother of the husband and (3) Criminal Misc. No.59336-M of 2006 filed by Gurdit Singh-elder brother of father-in-law and Tejinder Singh-husband shall be decided together.
FIR in these cases was lodged by Kulwinder Kaur, who was a citizen of United Kingdom. As per the FIR, she was resident of 7, Scribers Lane, Har Green Birmingham B-280 NY. The marriage of complainant-Kulwinder Kaur was solemnized with Tejinder Singh at Ludhiana on 8th May, 2004. It is not disputed that for solemnizing the marriage, complainant-Kulwinder Kaur came to India only one month before her marriage and thereafter she left for United Kingdom. Thereafter, immigration of her husband-Tejinder Singh was sponsored and he also left for United Kingdom on 24th October, 2004. Counsel for the petitioners has referred to the divorce proceedings (Annexures P-10 to P-14) between the husband and wife initiated and concluded in the Uxbridge County Court and has stated that all property and entrustment disputes between the parties have been resolved by the Matrimonial County Court while granting divorce. The matter has been investigated by the Ludhiana police. It is stated that the only allegation against the petitioners is that the dowry articles were entrusted to them in India and during the stay of complainant-Kulwinder Kaur in India, her husband and his relations had misbehaved with the complainant and had demanded a car. It is stated in the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. (Annexure P-9) that Tejinder Singh reached United Kingdom on 24th October, 2004 and resided there with his father-in-law. On 24th February, 2005, he is stated to have left the house for an unknown place. For search of Tejinder Singh, the complainant- Kulwinder Kaur and her father came to India and a Panchayat was called, where on 17th August, 2005, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law and uncle-in-law of the complainant had demanded dowry articles. The Criminal Misc. Nos. 37932-M; 49931-M and 59336-M of 2006 3 police after enquiry, had deleted the offence punishable under Sections 364 and 382 IPC, however they came to a conclusion that offence punishable under Sections 406, 498-A and 323 IPC was made out against the accused.
This is one of those typical cases, where after the marriage, bride and bridegroom have gone abroad. The wife is a citizen of United Kingdom. She had facilitated immigration of her husband, who had married a Non-Resident-Indian wife only for the purposes of his settlement in a foreign country. Having reached abroad, he deserted his wife and had obtained a divorce. The hurt of a Non-Resident-Indian wife that she has been used as a conduit for immigration, can be well understood. In this context, the allegations in the FIR have been examined. This Court cannot become oblivious of the fact that the husband and wife, after obtaining divorce, parted their ways and are residing happily in United Kingdom. The property and entrustment of the articles was a subject matter before the Uxbridge County Court, which has granted divorce. A similar controversy was examined by Hon'ble the Apex Court in 'Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia and others v. State of Punjab and others' (2009) 7 Supreme Court Cases 712, wherein it was held as under:
"32. Furthermore, the larger part of offence, if any, has been committed only in Canada. Why the father of Respondent 3 had to come from Canada to Jalandhar to lodge an FIR is difficult to comprehend. Respondent 3 and the first informant do not say that the inquiry report submitted by the Superintendent of Police on the representation made by Appellant 2 was incorrect. It has also not been stated that as to on what material, the chargesheet had been submitted. we, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, have absolutely no doubt in our mind that the allegations contained in the FIR had been made with an ulterior motive to harass Criminal Misc. Nos. 37932-M; 49931-M and 59336-M of 2006 4 the appellants. Continuance of the criminal proceeding against them would, therefore, amount to abuse of process of the Court."
Admittedly, Tejinder Singh had left the house in United Kingdom, thereafter, as to why the complainant-Kulwinder Kaur and her father came to India in search of Tejinder Singh and then they met the relations of husband where they made a demand of dowry articles? This is something which this Court cannot comprehend. This kind of allegations are not only unnatural, improbable and unconvincing but have been coined only as an abuse of the process of criminal law. It is another case where provisions of Sections 406 and 498-A IPC have been misused. The very fact that complainant aggrieved wife had stayed in India for less than one month and husband cohabited with complainant wife for a period of about six months i.e. from October 2004 to February 2005 in United Kingdom and thereafter, obtained divorce from County Court in United Kingdom settling all disputes is sufficient to hold that proceedings in the present case should be quashed. Hence, the above said three petitions are hereby accepted and the impugned FIR along with all subsequent proceedings is quashed.

[KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA]
JUDGE
October 4, 2010

http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1318745/

Sunday, November 14, 2010

Delhi district court-Three acquitted in dowry death case. Suicide due to Illicit relationship given color of dowry demand and death by Girl’ family

Three acquitted in dowry death case

New Delhi, Nov 14 (PTI) A Delhi court has acquitted a man and his parents of the charges of causing death of the former''s wife for dowry, noting that the accused were financially well-off to raise such demands.
Additional Sessions Judge Kamini Lau absolved Pankaj Raj, his father Surender Kumar and mother Kamlesh of the charges under Section 304 B (dowry death) and 498 A (cruelty) of the IPC.
The court took into account a number of facts like Raj''s earnings, the gifts he had given to his wife Ritu, the places he took her to on their honeymoon, besides the financial condition of Kumar and the victim.
It said that Ritu was maintaining an independent bank account and had even paid Rs 40,000 to her brother for buying a motorbike after her marriage with Raj on December 9, 2005 to conclude that she herself was capable of taking care of her financial requirements.
The court further said the demands for articles like TV and AC do not appear "plausible" as Raj was the only son of his parents and his sister was settled in the USA as professor at Harvard University.
It also said that besides the mother and brother of the deceased, no one else from her family including the father was cited as witness by the prosecution to prove their charges.

