Sunday, September 12, 2010

'Pregnant woman can't be forced to appear in court' – Delhi district court

JUDGMENT TEXT AWAITED

 

'Pregnant woman can't be forced to appear in court'

NEW DELHI: A woman who is at an advanced stage of pregnancy cannot be forced to appear in a court, a Delhi court has said.
It came to the help of an expectant mother against whom a non-bailable warrant was issued by a lower court for not appearing in a dowry harassment case.


Additional Sessions Judge R K Gauba expressed the court's displeasure over the lower court judge not exempting the six-month pregnant woman from personally appearing in criminal proceedings.

 
The court also took exception to the lower court putting a condition as -- either accept the charge or appear before it -- on the lawyer representing the woman seeking exemption from appearance.


"The law does not permit the court to put conditions of the kind indicated in the order. The requirement of the law for appearance of the accused is subject to just exceptions which include physical impossibility," ASJ Gauba said.


"This requirement (of appearance) cannot be used to arm-twist the accused or her counsel to accept the charge. I find the language used to be rather loose," the court said.


Granting relief to 25-year-old Meenakshi, who is facing charges in a dowry case, the ASJ set aside the lower court's order and exempted her from personal appearance in the case.


During the proceedings in the lower court, the woman sought its permission for non-appearance as she was at the advanced stage of pregnancy.


But the lower court issued non-bailable warrant against her. She filed a revision petition before the sessions court challenging the order to issue NBW against her.


"If it was confirmed by proper documents in support, as has been done through the documents in the revision petition indicating the petitioner to be under ante-natal care since January 13 this year, the exemption deserved to be granted," the court said.

 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pregnant-woman-cant-be-forced-to-appear-in-court/articleshow/6539499.cms#ixzz0zJPZFyVQ

Wednesday, September 8, 2010

Delhi high court says corrupt central servants can be punished after retirement

text @

http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/PNJ/judgement/31-08-2010/PNJ31082010CW136642009.pdf

 

Delhi high court says corrupt central servants can be punished after retirement

8 sep 2010

Sending out a clear message to the corrupt, the Delhi high court (HC) ruled on Tuesday that tainted government officials cannot escape punishment even after retirement.

HC said corruption should be accountable at all stages and officials involved should face the consequences.

A division bench of justices Pradeep Nandrajog and MC Garg upheld the Centre’s decision to deduct 50% of pension of HL Gulati, who retired as a senior accounts officer in the ministry of defence.

“The charges proved against the respondent [Gulati] go to show that his conduct tantamounts to unlawful behavior by a public servant in relation to his duties willfully. Thus, he is certainly guilty of committing misconduct in office. Looking at the amount involved, it can certainly be said to be a case of grave misconduct,” the judges said.

HC was hearing the Centre’s plea against a central administrative tribunal order quashing its decision of deducting Gulati’s pension. “The order passed by the tribunal is not sustainable in law,” HC said.

Gulati authorised payment against 36 fraudulent claims to the tune of Rs42.24 lakh approximately, Jyoti Singh, counsel for the government, argued.

“Acts of moral turpitude, of dishonesty, bribery and corruption would obviously be an aggravated form of misconduct, not only because of their morally depraving nature but even the reason that they would be attracting penal laws. Failure to maintain devotion to duty would be like fireman sleeping in the fire office and not responding to an emergency call, ultimately resulting in the death of 10 persons,” HC observed.

http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_delhi-high-court-says-corrupt-central-servants-can-be-punished-after-retirement_1435008

No indulgence to wives for transfer of criminal cases against husbands: SC

 

JUDGMENT AWAITED

 

No indulgence to wives for transfer of criminal cases against husbands: SC

Dhananjay Mahapatra, TNN, Sep 8, 2010,

NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court has been very lenient in entertaining pleas of estranged wives for transfer of matrimonial cases to courts close to their place of stay. But in a recent order, it put its foot down saying the concession would not be given to wives for shifting of trial of dowry harassment cases filed by them under Section 498A of Indian Penal Code against husbands and their relatives.

This assumes significance in the wake of last month's judgment of the apex court firmly telling the government to have a relook at Section 498A saying it was being misused by women to lodge false or exaggerated complaints against husbands and their relatives accusing them of cruel behaviour.


In the case at hand, a woman had sought transfer of the criminal case under Section 498A lodged by her against her husband and his relatives from Hyderabad to Indore, where she had moved after leaving the matrimonial home.

