Discharge U/s 239 CrPC: State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Som Nath Thapa and Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1744
PETITIONER:
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ETC. ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SOM NATH THAPA, ETC. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/04/1996
BENCH:
HANSARIA B.L. (J)
BENCH:
HANSARIA B.L. (J)
AHMADI A.M. (CJ)
SEN, S.C. (J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 1744 1996 SCC (4) 659
JT 1996 (4) 615 1996 SCALE (3)449
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
HANSARIA. J
Bombay of yesterday, Mumbai of today: financial capital
of the nation. It woke as usual on 12th March, 1993. People
started for their places of work not knowing what was in
their store. The terrorists and/or disruptionists, bent on
breaking the backbone of the nation (for reasons which need
not be gone into) had, however, hatched a well laid-out
conspiracy to cripple the country by striking at its
financial nerve. As Bombay set down to work, blasting of
bombs, almost simultaneously, took place at important
centres of commercial actvities like Stock Exchange, Air
India, Zaveri Bazar, Katha Bazar and many luxurious hotels.
A shocked Bombay and a stunned nation first tried to provide
succour to the victim as much as possible and then wanted to
know the magnitude of the loss of life and property. It
surpassed all imagination, as it was ultimately found that
the blasts left more than 250 persons dead, 730 injured and
property worth about Rs.27 crores destroyed. By all counts,
it was thus a great tragedy; and revolting also, as it was
men-made.
2. All right thinking persons and wellwishers of the
nation started asking; Why it happened ? How could it happen
? We are not concerned in these ceses with why, but with
how. The gigantic task led Bombay police, despite its
capability, to seek assistance of the CBI. An arduous and
painstaking investigation by a team of dedicated officials
showed that the aforesaid bomb blasts were a result of deep
rooted conspiracy concerted action of many, guided either by
greed or vengeance. The finale of investigation consisted in
charge-sheeting 145 persons (of whom 38 were shown as
absconders) under various sections of the Penal Code and the
Terrorists And Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987
(TADA), hereinafter the Act also. The Designated Court
constituted under Section 9 of the Act came to be seized of
the matter and by its impugned order of 10.9.1995 it has
framed charges against 127 persons, discharing at the same
time 26. One died and two became approvers. (The total thus
comes to 146)
3. Of the charged accused, four: (1) Abu Asim Azmi; (2)
Amjad Aziz Meharbaksh; (3) Raju alias Raju Code Jain; and
(4) Somnath Thapa have approached this Court having felt
aggrieved at their having not been discharged. The State of
Maharashtra has approached the Court seeking cancellation of
bail granted to appellant Thapa.
4. We were fortunate to have leading criminal lawyers of
the country to assist us in the matter in asmuch as Shri Ram
Jethmalani appeared for Raju and Moolchand, Shri Ratinder
Singh for Abu Azim Azmi, Shri R.K. Jain for Amzad Ali and
Shri Shirodkar for appellant Thapa. The State was
represented by Addl. Solicitor General, Shri KTS Tulsi.
Lengthy arguments were advanced by the learned counsel to
sustain the stands taken by them. We put on record our
appreciation for the able assistance rendered by all.
5. The appeals call for examination of three questions of
law. These are:
(a) What are the ingredients of "criminal conspiracy' as
defined in Section 120-A o the Penal Code ?
(b) When can charge be framed ?
(c) What is the effect of repeal of TADA ?
After understanding and explaining the legal position,
we would examine the cases of individual appellants and
would see whether any of them deserves to be discharged. We
would then express our view whether bail of Thapa has to be
cancelled and whether Moolchand has to be released on bail.
Essential ingredients of criminal conspiracy:
7. It would be apposite to note at the threshold that
sections 120-A and 120-B, which are the two sections in
Chapter V - A of the Code, came to be introduced by Criminal
Law Amendment Act of 1913. The Statement of Objects and
Reasons stated that a need was felt for the same to make
conspiracy a substantive offence. In doing so the common law
of England was borne in mind.