"It is clear from the evidence of the witnesses that the deceased has committed suicide but it cannot be related to any dowry-related harassment by the accused as apparently there is no proximity or link between her death and the alleged misconduct by the accused persons," the court said.
During the trial, the accused tried to point out to the court that the victim could not reconcile with her marriage as she got attached with a boy with whom she was earlier engaged and was even in touch with before committing suicide on April 10, 2006 at her matrimonial home in Janak Puri here within five months of her marriage.
"The prosecution story does not inspire confidence and is not worthy of credence, especially in view of the glaring contradictions and overwhelming inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses," the court said, acquitting the accused.

http://news.in.msn.com/national/article.aspx?cp-documentid=4576032

Saturday, November 13, 2010

SC acknowledges Gross Abuse of ANTI DOWRY LAWS 498a 304B by wife’s parents

Bench: P Sathasivam, B Chauhan

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 891 of 2004

Dr. Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta & Ors. ...Appellants Versus

State of Maharashtra ...Respondent JUDGMENT

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay, dated 29.4.2004, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 865 of 1987, by which the High Court has reversed the judgment and order of the Trial Court acquitting the appellants of the charges under Sections 306/34 and 498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as `IPC').

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that appellant No.1 got married to one Neeru Gupta (hereinafter called as `the deceased') on 1.12.1978 by way of an arranged marriage. Out of the said wedlock, a female child named Mili was born in 1981. There had been some disputes between the husband and wife on petty matters. Neeru committed suicide on 28.9.1985 by hanging herself in the bathroom when all the other family members had gone outside. Rajesh (PW.2), brother of the deceased, filed a complaint dated 30.9.1985, against the appellants i.e. the husband and parents in law of the deceased, alleging that they had been demanding dowry and had given ill treatment to the deceased, and that is why Neeru committed suicide. The police investigated the matter and filed the charge sheet against all the three appellants on 9.1.1986 under Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC. The prosecution examined a large number of witnesses to substantiate its case. After the conclusion of the trial, the Sessions Court vide its judgment and order dated 21.5.1987, held that the deceased had committed suicide. However, no role could be attributed to any of the appellants for the same, and the prosecution failed to prove any of the charges beyond reasonable doubt against the appellants. The witnesses examined by the prosecution improved their version with regard to claims of the alleged demands, particularly in respect of the gold ornaments and ill treatment of the deceased. The Trial Court came to the conclusion that the deceased was suffering from epilepsy, psychosis and depression and had been getting regular treatment for the same. Therefore, it was not a case of dowry demand or treating her with cruelty.

3. Being aggrieved, the State of Maharashtra preferred Criminal Appeal No.865 of 1987 before the High Court of Bombay and the High Court reversed the order of acquittal, convicted the appellants vide its judgment and order dated 29.4.2004 and imposed the punishment of 3 years RI on the husband, appellant No.1, and 2 years on the other appellants i.e. the in-laws of the deceased. Hence, this appeal.

4. Shri K.T.S Tulsi, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, has submitted that the High Court failed to appreciate the medical evidence and depositions of the prosecution witnesses in the right perspective, as the same could not establish conclusively that the suicide by the deceased could be attributed to the appellants to any extent. It was a clear cut case of suicide because of depression, as the deceased had been suffering from epilepsy and other mental disorders. The deceased had developed an illicit relationship with a family friend, Kake, and a letter written by the said Kake had been in the possession of the other family members and, therefore, they had informed her parents and brother about the said illicit relationship. The medical evidence, particularly, the deposition of Dr. Daulatram Nekumal Gurbani (PW.10) made it clear that the deceased had been suffering from serious depression and such a patient often develops suicidal tendencies. The deceased had also made an attempt earlier to commit suicide in 1985 and she had been taken to the local hospital. Subsequently, she had also been treated at Kanpur. The findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court that there was neither any demand of gold ornaments or any kind of dowry, nor had the deceased been subjected to cruelty, could not be held to be perverse by the High Court to bring home the charges against the appellants under Sections 306 or 498A IPC. The parents-in-law of the deceased were not living at Kalyan, as the appellant No.2 had been transferred to Kurudwadi in 1983 and the deceased was living with her husband i.e. appellant No.1, at Kalyan. The High Court committed an error in shifting the burden of proof to the defence as the court observed that the defence failed to prove its version. In fact the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the failure of the defence to prove the defence version cannot be a ground for conviction. More so, as there has been no abetment to suicide, the provisions of Section 306 IPC could not be attracted. Thus, in view of above, the appeal deserves to be allowed.

5. On the contrary, Shri Sushil Karanjakar, learned counsel appearing for the State has vehemently opposed the appeal contending that the High Court's judgment is based on cogent reasons and on a proper appreciation of the evidence on record. The High Court has correctly reached the conclusion that the findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court were perverse. The High Court is the final court of facts, its findings do not deserve to be disturbed by this Court in a routine manner. There is sufficient evidence on record to prove the demand of dowry and abetment to suicide. Therefore, no interference is required by this Court with the findings of fact recorded by the High Court. The appeal lacks merit and, thus, is liable to be dismissed. 5

6. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

7. Before proceeding further, it may be pertinent to mention here that Shri K.T.S Tulsi, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, has informed us that appellant No.3, Sou. Pushamalati Sambhudayal Gupta died in the month of February, 2010. In view thereof, the appeal by appellant No.3 stands abated and we only have to consider the case of appellant Nos. 1 and 2, i.e., the husband and the father-in-law of the deceased.