Faulting her for not impleading other accused except her husband, a Bench comprising Justices Aftab Alam and R M Lodha said it was not inclined to transfer a criminal case from one state to another solely on the ground that it would be more convenient for the wife to pursue the matter.

"It is true that in cases of dissolution of marriage, restitution of conjugal rights or maintenance, the Supreme Court shows much indulgence to the wife and ordinarily transfers the case to a place where it would be more convenient to the wife to prosecute the proceedings," the Bench said.

"But a criminal case is on a somewhat different footing. The accused may not be able to attend the court proceedings at Indore for many reasons, one of which may be financial constraints, but the consequences of non-appearance of the accused before the Indore court would be quite drastic," it said.

"Having regard to the consequences of non-appearance of the accused in a criminal trial, we are loath to entertain the petitioner's prayer for transfer. In a criminal proceeding, the right of the accused to a fair trial and a proper opportunity to defend himself cannot be ignored for the convenience of the complainant simply because she happens to be the estranged wife," the Bench said dismissing the transfer petition.

dhananjay.mahapatra@timesgroup.com

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/No-indulgence-to-wives-for-transfer-of-criminal-cases-against-husbands-SC/articleshow/6514221.cms#ixzz0yvZjlFqf

Tuesday, September 7, 2010

U-turn by victim's parents; husband let off in dowry death in New Delhi

Full Judgment text @

 http://legalmanthan498adowrymisuse.blogspot.com/2010/09/cross-examination-shatters-498a-304b.html

 **************
This again reinforces the misuse of 304B to fudge data of dowry death and dowry harassment to mislead the legislatures and siphon funds from US handlers in the name of women emancipation and empowerment
A recent judgment by Delhi HC has exposed and the mentality of girls’ parents to implicate husband and all his relatives in the desparate attempt to seek revenge or encash the opportunity to extort monies
the complete judgment is available here

U-turn by victim's parents; husband let off in dowry death in New Delhi

Monday, Sep 6, 2010,
A Delhi court has acquitted six members of a family, including the husband of the victim, in a dowry death case, considering the flip-flops of her parents while recording the testimonies during the trial.
"I am astonished to see their (parents of the victim) changed versions. These witnesses have deposed entirely different things in their cross examination by their examination in chief," additional sessions judge SC Rajan of a fast track court said.
The court absolved Sandeep Chopra, the husband of deceased Shefali, and his five family members of the charges under section 304B (dowry death), 498A (subjecting a woman to cruelty) and 406 (criminal breach of trust) of the IPC.
Shefali, who married Sandeep in 2006, was found hanging with the ceiling at her matrimonial house at Chitranjan Park area in New Delhi on February 9, 2007.
In the FIR, Anita Bhatia, mother of the victim, had alleged that Shefali's husband used to harass her as one of his friends was not invited to their wedding. They had also demanded dowry, she had alleged.
She also charged the accused first killed her and then hanged her to the ceiling to establish that she committed suicide.
During the trial, Anita and Kuldeep Bhatia, parents of the victim, first testified that she was subjected to cruelty by the accused.
However, when cross-examined by defence lawyers, they took a complete U-turden and denied their own allegations.
The court, while perusing their testimonies, was of the opinion that there was some substance in the allegations but later found out that they were refuted by the witnesses themselves.

Saturday, September 4, 2010

Del HC- Misuse of 304 B dowry death-mentality of girls parents, reasons of unnatural death suicidal tendencies

Crl. Rev. P. No.555/2003  Narender Singh Arora v State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Ors.   
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI  
Date of Reserve: 26th  August 2010  
Date of Order:  September 01 , 2010 Crl. Revision Petition No.555/2003      01.09.2010
  Narender Singh Arora          ...Petitioner         
  Versus  
  State (Govt. of NCT Delhi) & Ors.        ...Respondents   
Counsels:
Mr. R.S. Bains and Ms. Parvinder Khatra for revision petitioner.
Mr. O.P. Saxena, APP for State/ respondent no.1.
Mr. Satish Tamta for respondent no.2
JUSTICE SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA
1.  Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2.  To be referred to the reporter or not?
3.  Whether judgment should be reported in Digest?
JUDGMENT
1.  This petition under Section 397/401 read with Section 482 of Cr.P.C has been preferred by the revision petitioner for setting aside the judgment and order dated 22nd March, 2003 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi in Sessions Case No.104 of 2001 whereby the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the accused persons of charge under Section 498A/304B 302 read with Section 34 IPC. 