8. Section 120-A defines criminal conspiracy as below:
"120-A. Definition of criminal
conspiracy:- When two or more
persons agree to do, or cause to be
done,
(1) an illegal act, or
(2) an act which is not illegal by
illegal means, such an agreement is
designated a criminal conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement
except an agreement to commit an
offence shall amount to a criminal
conspiracy unless some act besides
the agreement is done by one or
more parties to such agreement in
pursuance thereof.
Explanation:- It is immaterial
whether the illegal act is the
ultimate object of such agreement,
or is merely incidental to that
object".
9. This definition shows that conspiracy consists in either
doing an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. Shri
Tulsi emphasised that we should bear in mind the illegality
of means as well. Group action being apparently involved, it
was urged that division of performances in the chain of
actions as happens in smuggling of narcotics should also be
taken note of by us. The Addl. Solicitor General was at
pains in contending that protection of the society from the
dangers of concerted criminal activity may not be lost sight
of by us.
10. Shri Ram Jethmalani, who addressed us principally on the
questions of law involved, filed a compilation of relevant
decisions for our benefits, wherein the essential
ingredients of criminal conspiracy have been spelt out. The
decisions mainly relied by the learned counsel are R. vs.
Hawkesley, 1959 Criminal Law Report 210; and People vs.
Lauria, 251 California Appeal 2d 471. Some assistance is
derived from a judgment of this Court in Natwarlal
Shankarlal Mody vs. State of Bombay, 1961 Bomboy Law Report
661. The only other foreign decision we would be required to
note is United States vs. Feola 420 US 671, referred to on
behalf of the State. We would finally see what was held by a
two Judge Bench of this Court in Ajay Aggarwal vs. Union of
India, 1993 (3) SCC 609 strongly relied on by Shri Tulsi.
11. The thrust of Shri Ram Jethmalani's argument is that to
find a person quilty of conspiracy there has to be knowledge
of either commission of any illegal act by a co-conspirator
or taking recourse to illegal means by the co-conspirator,
along with the intent to further the illegal act or
facilitate the illegal means. Though at one stage the
learned Addl. Solicitor General sought to contend that
knowledge by itself would be enough, he, on deeper thought,
accepted that this would not be. But then, according to him,
at times intent may be inferred from knowledge, specially
when no legitimate use of the goods or services in question
exists. To sustain this submission, he also relied on
Lauria's case. He has added a rider as well. The same is
that so far as knowledge is concerned, the prosecution, in a
case of present nature cannot be called upon to establish
that the conspirator had knowledge that the goods in
question would be used for blasting of bombs at Bombay. This
follows, according to the Addl. Solicitor, from the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Fegla.
12. Let us first see what was held in Hawkesley. The facts
of that case are that the accused was a partner with Z in a
small taxi business. A and B, two young men with some
previous criminal record, who were fairly well known to Z
but less well known to the prisoner, H, persuaded H to drive
them on credit from the taxi office in the centre of the
city at about 12.25 a.m. a distance of about five miles to
the outskirts of the city. H did not know that either A or B
had criminal records. On the journey A and B informed H that
the purpose of the journey was to break into a golf club. H
dropped A and B near the golf club and a police officer
overheard one of them say, "We will want you back in about
an hour". H never did return to the golf club but returned
to the city where he drove some other fares which had been
previously booked after which he went home taking his taxi
with him.
A and B ran away from the golf club on being disturbed
be the police and were later arrested together. A and B were
charged with being in possession of house-breaking
implements by night and A, B and H were charged with
conspiracy to break and enter the club. A and B pleaded
"guilty" to both counts and H pleaded "not quilty" to the
count of conspiracy against him. When A end B were arrested
a torch which was usually kept in the taxi was found in
their possession. H made a statement to the police in
writing in which he said that on the journey he learnt that
A and B were "Going to do the club".