8. The Trial Court after appreciating the depositions of the witnesses and examining the documentary evidence on record came to the conclusion that the alleged demand of gold ornaments or ill- treatment of the deceased could not be established and none of the letters produced by the prosecution has been suggestive of either of ill-treatment or demand of dowry. None of the prosecution witnesses, i.e. the family members of the deceased, made such allegations either while lodging the FIR or in their statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called `Cr.P.C.'). Such allegations had been made for the first time while making statements before the court during trial. There were material contradictions and improvements, which were not mere elaborations of their statements already made. Thus, their statements in regard to those allegations were liable to be discarded.

9. The High Court reversed the findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court, mainly relying upon the evidence of Dr. Daulatram Nekumal Gurubani (PW.10), as he had deposed that when he had examined the deceased, she told him that she had been deprived of love and affection by her family members. She had no faith in any member of her family. He had also opined that it was not a case of psychosis, but the deceased had been suffering from a mental disorder. The High Court also reached the conclusion that the defence failed to establish that the deceased was suffering from epilepsy before her marriage. The stay of the deceased along with her parents in a Guest House for two-three days after going from Kanpur to Kalyan has also been taken by the High Court as a circumstance adverse to the appellants. The High Court also came to the conclusions that the intimacy between the deceased and Kake did not mean that she had illicit relationship with Kake; and there had been a demand of a gold chain by appellant No.3.

10. As the High Court has reversed the order of acquittal and taken a view contrary to the view taken by the Trial Court, we have taken upon ourselves the task of appreciation of evidence and considered the legal and factual issues involved in the case.

11. Letters written by the parties to each other:

(A) A large number of letters had been placed on record before the Trial Court by both the parties. Letter dated 24.2.1979 (Ext.P-26), written by the deceased to her husband, about 3 months after the marriage reveals that there was no problem in the relationship between the husband and wife. In fact, it suggests that they had deep love and affection for each other.

(B) Letter dated 3.4.1985, written by appellant no. 2 to the father of the deceased, makes it evident that something had gone wrong and the behaviour of the deceased had been totally unwarranted, as it revealed that she had gone out of the house i.e. on the main road, half-naked and she had brought disrepute to the family of her in-laws. However, they had been tolerating such behaviour. She had lowered their prestige so much that they had not been able to show their faces to anyone. It suggested an illicit relationship between the deceased and one family friend, Kake. It also suggested that the deceased wanted to live with the said Kake, as she had developed love for him and she was willing to elope with him. It also suggested that it was wrong on the part of Smt. Shanti (mother of the deceased) to have been giving wrong advice to the deceased and making false allegations that her in- laws were not treating her properly. According to this letter, the deceased had declared that she was no longer interested in Sunil, her husband, as she did not like him any more and in the end appellant No.2 had expressed great concern about his grand daughter Mili and stated that he was willing to keep her in a hostel so that she could be spared humiliation because of the illicit relationship between the deceased and Kake. The author of the letter suggested to the father of the deceased that he should call the deceased to Kanpur as there could be some untoward/disastrous incident in future. (C) The undated letter (Ext. P-2) purported to have been written by Kake to the deceased, gives an impression that the deceased had not only deep intimacy, but something more with Kake. Kake was also in possession of some of her photographs which he claimed to be his fortune and said that the same would not be returned to her as she had requested and would be burnt only with the end of his life. This letter also suggested that he had the opportunity to have a physical relationship with her.

(D) There are several other letters on record showing that after the development of the intimacy between Kake and the deceased, both families were disturbed and attempts had been made from both the sides to patch up the matter. However, none of the letters suggests any demand of dowry or ill treatment to the deceased amounting to cruelty by the appellants.

(E) The letter dated 7.7.1985 written by the complainant, Rajesh, brother of the deceased to appellant No.1, is suggestive in nature. It suggests that appellant no. 1 should try to save the prestige of the family at any cost and forget all that had happened in the past, as the deceased was willing to improve herself and accept any advice given by her husband. Another letter dated 9.7.1985, written by the informant, Rajesh, brother of the deceased to the appellant No.2 revealed that the entire family of the deceased had been making serious attempts at re-conciliation. Even in this letter there was not even a whisper/mention of any demand of dowry or of ill treatment.

(F) The letter dated 18.7.1985 written by the father of the deceased to his son Rajesh (PW.2) from Kalyan made it clear that the author along with the deceased had gone to Kalyan to meet the family of the appellants, and they were not welcomed by the mother-in-law of the deceased at the initial stage. They had been staying in Modern Guest House in the same colony. Appellant No.1, the husband of the deceased suggested that the deceased should meet her mother-in-law and apologies, which was accepted by the deceased. The deceased met her mother-in-law and apologized. After some time, the mother-in- law became quiet and calm and started behaving properly and all the appellants treated them well.