2.  Brief facts relevant for purpose of deciding this revision petition are that the petitioner’s daughter Mrs. Arveen was married to Mr. Paramjit Singh Rana (respondent no.2) in 1984. She delivered a child on 26th  August, 1987. She committed suicide by hanging herself from ceiling fan with the help of a chunni on 23rd November 1988. A case under Section 302/498A/304B read with Section 34 IPC was registered against the husband, father in law, brother in law and sister in law. When trial started, father of the deceased through State got appointed Special Public Prosecutor in this case  and Ms. Rani Jethmalani a known criminal lawyer and Mr. P.K Dey her Junior conducted the prosecution case. 

3.  The learned trial court came to conclusion that it was not a case of dowry death and no case under Section 498A/304B or 302 IPC was made out against the accused persons. Dissatisfied with the judgment, this revision petition has been preferred on the ground  that the judgment passed by learned trial court was based upon misreading of evidence and misinterpretation of facts and law. It is stated that there was sufficient evidence on record by way of testimony of PW-1, PW-2, PW-9, PW-11, PW-15 and PW-16 to show that the deceased was harassed for dowry and it was a case of dowry death. It is also submitted that the trial court wrongly observed that  the cruelty  in the form of beatings was not there. The cruelty could not only in the form of beatings but mental cruelty by way of taunts, harassment, etc  was sufficient to bring home offence under Section 498A IPC. The trial court did not consider the evidence in proper perspective. 
4.  The counsel for the revision petitioner also submitted that the trial court did not consider that it was a case of murder, if not of dowry death and should have convicted the accused persons for murder.  
5.  This case  is  a reflection of mentality which is now taking grip  of parents of a deceased wife in the criminal cases. Whenever a woman dies an unnatural death within seven years of her marriage at  in-laws’ house, whatever be  the cause of death,  the  in-laws must be hanged. This case also shows how truth is losing significance because of the ego of the litigants to see that in-laws should be hanged. 
6.  Suicide is a known phenomenon of human nature. Suicides are committed by living human beings for various reasons, some are not able to bear the normal stresses which are common in life. Some are not able to cope up with the circumstances in which they are placed. Some commit suicide because of frustration of not achieving the desired goals. There  are many  cases where students commit suicide because they failed to achieve certain percentage of marks. Some commit suicide because they are not able to retain top position, some commit suicide because they are not able to cope with the demands of life. Some commit suicide because they suffer sudden loss, some commit suicide out of fear of being caught. There are various reasons for which suicides are committed by men and women. All suicides are unnatural deaths. Suicide  is a complex phenomenon. One, who commits suicide, is not alive to disclose as to what was going on in his or her mind when he or she committed suicide. There is no presumption that every suicide committed by a married woman in her in-laws’ house or at her parents’ house has to be because she was suffering harassment at the hands of her husband or her in-laws. 