13. The evidence as to how a torch came into possession of A
and B was conflicting. There was no evidence that the
accused knew, until the journey in the taxi had begun, that
A and B intended to commit a criminal offence or that he had
any reason to suspect that they intended to do so. It was,
therefore, held that there was no evidence as to conspiracy
because of lack of evidence that the accused and A and B
were acting in concert or had agreed together to commit a
criminal offence. It is brought to our notice that this
Court in Natwar Lal's case (supra) had also held that
knowledge of conspiracy is necessary as appears from what
was stated at page 667 of the Report. Shri Jethmalani,
therefore, submits that mere knowledge that somebody would
commit an offence would not be sufficient to establish a
case of criminal conspiracy, unless there be evidence to
show that all had acted in concert or had agreed together to
commit the offence in question.
14. The discussion in Lauria is more illumnating and its
importance lies in the fact that learned counsel of both the
sides have sought to place reliance on this decision.
Fleming, J., who decided the case, was confronted with two
leading cases of the United States Supreme Court pointing in
opposits directions - one was that of United States vs.
Falcne, 311 US 205 wherein sellers of large quantities of
sugaryeast and canes were absolved from participation in a
consipracy among distillelrs who bought from them. In Direct
Sales Co., vs. United States, 319 US 703, however, a
wholesaler of drugs was convicted of conspiracy to violate
the federal narcotic laws by selling drugs in quantity to a
co-assused physician who was supplying them to addicts. The
distinction between these two cases appeared primarily based
on the proposition that distributors of such dangerous
products as drugs are required to exercise greater
discrimination in conduct of their business than are
distributors of innocuuous substances like sugar and yeast.
Fleming, J., therefore, observed that in Falcone the
seller's knowledge of the illegal use of the goods was
insufficient by itself use of the goods was insufficient by
itself to make the seller privy to a conspiracy with the
distillers who bought from them, whereas in Direct Sales,
the conviction was affirmed on showing that the drug
wholesaler had atively promoted the sale of the drug
(morphine sulphate) in quantity and had sold that same to a
physician who practised in a small town - the quantity being
300 times more than the normal requirement of the drug.
15. The following quotations in Lauria from the decision in
Direct Sales is very pertinent :
"All articles of commerce may be
put to illegal ends,...............
But all do not have inherently the
same susceptibility to harmful and
illegal use....... This difference
is important for two purposes. One
is for making certain that the
seller knows the buyer's intended
illegal use. The other is to show
that by the sale he intends to
further, promote and cooperate in
it. This intent, when given effect
by over act, is the gist of
conspiracy. While it is not
identical with mere knowledge that
another proposes unlawful action,
it is not uprelated to such
knowledge.......... The step from
knowledge to intent and agreement
may be taken. There is more than
suspicion, more than knowledge,
acquiescence, carelessness,
indifference, lack of conern. There
is informed and interested co-
operations stimulations
instigstion."
16. The learned Judge, after examining they precedent in the
fields thereafter held that sometimes, but not always, the
criminal intent may be inferred from the knowledge of the
accused of the unlawful use made of the goods in question.
He gave two illustrations to bring home the point, one of
which is that the intent may be inferred from
knowledge, when no legitimate use for the goods or
services exists. Being of this view, Fleming , J. held
that the respondent before him (Lauria) had knowledge of
the-criminal activities of the prostitutes, end the same
was sufficient to charge him with that fact, even though
what Lauria had manifestly tone was allowing them, who were
actively plying their trade, to use his telephone. The
prosecution in that case Sad attempted to establish
conspiracy by showing that Lauria was well aware that his
co-defendants were prostitutes, who had received business
calls from customers through his telephone answering
service, despite which Lauria continued to furnish them with
such service. This action of Lauria was regarded as
sufficient to hold that he had conspired with the prostitute
to further their criminal activity.