(G) The un-dated letter (Ex.P-21) written by the deceased to her father revealed that her mother-in-law wanted her to separate herself from the other members of the family and her parents. It also gave the impression that her mother-in-law was asking for a gold chain ("zanzir ke liye keh rahi thi") and created problems for her in meeting her husband and daughter. After the arrival of her brother-in-law to Kalyan, the behaviour of her mother-in-law had improved a lot, but her husband being busy in his practice and did not have sufficient time to be with her.

(H) From the original record, a letter dated 1.4.1985 (Ext. 16), by the mother-in-law to the father of the deceased seems to have been written after losing hope completely and concluding that the deceased had become incorrigible. The said letter suggests that the relationship between the deceased and her husband had come to an end. The deceased had become a woman of bad character. They had tolerated her to a great extent. The deceased had been tutored by her mother; she had been misbehaving with them and it had become difficult for them to tolerate her any more. The deceased had been using abusive language to all the family members. She had lowered their reputation and they had been very unlucky to have such a daughter-in-law. As she wanted to live with Kake and not with her husband, they did not want to have any relationship with her. [Appellant No. 3 had denied writing the said letter].

(I) Another letter dated 22.5.1985, is on record written by Jai Narain Gupta from Sandila, U.P. (who seems to be relative of the deceased) wherein a suggestion had been made to patch up the matter. The author has drawn the inference that the problems were being created for the deceased, and she has been treated with cruelty as her in-laws did not receive dowry according to their expectations, though, there is no allegation that there has been any demand of dowry and for not giving the same.

(J) The undated letter written by the deceased to her aunt Manorma Gupta at Barabanki does not suggest anything against the accused, as the deceased had written that everything was fine and that she would discuss things when they met. The undated letter written by her aunt in reply, suggests that there was something amiss. She had mentioned that the whole family was very disturbed, but they were not able to suggest any solution. There was nothing to worry or fear as all of them were with the deceased and she also told the deceased to face things with courage, as she had equal rights to stay in the house and to fight for justice.

12. Depositions of Prosecution witnesses (Relevant parts): (I) Dr. Mohan Kulkarni, a practicing doctor residing in the same building (PW.1)-

"I know both accused Nos. 2 and 3 used to occasionally visit their block at Waldhuni (Kalyan) after transfer of accused No.2 at Kurduwadi.....I have no any personal knowledge about the relations in between accused No.1 and his deceased wife.....It is true that I was told by accused No.1 some four or five month before the incident that his wife Guddi was getting the attacks of epileptic fits. The ailment of epileptic fits is of neurological problems. I say that these medicines namely used in neurological problems as gardenal, have their side effects on the patient. E.C.T. (Electro Convulsive Therapy) treatment is given to mental patients of some sort. If a person shows abnormal signs then he is branded as a mental patient. I say that those who have tendency of mental depression they tend to commit suicide. It is true that mental disorder in some cases creates mental depression."

(II) Rajesh (PW.2) (Brother of the deceased)- "It is true that there was nothing wrong in between the accused and Neeru till the delivery of a female child and everything was smooth and cordial, in between them......I cannot say why it is not disclosed specifically in my complaint that as accused no.3 instructed Neeru to fetch golden ornaments on account of my marriage ceremony, my father presented with four golden bangles in the ceremony....... I cannot say why it is not stated in my complaint that after the birth of her daughter we presented Neeru with two golden ear rings and golden chain of two tolas because those were demanded by her husband's family members..... As I did not remember the exact account of the remaining ornaments presented to Neeru by us as and when demanded by her in laws. I did not narrate about them in the complaint. Except my words I have no documentary evidence to show how many golden ornaments were presented to Neeru and when...... There is no reference to golden chain any other letters except letter (Exh.21) sent by Neeru to my parents and myself. That golden chain we give to Neeru in 1985 was weighing 2 and = tolas..... The only reference about the golden chain asked for by accused no.3 appears in letter (Exh.21) sent by Neeru to us after she was reached at her in laws place on 24.8.1985."

(III) Manorma (PW.7) Aunt of deceased-

"She told me that accused persons had demanded a golden chain from her and hence she was not being called back now shown  inland letter dated 10.7.1985 which is written by me to Neeru alias Guddi at Kanpur.....I have not stated before the police that when I met Neeru in March 1985 she told me that accused persons were demanding more golden ornaments from her and that they were keeping her starving and were not allowing her to meet her daughter Mili, and that she was craving to meet Mili. As I was not well at that time I forgot to narrate the things before the police. I have told this fact for the first time to the court...... I have not written specifically in my two letters (Exh.39 and 40) addressed to my brother and sister in law that Neeru told me that she was subjected to physical assault by the accused and that she was kept starving by the accused and further accused demanded golden ornaments from her."