7.  Normally in-laws are convicted on the testimonies of parents of the girl who, in a fit of anger or because they had lost their daughter, are not prepared to believe that their daughter could commit suicide for any other reason. Fortunately, in this case, the deceased was in the habit of writing letter to her parents when she was living at her in-laws’ house and to her husband when she was living in her parents’ house and these letters were produced before the trial court. The trial court went through these letters and after going through all the letters written by the deceased, preferred to believe the circumstances prevalent between deceased and her in-laws, as reflected by the letters instead of believing the testimony of father of the girl and other relatives of the girl who wanted the court to believe that it was a dowry death. The learned trial court extensively quoted these letters. A perusal of these letters would show that the deceased was in the habit of writing every minuscule thing happening in the family of her in-laws to her father. She was in love with her father and in her letters gave details of happenings in the family of her in-laws to her father. She had written to the extent that she had to go to market by Rickshaw and that her in-laws were not well-off.  She had written how her bhabi used to behave cleverly and wanted to separate from the house, how her bhabi used to behave; how her  father-in-law used to behave, who were the servants in the family, how they used to cook, what her bhabhi did at the dinner table, how she managed to take bigger share of chicken and all trivial things. The learned trial court concluded that girl who was writing to her father about each and every circumstance of her matrimonial home to such minute details, could not have held back any information from her father if she was harassed on account of dowry or any dowry demand had been made to her. I consider that the trial court rightly put greater reliance on the letters written by the deceased right up to the time of her death to her parents and rightly rejected the oral testimony of her father and other family members who wanted the court to believe that she was being harassed on account of dowry demands. It is well known maxim that men may speak lies but the circumstances do not. The letters written by the deceased is her own testimony in respect of what kind of life she was leading. This testimony of her is unimpeachable and most reliable testimony because it was given by her when there was no shadow of any litigation between the two and relations were normal. The testimony given by her father is not normal testimony. Her father and other family members who deposed in the court testified after death of Arveen and their testimony is coloured with the loss they suffered due to sudden death of the daughter little realizing that she committed suicide not because of dowry demands but because of her fragile and sensitive nature which is reflected from the letters written by her. The letters reflect that she was in deep love with her husband, her husband was also in deep love with her. It looks she was not getting all those facilities at her in-laws’ house to which she was used  to and accustomed at her parents’ house. The letters do not reflect any kind of ill-treatment being meted out to her either at the hands of her husband or at the hands of her in-laws. The letters only reflect the usual day-to-day hiccups which a newly married couple has to undergo. I consider that the learned trial court relied upon the best evidence in order to come to a just and right conclusion whether it was a case of dowry death or it was a case of simple suicide and rightly acquitted the accused persons for the offences under Section 304B/302/498A read with Section 34 IPC. 
8.  The counsel for the petitioner argued that the trial court did not look into the theory of murder of the girl though charge of murder was there. In this case, the death had taken place by hanging. There were ligature marks around the neck of deceased. It is argued by the counsel for the petitioner that the ligature mark was continuous on the neck without a break and if  it were a case of hanging, the ligature mark would not have been continuous and there would have been a break in the ligature mark. It is submitted that it was a case of manual strangulation and a case of murder. This theory was also examined by the learned trial court. The trial court had referred to medical jurisprudence and drawn a table  showing  differences  between a suicidal death by hanging and  a homicidal death by strangulation and came to a conclusion that there was no evidence of a homicidal death. The learned trial court also noted that  to  the doctor who conducted postmortem, no questions were put suggesting that this was a case of murder and not a suicidal death. Even otherwise, except the ligature marks, there was no  other external injuries, no mark of struggle and no other evidence to show that it was a homicidal death. To my view, the learned trial court rightly came to conclusion that it was a suicidal death. I find no force in this revision petition. The revision petition is hereby dismissed.   

SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA, J
September 01, 2010 
rd

Wednesday, September 1, 2010

Supreme court uphelds the HC (Madras) order: Wife can File Divorce Anywhere

Supreme court uphelds the HC (Madras) order: Wife can File Divorce Anywhere

http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/temp/dc%202041010p.txt
ITEM NO.1                      COURT NO.9                  SECTION XII

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).20410/2010
(From the judgement and order dated 09/07/2010 in WA No. 1181/2009
of The HIGH COURT OF MADRAS)

R.SRIDHARAN TR.POA HOLDER Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

R.SUKANYA Respondent(s)
(With prayer for interim relief)
(For final disposal)

Date: 19/08/2010 This Petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P. SATHASIVAM
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE B.S. CHAUHAN

For Petitioner(s) Mr. K.K. Mani,Adv.
Mr. R. Siva Kumar,Adv.
Mr. Abhishek Krishna,Adv.

For Respondent(s) Ms. Geeta Ramaseshan,Adv.
Ms. Rukhsana Choudhury,Adv.

UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
We do not find any valid ground to interfere with the
impugned decision of the High Court. Accordingly, the special
leave petition is dismissed. However, we leave the question
of law open to be decided in an appropriate case. If the
appellant has any other grievance including his personal
appearance etc., it is for him to approach the Family Court
at Chennai.
Since the petition for divorce is pending from 2004,
we direct the Family Court to dispose of the same in
accordance with law within a period of four months from the
date of receipt of copy of this order.



[Madhu Bala] [Savita Sainani]
Sr.PA Court Master


 


………….