(IV) Ramkishan Gupta (PW.8) Father of deceased- "I then arranged for a golden chain and sent Rajesh along with Neeru with a golden chain to Kalyan on 24.8.1985. Rajesh handed over golden chain to accused, and left Neeru in her in laws house and returned back to Kanpur. After 15 days we received a telegram sent by brother of accused no.1 Pradeep Kumar that all was well in the house at Kalyan. On 29.9.1985 we received a phone call informing us the said news of death of Neeru..... I have not stated in letter (Exh.23/1) that while we were standing out side the house of accused and requesting them to accept Neeru, accused no.3 demanded a golden chain from us and refused to allow Neeru to see her daughter in side the house, because Rajesh already knew all these things at Kanpur. I have no documentary evidence except my words to show that I had written to my sister Manorama and to my brother that accused persons were demanding...... I have not stated in either of my two statements before the police that when accused no.3 came to attend the wedding of my son Rajesh she demanded golden ornaments for herself (Accused no.3). I have not stated in either of my two statements before the police that even after the delivery of Neeru in 1981 none of the accused persons came to Kanpur to visit her. I have not stated in my first statement dated 1.10.1985 before the police that when Neeru came for delivery at Kanpur she informed us that accused no.3 was demanding golden ornaments from her..... I have not stated in either of my two statements specifically that when I and my wife went to the house of accused on 17.2.1985 we met all three accused at the entrance and all of them asked me whether I had brought golden ornaments or had come empty handed, and that they had already asked Rajesh to bring along golden ornaments and whereupon I told all three accused that I had not brought along golden ornaments as I was not having them and where upon all three accused pointed out towards Neeru and said as to how all those accused had driven Neeru to such a condition and that they would further make her condition miserable. I have not stated in either of my two statements before the police that when Neeru returned back to our house in March 1985 she told us that all accused told her that till their demand for cash and ornaments was not made, they would not allow Mili to go along with Neeru. I have not stated in either of my two statements before the police that when accused nos.2 and 3 had come to attend the marriage ceremony at Kanpur in the month of March 1985 accused nos.2 and 3 did not allow me to meet Mili. I had not stated in either of my two statements before the police that when Rajesh brought back Neeru in the month of June 1985 at Kanpur Neeru told me that she was not allowed to meet her daughter Mili in the house of her husband and accused no.3 asked her if she had brought golden chain or not."

(V) Daulatram Nekumal Gurubani (PW.10), Doctor- "In the mid of February, 1985 accused No.1 told me that his wife has become aggressive and was not co-operative and also used to become violent. When I reached the house of accused No.1, there I met accused No.2 and Accused No.3. I examined Neerubai, the wife of accused No.1. She was lying in store room and was not in a  mood to talk anything with me even she become aggressive with me in the sense she was not co- operative with me. Accused No.1 told Neerubai that I was psychotherapist of Thane Mental Hospital and then Neeru asked me whether I treated my wife in the same way she was being treated by her husband accused No.1. She showed me injury marks bruises on her both knees and a small injury on the lower lip and also bruises on the back. She also told me that she was beaten by her family members and by a ward boy of hospital. She also told me that she had been maltreated by her husband, by her mother in law. She also told me that, her ornaments were being worn by accused No.3. On seeing the injury marks on her person I talked with accused No.1 and asked for details. Accused No.1 told me that as Neeru had become violent and we were controlling her it was possible that she sustained small bruises..... Accused No.1 told me that his wife was suffering from epileptic fits since before her marriage and that she was on Geroin tablets. I told him that there were side effects of this drug and the drug should be stopped after 3 years. He told me that she was on drug for so many years and she is maintained on that drugs. I told him to continue with above tablets and consult Neurologist if she is suffering from the above ailments. I visited her place for 4 times in the same month i.e. February, 1985. During all those visits I never found any signs of epileptic fits......

Cross examination:

I started my practice in January 1985 at Ulhasnagar and handed the case of Neeru in February 1985 after I passed my M.D. Degree in Psychiatry in July 1984 though I joined mental hospital at Thane as Medical Officer...... I agree that even in major epilepsy this medicine Geroin is prescribed. It will not be correct to say that because I prescribed medicine Geroin I was convinced that the patient was suffering from major epilepsy. Even though I knew that drug Geroin carried side effect yet I prescribed it though I knew she had no sign of epilepsy because once the drug is started it cannot be abruptly discontinued otherwise the patient may get fits. I stick to the proposition that if an anti- convulsent drugs such as Geroin is given for long period and withdrawn abruptly then she may get convulsions. I am backed by authority. Clinical examination alone cannot decide whether a patient is suffering from epilepsy or not. Patient of epilepsy may have a grand-mal or petit-mal. It is true that dose of Geroin daily is more in case of grand-mal than in the case of petit-mal. It is true that a maximum dose of Geroin tablets is 4 tablets 3 times a day. I agree that brain scan, EEG and X- ray of all the skull are required for investigations in cases of epilepsy....

It is true that drugs at Sr. Nos. 1 to 5 prescribed by me to Mrs. Neeru wife Exh.46 are normally prescribed in a case of epilepsy with psychoses and in depressive state....I have prescribed to Neeru E.C.T. treatment.....It is not stated in my prescription letter (Exh.46) that if the drug as Sr. Nos. 1 to 5 prescribed to Neeru do not work out, then E.C.T. therapy should be started to her, though verbally told her so. It is true that I have not specifically stated in my prescription letter (Exh.46) at any time during my visits to Mrs. Neeru on 4 or 5 occasions that as the drugs at Sr.Nos. 1 to 5 in (Exh.46) were working, E.C.T. therapy was not essential.....I have not stated in my police statement that the room in which Neeru was found was an unkept room or a store room. I have not stated before the police that when I was introduced to Neeru as a psychiatrist, Neeru asked me whether I treat my wife in the same way as she was treated by her husband. I have not stated before the police that before Neeru was examined by me she told me that she was harassed by accused persons and that her ornaments were worn by accused No.3......

I have not stated before the police that I examined Neeru and found that there was not any gross psychological problem but she was mentally disturbed and I found that she had no faith in any of the members of the family and I found that she was deprived of love, affection and sympathy of her family members. I have not stated before the police that accused No.1 told me she was also epileptic but I did not find any signs and symptoms of that disease with her. I have not stated before the police that I requested accused No.1 where was the X-ray of skull and other investigation papers and accused No.1 told me that his wife was suffering of epileptic fits since before her marriage and that she was on geroin tablet. I have not stated before the police that I told him that there were side effects of this drug and the drug should be stopped after 3 years..... I agree that Mrs. Neeru did not meet me in April 1985 but she brought the letter of April 1985 of Dr. S. Mahendru in the month of June 1985. I have not stated before the police that Neeru either met me in April 1985 or in June 1985. Beyond my word there is no any other evidence to show that in September 1985 accused Nos. 1 and 2 came to me. I have not stated before the police that both accused Nos. 1 and 2 later on told me that Neeru committed suicide and that they needed certificate about her mental condition....."

(VI) Dr. Ramesh Kumar Mahendru (PW.12) - Doctor from Kanpur :

xxx

".....I say that the experts prescribed E.C.T. (Electro Convulsive treatment) in cases of retarded

depression and, manic depressive psychosis. I am shown the chart today by the learned Defence counsel in which the prescription of medicines advised by Dr. Gurubani for Niru and by me are practically same except with a difference that the medicines mentioned at Sr.No.4 does not potentiate as anti depressants but it prevents the reactions caused by the medicines stated at Sr.No.3 in the chart.....

Narco therapy is a kind of suggestive psycho therapy under the influence of narcotic drugs such as barbiturates."

13. The above referred letters and the depositions of the witnesses have to be understood/appreciated within the four corners of law, particularly dealing with the issues of reversal of the order of acquittal by the appellate court and discrepancies/improvement/embellishment and contradictions in the statements of the witnesses.

14. Material Contradictions:

While appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions had been of such magnitude that they may materially affect the trial. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters without effecting the core of the prosecution case should not be made a ground to reject the evidence in its entirety. The Trial Court, after going through the entire evidence, must form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses and the appellate Court in normal course would not be justified in reviewing the same again without justifiable reasons. (Vide: State Represented by Inspector of Police v. Saravanan & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 152).

15. Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of a witness and other witness also make material improvements before the court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it cannot be safe to rely upon such evidence. (Vide : State of Rajasthan v. Rajendra Singh, (2009) 11 SCC 106).

16. The discrepancies in the evidence of eye-witnesses, if found to be not minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving and discrediting their evidence. In such circumstances, witnesses may not inspire confidence and if their evidence is found to be in conflict and contradiction with other evidence or with the statement already recorded, in such a case it cannot be held that prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. (Vide: Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 11 SCC 334).

17. In case, the complainant in the FIR or the witness in his statement under section 161 Cr.P.C., has not disclosed certain facts but meets the prosecution case first time before the court, such version lacks credence and is liable to be discarded. (Vide: State Represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu v. Sait @ Krishnakumar, (2008) 15 SCC 440).

18. In State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 1390, while dealing with this issue, this Court observed as under: "In the depositions of witnesses there are always normal discrepancies, however honest and truthful they may be. These discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of the occurrence, and the like. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person."

19. The courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy belongs. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material discrepancies do so. (see: Syed Ibrahim v. 23 State of A.P., AIR 2006 SC 2908; and Arumugam v. State, AIR 2009 SC 331).

20. In Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh & Ors., (2004) 9 SCC 186, this Court examined the issue and held: "Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle. But it can be one of the factors to test credibility of the prosecution version, when the entire evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility."

21. While deciding such a case, the Court has to apply the aforesaid tests. Mere marginal variations in the statements cannot be dubbed as improvements as the same may be elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier. The omissions which amount to contradictions in material particulars i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the trial or core of the prosecution's case, render the testimony of the witness liable to be discredited.

Appeal against Acquittal:

22. It is a well-established principle of law, consistently re-iterated and followed by this Court is that while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, an appellate court must consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. Even though the appellate court is entitled to consider, whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had placed the burden of proof incorrectly or failed to take into consideration any admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration evidence brought on record contrary to law; the appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. The trial court which has the benefit of watching the demeanor of the witnesses is the best judge of the credibility of the witnesses.

23. Every accused is presumed to be innocent unless his guilt is proved. The presumption of innocence is a human right. Subject to the statutory exceptions, the said principle forms the basis of criminal jurisprudence in India. The nature of the offence, its seriousness and gravity has to be taken into consideration. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused, and further, that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference with the decision of the Trial Court in a casual or cavalier manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for such interference.

24. In exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. A finding may also be said to be perverse if it is `against the weight of evidence', or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (See: Balak Ram & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 2165; Shailendra Pratap & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 2003 SC 1104; Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 2006 SC 2500; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 2066; Arulvelu & Anr. v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206; Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 445); and Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189).