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
http://judis.nic.in/chennai/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=26671
DATED: 09.07.2010
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ELIPE DHARMA RAO
and
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN
W.A.No.1181 OF 2009
& M.P.No.1 of 2009
R.Sridharan ..Appellant
Vs.
1. The Presiding Officer
Principal Family Court
Chennai-600 106.
2. R.Sukanya ..Respondents
Prayer: Writ appeal against the order dated 18.8.2008 passed by this court in W.P.No.34838 of 2004.
For Appellant : Mr.K.Chandra Mouli
Senior Counsel
for Ms. K.M.Nalinishree
For Second Respondent : Mrs.Geetha Ramaseshan
-----------
JUDGMENT
K.K.SASIDHARAN, J
INTRODUCTORY:-
The legality of a matrimonial proceeding initiated by the wife before a family court in India invoking the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act against her Hindu husband having his domicile in New Jersey in the United States of America is the substantial issue raised in this writ appeal.
2. The appeal is directed against the order dated 18 August, 2008 in W.P.No.34838 of 2004 whereby and where under the request of the appellant to issue a writ of prohibition to prohibit the first respondent from proceeding with the trial in O.P.No.569 of 2004 was rejected.
THE FACTS:-
3. The appellant was an Indian Citizen and on his migration to the United States of America, he was granted US Citizenship. The second respondent was residing adjacent to the residence of the appellant at Madras. Their marriage was solemnized on 17 April, 2002. The marriage was conducted in accordance with the Hindu Rites and custom in the Balaji Temple at New Jersey. The parties were living happily as husband and wife. Subsequently, during the second week of January, 2003 the second respondent came to India for a short visit promising to return after completing her dance program. However all of a sudden, she changed her mind and contrary to the promise made, began to act in films with no idea of returning to States. She also filed divorce petition in O.P.No.569 of 2004 before the Principal Family Court, Chennai on the ground of cruelty.
4. Since the petitioner was residing in United States, he was not aware of the proceedings initiated by the second respondent. Summons was not served on him. However, an ex parte order of divorce was granted on 19 July, 2004. When the appellant came to knowthe said order, he took necessary steps for setting aside the ex parte order. The learned Family Court Judge was pleased to set aside the ex parte order of divorce on 23 September, 2004. The appellant on his appearance filed his counter opposing the plea of divorce.
5. While the matters stood thus, the appellant filed a writ petition in W.P.No.34838 of 2004 for issuance of a writ of prohibition. According to the appellant, the Family Court at Chennai has no jurisdiction to entertain the divorce proceedings, as he is a citizen of United States of America and a permanent resident in the said Country. The Court in India had no jurisdiction to take up the matter involving American citizens, having his domicile in United States of America. Therefore, the Family Court proceedings at Chennai was one without jurisdiction and as such, he prayed for a writ to direct the first respondent to abstain from taking up the matrimonial proceedings.
COUNTER STATEMENT:-
6. The second respondent filed a counter opposing the plea made by the appellant. According to the second respondent, the marriage was solemnized in Balaji Temple at Bridge Water, New Jersey in United States of America as per the Hindu Rites and Customs. Therefore the rights and obligations of the parties runs from the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. As per Section 19(iii-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, she was competent to institute proceedings for dissolution of marriage at the place where she is residing on the date of presentation of the divorce proceedings. Therefore the first respondent has got jurisdiction to decide the lis between the parties. It was her further contention that it was not open to the appellant to raise the question of jurisdiction after submitting to the jurisdiction of the Family Court by filing counter. Accordingly, she prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
THE JUDGES REASONING:-
7. The learned Single Judge opined that the appellant had his domicile of India by origin and the marriage was solemnised as per Hindu vedic rights and customs and as such the parties are governed by their personal law. Therefore the Court in India exercising jurisdiction under Hindu Marriage Act had jurisdiction to entertain the divorce petition irrespective of the present residence of the opposite party. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.
THE ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL
8. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contended that the Court in India has absolutely no jurisdiction to take up the matter involving a Foreign Citizen. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the domicile of the appellant is United States of America and so long as he has no domicile in India and continue to be a Foreign Citizen, the question of invoking the jurisdiction by a party before the Courts in India does not arise. The learned Senior Counsel would further contend that the remedy of the second respondent is to initiate proceedings under the Foreign Marriages Act before the competent court in America. It was his further contention that the Family Court at Chennai has absolutely no jurisdiction to deal with the issue and any further proceeding on the basis of the divorce petition filed by the second respondent is a futile exercise. Learned Senior Counsel also made submissions with respect to the reasoning given by the learned Judge, as according to him those reasonings with respect to domicile has absolutely no bearing on the issue on hand. Accordingly, he prayed for allowing the appeal.
9. The learned counsel for the second respondent would submit that though the marriage was conduced in United States of America, it was only in accordance with the Hindu Custom. Therefore the proceeding initiated by the second respondent to dissolve the marriage by invoking the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the first respondent was clearly maintainable. The learned counsel would further submit that the intention of the appellant is only to drag on the proceedings without allowing the second respondent to lead a peaceful life in India by dissolving the marriage.
THE ISSUE ON THIS APPEAL:-