25. The instant case is required to be examined in light of the aforesaid legal principles.

Undoubtedly, the record reveals that at an initial stage the relationship between husband and wife had been very cordial and they had love and affection for each other. At a later stage when the family suspected an illicit relationship between the deceased and Kake, the appellants were very much disturbed. Both the families made serious attempts to re-concile and patch up the matter and the appellants agreed that the deceased may be given an opportunity to improve her behaviour. Thus, admittedly there was a doubt that the deceased had developed serious intimacy with Kake, which was much more than what happens in normal course with a family friend. Therefore, the finding recorded by the High Court that the intimacy between them to the extent of having an illicit relationship was not there, loses its significance, for the reason that even the suspicion of such a matter becomes the talk of the town and the reputation of the family remains at stake. The protests on the part of the appellants even on a mere suspicion and asking the deceased to keep distance from Kake or improve her behaviour is not something which can be termed to be unwarranted or uncalled for.

26. There is ample evidence on record to suggest that the deceased had been suffering from psychosis/mental dis-order. According to Dr. Daulatram Nekumal Gurubani (PW.10) the ailment was not of a very serious nature. However, the prescriptions given by Dr. Gurubani (PW.10) reveal that the deceased had been suffering from serious mental dis-order, otherwise such medicines could not have been prescribed by him. He has prescribed the deceased the medicine Geroin because he was convinced that the deceased was suffering from major epilepsy, in spite of the fact that he was fully aware that the said drug has side effects. He also deposed that mere clinical examination alone is not sufficient to decide whether the patient is suffering from epilepsy. He further deposed that such medicine can be given to a person suffering from grand-mal epilepsy. More so, had it not been the case of serious ailment of mental dis-order, the question of prescribing and giving E.C.T. to the deceased could not arise.

27. There had been a lot of improvements and contradictions in his statements. The witness deposed for the first time in the court during the trial, that when he went to examine the deceased, she was found in an unkept room/store room and that he was introduced to the deceased as a Psychiatrist and that the deceased had asked him whether he treated his wife in the same way as she had been treated by her husband. None of this was mentioned in his statement recorded by the police. Nor it had been recorded therein that the deceased had told him that she was harassed by the appellants and her ornaments were taken away/worn by her mother in law (A.3). More so, he had not stated in his police statement that the deceased was merely mentally disturbed and not suffering from a gross psychological problem. Nor had he stated therein that the deceased had told him that she was not having any faith in any of her family members and she was deprived of their love, affection and sympathy. Such contradictions in his statements cannot be held to be mere explanations or elaborations of his version, but are tantamount to material contradictions or vital omissions. The Rules of appreciation of evidence requires that court should not draw conclusions by picking up an isolated sentence of a witness without adverting to the statement as a whole. In such a fact- situation, it is not safe to rely on his testimony for the simple reason that he had made a lot of improvements/embellishments while deposing in court and vital contradictions exist with his earlier recorded statement. Thus, no reliance can be placed on his depositions to hold that appellants had ill-treated the deceased or that appellant No.3 had taken away/worn her ornaments or that she had been deprived of their love and affection or that she was not suffering from epilepsy etc.

28. The deposition of Dr. Mohan Kulkarni (PW.1) reveals that E.C.T. treatment is given only to mental patients, who have mental depression and tend to commit suicide; the ailment of epileptic fits is a neurological problem. His statement also suggests that her in-laws had not been living with her after 1983, as the appellant No.2 stood transferred to Kurudwadi and had shifted to the said transferred place and her in-laws had been visiting Kalyan occasionally. This view stands fully corroborated by the deposition of Dr. Ramesh Kumar Mahendru (PW.12), Reader in Psychiatric Medicine, Mental Hospital, Kanpur, as referred to herein above. He had examined the deceased and prescribed medicines for manic depressive Psychosis. The prescription of this witness substantially remained the same as of Dr. Daulatram Nekumal Gurubani (PW.10). The cumulative effect of the medical evidence given by three Doctors leads us to the conclusion that deceased had been suffering from manic depression and certainly had some mental/epileptic/ psychosis problem.

29. So far as the other witnesses are concerned, they are the father, brother and aunt of the deceased. Thus, being close relatives, in such facts and circumstances they might have developed inimical feelings towards the appellants, since they came to the conclusion that the appellants were responsible for the death of the deceased. However, their depositions are full of contradictions and have marked improvements from their statements recorded earlier. The exaggerations and improvements are of such a nature that they make their whole statements in respect of the demand for gold ornaments and/or the ill-treatment of the deceased liable to total disregard on these counts. Gold ornaments had been given by the complainants to the deceased out of love and free will at the time of the marriage of Rajesh (PW.2) and at the time of delivery of her daughter Mili. Undoubtedly, Rajesh (PW.2) had alleged in the FIR that there had been demand of gold ornaments by the appellants without any details of the same, however, he could not furnish any explanation as why this fact had not been disclosed to the police when his statement and supplementary statement was recorded. Also no such inference can be drawn from any of the letters on record. Only one un-dated letter (Ext.P-21) written by the deceased to her father suggests that her mother in-law had been asking for a chain. More so, as the chain had been given by the complainants to the deceased just 2/3 months before her death, and there is no evidence that any further demand had been there, the issue became totally irrelevant in terms of proving the motive, and it cannot be presumed that any demand had been made. More so, even if it is presumed that there was some demand by appellant No.3, as she is no more, and her appeal stands abated, this issue becomes totally irrelevant for the reason that no such allegation had ever been made against the remaining two appellants.