10. The moot question to be decided is as to whether the Indian Courts have jurisdiction to take up matrimonial proceedings involving two Hindus governed by the Hindu Marriage Act even in cases where the opposite party is a foreign national having his domicile outside India.
ANALYSIS:-
11. There are certain admitted facts in this case. Both the parties are Hindus. The marriage of the appellant with the second respondent was solemnized as per Hindu Custom and Rites. The marriage was in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. The marriage was registered before the competent authority. The second respondent was residing with the appellant in United States of America. It was only subsequently she came to India and filed an application for divorce. Though several grounds were alleged in the application for divorce as well as in the counter affidavit filed by the appellant, we are not inclined to consider those issues as the scope of this writ appeal is very limited as to the legality of the proceedings now pending on the file of the Family Court.
12. The Hindu Marriage Act, as it originally stood besides its coverage to the whole of India, also applied to all Hindus domiciled in India. The Act was subsequently amended and it was given an extended application. Accordingly "domicile in India" was substituted by a new clause "domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends". This amendment was made with a specific purpose to extent the provisions of the Act to all Hindus with such domicile, even though for the time being, they are outside the said territories. Because of this amendment, it was not open to a person governed by Hindu Law to contest the matter on the sole ground that he is residing outside India and as such the Act has no application to him.
13. Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act deals with jurisdiction and procedures. Before the amendment made to Section 19 as per Act 50 of 2003, the provision was as under:-
"19. Court to which petition shall be presented:- Every petition under this Act shall be presented to the District Court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction--
(i) the marriage was solemnized, or
(ii) the respondent, at the time of presentation of the petition, resides, or
(iii) the parties to the marriage last resided together, or
[ (iii-a) in case the wife is the petitioner, where she is residing on the date of presentation of the petition, or]
(iv) the petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the petition, in a case where the respondent is, at that time, residing outside the territories to which this Act extends, or has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of him if he were alive."
14. It was found that the provision regarding jurisdiction caused serious prejudice to the cause of women. It was not possible for a women to initiate proceedings before the Court in whose jurisdiction she was residing. Because of this rigid provision, women were compelled to approach the Courts in whose jurisdiction the marriage was solemnized or the husband resides or the parties to the marriage last resided together. They have to approach Courts in distant places to resolve their matrimonial disputes. Courts were flooded with transfer petitions to transfer those proceedings on various grounds so as to enable the wife to contest the proceedings before the nearest court without any kind of difficulties. The jurisdiction clause as it stood originally, was really unfair to the women. Accordingly it was decided to amend Section 19 for the purpose of incorporating a provision to enable the wife to file a petition before the District Court in whose jurisdiction she is actually residing. This provision was inserted by Act 50 of 2003 with effect from 23 December, 2003. Therefore the wife is now entitled to file a matrimonial petition before the District Court in whose territorial jurisdiction she is residing.
15. The provision regarding jurisdiction as per Sub clause (iv) of Section 19 permits initiation of matrimonial proceedings before the Court in whose local jurisdiction the petitioner is residing at the time of presentation of the petition, in a case where the respondent is, at that time, residing outside the territories to which the Hindu Marriage Act extends. Therefore the fact that the other party to the proceeding is residing outside the territory to which the Hindu Marriage Act extents does not disentitle the petitioner wife from applying before the local designated Court to redress her grievances.
16. The question raised by the appellant before the writ court was as to whether the Family Court in India has got jurisdiction to try the matter involving a foreign citizen whose domicile is outside the territory to which the Hindu Marriage Act extends.
17. There is no dispute that the appellant and the second respondent are governed by the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. The appellant was originally an Indian citizen and on his migration to United States of America, he acquired citizenship in the said country. The appellant has no case in his counter or in his affidavit filed in the writ petition that the marriage was not conducted in accordance with the Hindu custom or that he was not one governed by the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. When the marriage was solemnized under the Hindu law, the proceedings for divorce has also to be made under the said Act. The appellant cannot take any exception to the proceedings in India under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, merely on account of his US citizenship or domicile.
18. The marriage was an arranged one. The appellant ought to have known his respective rights and obligations when he has taken a decision to contract the marriage with the second respondent under the Hindu Marriage Act. The Hindu Marriage Act has to be given an extended coverage even outside the territory to which the Act extends. When the parties are governed by the Hindu Marriage Act, the jurisdiction as well as grounds for annulling the marriage should be as provided under the said Act.
19. The Hindu Marriage Act applies to all Hindus domiciled in the territory to which the act extends. Section 19 gives a right to the wife to present the petition to the District Court within whose jurisdiction she is residing.
20. When the wife was given the right to initiate the proceedings before the local District Court where she is actually residing, such a provision cannot be defeated by taking a technical plea that no such proceeding would lie on account of Foreign Citizenship of the husband or his domicile in another country.
21. The domicile or citizenship of the opposite party is immaterial in a case like this. In case the marriage was solemnized under Hindu Law marital relationship is governed by the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. Therefore, Section 19 has to be given a purposeful interpretation. It is the residence of the wife, which determines the question of jurisdiction, in case the proceeding was initiated at the instance of the wife.
22. While considering a provision like Section 19 (iii-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, the objects and reasons which prompted the parliament to incorporate such a provision has also to be taken note of. Sub Clause (iii-a) was inserted in Section 19 with a specific purpose. Experience is the best teacher. The Government found the difficulties faced by women in the matter of initiation of matrimonial proceedings. The report submitted by the Law Commission as well as National Commission for Women, underlying the need for such amendment so as to enable the women to approach the nearest jurisdictional court to redress their matrimonial grievances, were also taken note of by the Government. Therefore such a beneficial provision meant for the women of our Country should be given a meaningful interpretation by Courts.
23. In Y. NARASIMHARAO v. Y. VENKATALAKSHMI (1991(3) S.C.C.451) the issue before the Supreme Court was regarding recognition of foreign judgment on matrimonial disputes granted by a Foreign Court. In the said case, the marriage was as per the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. However the decree of divorce was granted by the Court at Missouri. The Supreme Court held that the Court at Missouri has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition under the Hindu Marriage Act. The relevant observation for the purpose of the present proceedings reads thus:-
" 7. Under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the ``Act'') only the District Court within the local limits of whose original civil jurisdiction (i) the marriage was solemnized, or (ii) the respondent, at the time of the presentation of the petition resides, or (iii) the parties to the marriage last resided together, or (iv) the petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the petition, in a case where the respondent is, at the time, residing outside the territories to which the Act extends, or has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years of more by those persons who would naturally have heard of him if he were alive, has jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The Circuit Court of St. Louis Country, Missouri had, therefore, no jurisdiction to entertain the petition according to the Act under which admittedly the parties were married.
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17. .......... The marriages which take place in this country can only be under either the customary or the statutory law in force in this country. Hence, the only law that can be applicable to the matrimonial disputes is the one under which the parties are married, and no other law. When, therefore, a foreign judgment is founded on a jurisdiction or on ground not recognised by such law, it is a judgment which is in defiance of the Law. Hence, it is not conclusive of the matters adjudicated therein and therefore, unenforceable in this country.
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21. ........... The parties do and ought to know their rights and obligations when they marry under a particular law. They cannot be heard to make a grievance about it later or allowed to bypass it by subterfuges as in the present case.
24. In Narasimha Rao's case the Supreme Court categorically stated that marriages performed under the Hindu Marriage Act can be dissolved only under the said Act. Naturally, the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act with regard to jurisdiction would also come into play. Section 19 clearly gives jurisdiction to the Court to deal with matrimonial proceedings initiated by the wife, if she is residing within the jurisdiction of the said Court. There is no question of the second respondent initiating divorce proceedings before the Court at United States of America invoking the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. The moment the appellant has married the second respondent, he has subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the Court designated to deal with matrimonial disputes under Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act.
25. The marriage between the appellant and the second respondent could be resolved only on the grounds set out under Section `13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The appellant has no case that the application for divorce could be made before the Court at New Jersey on the grounds found mentioned in the Hindu Marriage Act. None of those grounds as stated in Section 13 are stated to be available in New Jersey to dissolve a marriage. In such circumstances, it would be impossible for the second respondent to initiate divorce proceedings before the Court at New Jersey on the basis of the averments found in the application for divorce filed before the first respondent.
26. Though the appellant has taken U.S. Citizenship, it was not his case that he has no residence in India. Even as per the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, the appellant had his residence at Chennai and very frequently he visits India to see his family members. Moreover the appellant has already submitted to the jurisdiction of the Family Court. He has filed his counter opposing the plea of divorce by denying the allegations and averments as found in the divorce petition. Therefore there is no question of putting an embargo on the Family Court from proceeding further with the divorce proceedings.
27. Therefore on a true construction of Section 19 read with Sections 1 and 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act, we are of the considered view that the Family court at Chennai has got jurisdiction to try the matrimonial litigation initiated by the second respondent not withstanding the fact that the appellant is a citizen of United States of America and not an ordinary resident of India.
28. we do not find any merit in the said contention raised on behalf of the appellant. Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed.
29. The divorce petition is pending before the Family Court from 2004 onwards. Therefore the Family Court is requested to decide the original petition as expeditiously as possible and in any case within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. Consequently, the connected MP is closed.
Tr
To
1. The Presiding Officer
Principal Family Court
Chennai 600 106