30. So far as the stay of the deceased with her parents after coming from Kanpur to Kalyan at the guest house is concerned, admittedly at that time the relations between the parties were strained because of the suspicion that the deceased was having an illicit relationship with Kake. However, it has been admitted by Ramkishan (PW.8), father of the deceased, that subsequently the relations became normal and they were invited at the house of the appellants after the deceased tendered an apology to her mother-in- law. The said witness did not state in his statement before the police that when he went to see the appellants on 17.2.1985, they had asked him whether he had brought gold ornaments or had come empty handed or that he was told that the deceased would not be allowed to live there and they would make her condition even more miserable. Such an improvement was made while deposing in court and no explanation could be furnished by him as to why such vital facts were not stated by him at the time of recording his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. This statement is to be discarded as it is not safe to hold the appellants guilty of the offences alleged against them on such an improved version.

31. The deposition of Manorma (PW.7), aunt of the deceased is by no means different, as she had also made major contradictions and improvements in her statement made in court. She had not stated in her police statement that the appellants were demanding gold ornaments from the deceased and her family or that the appellants were keeping the deceased starving and were not allowing her to meet her daughter, Mili. The explanation furnished by her that she had not been feeling well and had forgotten to narrate such material facts, cannot be believed.

32. The statement of Rajesh (PW.2), the brother of the deceased is also full of contradictions and suffers from major improvements. The contradictions are of such a nature that they impair the whole of his evidence. The same cannot be held to be clarificatory. He was not in a position to state what ornaments his family had presented to the deceased on different occasions. More so, it was not even stated in his police statement that after the birth of Mili, his family had given gold ornaments as demanded by the appellants. He could not even furnish an explanation as to why the demand of a gold chain is not evident from any of the letters between the parties, except in the letter (Ext. P- 21).

33. The complainants have denied the receipt of letter dated 3.4.1985 written by the appellant No.2 to the father of the deceased, referred to hereinabove. However, the appellants have produced the correspondence with the post office and proved the postal stamp to show that the said letter had been sent by registered A.D. to Ramkishan Gupta (PW.8). The law in this regard is well settled. In Gujarat Electricity Board & Anr. v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani, AIR 1989 SC 1433, this court examined the issue regarding the presumption of service of letter sent by registered post under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and held as under: "There is a presumption of service of a letter sent under registered cover.... No doubt the presumption is rebuttable and it is open to the party concerned to place evidence before the court to rebut the presumption by showing that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the postal authorities never tendered the registered letter to him.....The burden to rebut the presumption lies on the party challenging the factum of service." (Emphasis added)

A similar view has been re-iterated by this court in Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (Administration), Bangalore v. V.K. Gururaj & Ors., (1996) 7 SCC 275; and Shimla Development Authority & Ors. v. Santosh Sharma (Smt.) & Anr., (1997) 2 SCC 637.

In Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi Roy, AIR 1918 PC 102, a similar view had been taken by the Privy Council, referring to Illustration (f) of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In view of the above, it was the responsibility of the complainants to prove by adducing evidence of the official of the Post Office, Kanpur that the said letter had not been delivered to them. However, for the reasons best known to the prosecution such an exercise has not been undertaken.

34. The instant case is required to be examined from another angle also. The marriage took place on 1st December, 1978. The complainant party could not place any correspondence on record prior to February 1985 except letter dated 24th February, 1979 written by the deceased herself to her husband. However, it goes in favour of the appellants. Therefore, it is evident that the controversy arose only after the expiry of the period of more than 6 years from the date of marriage. It is quite possible that the dispute arose between the parties only because of the suspicion that the deceased had developed an illicit relationship with Kake. Had there been a demand of dowry or ill-treatment to her on any other ground by the appellants, there could have been some correspondence between the parties during the aforesaid long period of more than 6 years. None of the prosecution witnesses had made any allegation of any demand of dowry or ill treatment during the said earlier period. It is unnatural that after expiry of such a long period, the appellants suddenly became greedy and started demanding ornaments and for not meeting their demand, started ill treating the deceased to the extent that she had to commit suicide. Thus, the allegations made by the complainant party remained unnatural and improbable. More so, the demand had been only of a thin gold chain which could not be very expensive in those days, especially given the socio-economic status of all the parties. For the gold ornament worth such a petty amount after the expiry of a long period of about 6 = years, from the date of marriage, it is not natural that the appellants could treat the deceased with such cruelty that she was drawn to commit suicide.

35. It is a clear cut case of gross abuse of the dowry laws. We find it difficult to sustain the conviction of the appellants on the aforesaid counts based upon the inconsistent, embellished and improved statements of the witnesses, which materially contradict their respective statements recorded earlier. The High Court did not dislodge the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal. The High Court did not make any reference to the deposition of Dr. Daulatram Nekumal Gurubani (PW.10) in the cross-examination and dealt with the case very casually, adopting a very superficial approach to the whole matter and brushed aside the allegation of an illicit relationship for which there had been documentary evidence on record without recording any cogent reasons for the same. The High Court did not make any attempt to appreciate the evidence with accuracy and reversed the findings of the trial court which were based on the evidence on record and for which detailed reasons had been assigned.

36. In view of the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay, dated 29.4.2004, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 865 of 1987 is set aside. The judgment and order of the Trial court in Sessions Case No. 25/1986 dated 21.5.1987 is hereby restored. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds stand discharged..................................J.

(P. SATHASIVAM)

..............................

...J.

(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

New Delhi,

November 11 , 2010

38

39

http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/664488/