Family members of disproportionate assets case accused can be prosecuted: Delhi HC

Family members of disproportionate assets case accused can be prosecuted: Delhi HC


IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Reserve:  16th  July, 2010
Date of Order:  30th  August, 2010
+ WP (Crl.) 368 of 2010  %                 30.08.2010
SIDDARTH VERMA                 ..... Petitioner
        Through: Mr. Vishal Gosain, Adv. 
        versus
CBI                   ..... Respondent
        Through: Mr Vikas Pahwa, Standing Counsel.
JUSTICE SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the reporter or not?
3. Whether judgment should be reported in Digest?
JUDGMENT
1.  Present petition has been filed by the petitioner assailing order dated 6th   January,  2006 of  the learned Special Judge, CBI, New Delhi, whereby an application of the petitioner for his discharge from the case was dismissed by  the learned Special Judge.
2.  The petitioner’s father and petitioner were arrayed as accused persons in this case by CBI.  The petitioner’s father was arrayed as accused for possessing disproportionate assets and was charged by the trial court under Section 13(1) (e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,   1988, and the petitioner was charged under Section 109 of IPC read with Section 13(2) and 13 (1) (e) of Prevention of Corruption Act.  During the pendency of proceedings, father of the petitioner expired on 8th August, 2005.  Thus, criminal proceeding against him got abated.  The petitioner then moved an application for his discharge on the ground that he could not be prosecuted under Prevention of Corruption Act in view of the fact that the public servant charged under Prevention of Corruption Act (his father) had already died.  The petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in  Kartongen Kemi Ochforvaltning AB Vs State through AB, 2004 (1) JCC 218. 3.  The learned Special Judge relying on the judgment of Supreme Court in Wakil Yadav and Another Vs. State of Bihar, 2001 SCC Crl. 1499 observed that abetment to an offence of corruption was itself a distinct offence for which a charge could be framed.  
4.  The accused/petitioner Siddharth Verma was summoned by the Court for offences under Section 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 109 of IPC.  His father was found indulging into corruption and amassing wealth during the period from 23rd  July, 1964  to 31st March, 2001.  Accused Siddharth Verma was a student up to year 1993 and had completed his B.Sc. in the year 1993.  Thereafter, he had undergone training of Commercial Pilot from 1996 to 1998.  He acted as a conduit for this father  in amassing wealth by corrupt means and despite being a student, his income was shown from unknown sources.  He was shown to have  purchased 37.4 Bighas and 3.33 Acres of agricultural land from Sh. Shanti Swarup and Sh. Maheshwari Prasad respectively for Rs. 55,000/- and Rs. 2,24,800/- which was registered in the joint names of his mother and himself  on 8th October, 1992 and 13th October, 1992 respectively.  The  sources for this investment, as per CBI, were his  father’s  ill-gotten money.  This accused was shown working in four companies (i.e M/s Indus Global, M/s Jubilee Enterprises ltd., M/s Jubilee Medicare Ltd. and M/s Prasuti Construction and Investment (P) Ltd.)  to show that he was earning.  The investigation of CBI  revealed  that this income was fictitious income just to legalize the ill-gotten money of his father.  Considering all aspects, the appellant was charged under Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 109 of IPC.
5.  I consider that learned Special Judge rightly dismissed the application of the petitioner  for discharge.  Charges  were framed  against two accused persons, against one for substantive offence and against other for abetment.  If the main accused has died, that does not mean that substantive offence stands wiped out.  The offence committed by the  deceased,  accused of amassing wealth through corrupt means, does not stand wiped out and the wealth still stands there  in the hands of LR of the deceased/accused and the role of the petitioner of acting as a conduit for amassing wealth for his father  can be proved by CBI during trial.  I, therefore, find no force in this petition. 
The petition is hereby dismissed. 
August 30, 2010         SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA, J.

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