17. The Additional Solicitor General has, according to us.
stolen a march over the counsel for the accused because of
what was stated in Lauria's case, as he is undoubtedly right
in submitting that RDX, or for that matter bombs, cannot be
put to any legitimate use but only to illegitimate use; and
it is RDX or bomb which was either handled or allowed to
slip by the accused before us. So, this act by itself would
establish the intent to use the goods for illegitimate
purpose.
18. Another decision to come tn the assistance of the
prosecution is Feola. This decision of the United States
Supreme Court is important because the presented in that
case was whether knowledge that intended victim was a
federal officer essential establish crime of conspiracy
under the relevant provision which made an assault upon a
federal Of while engaged in the performance of his official
duties, an offence. Justice Blackmun, who delivered opinion
far the majority, held that in so far substantial offence is
concerned, to answer question of individual guilt or
innocence, awareness the official identity of the assault
victim irrelevant. It was then observed that the same has
obtain with respect to conspiracy.
19. What had happened in Feola was that he and his
confederates had arranged for sale of heroin to buyers, who
turned out to be undercover agents for the Bureau of
Narcotic and Dangerous Drugs. The planning of the group was
to palm off on the purchasers, for a substantial sum, a form
of sugar in place of heroin and, should that ruse fail,
simply to surprise their unwitting buyers and relieve them
of the cash they had brought along for payment. The plan
failed when one agent on a suspicion being aroused, drew his
revolver in time to counter an assault upon another agent
from the rear. So, instead of enjoying the rich benefits of
a successful swindle, Feola and his associates found
themselves charged, to their undoubted surprise, with
conspiring to assault and assaulting federal officers.
20. The plea taken by Feola was that he had no knowledge of
the victim's official identity and as such he could not have
been guilty of conspiracy charge. The Court was, therefore,
first required to find out whether for the substantive
offence of charge envisaged by the punishing section,
awareness of the official identity of the victim was
relevant; and the majority answered the question in
negative, because the offence consisted in assaulting a
federal officer on duty; and undoubtedly there was an
assault and the victim was a federal officer on duty. The
further step which the majority took, and with respect
rightly, was that the same logic would apply with respect to
conspiracy offence.
21. The Additional Solicitor General has thus a point when
he contended that to establish the charge of conspiracy in
the present case, it would not be necessary to establish
that the accused knew that the RDX and/or bomb was/were
meant to be used for bomb blast at Bombay, so Long as they
knew that the material would be used for bomb blast in any
part of the country.
22. As in the present case the bomb blast was a result of
chain of actions, it is contended on behalf of the
prosecution, on the strength of this Court's decision in
Yash Pal Mittal vs. State of Punjab 1977 (4) SCC 540, which
was noted in para 9 of Ajay Aggarwal's case that of such a
situation there may be division of performances by plurality
of means sometimes even unknown to one another; and in
achieving the goal several offences may be committed by the
conspirators even unknown to the committed. All that is
relevant is that all means adopted and illegal acts done
must be and purported to be in furtherance of the object of
the conspiracy, even though there may be sometimes misfire
or over-shooting by some of the conspirators.
23. Our attention is pointedly invited by Shri Tulsi
to what was stated in para 24 of Ajay Aggarwal's case
wherein Ramaswamy, J. stated that the law has developed
several or different models or technique to broach the
scope of conspiracy. One such model is that of a chain,
where each party performs even without knowledge of the
other, a role that aids succeeding parties in
accomplishing the criminal objectives of the conspiracy.
The illustration given was what is done in the process
of procuring and distributing narcotics or an illegal
foreign drug for sale in different parts of the globe. In
such a case, smugglers. Middleman privies to a single
conspiracy to smuggle and distribute narcotics. The
smugglers know that the middlemen must sell to retailers
and the retailers know that the middlemen must buy from
importers. Thus the conspirators at one end at the chain
know that the unlawful business would not, and could not,
stop with their buyers, and those at the other end know that
it had not begun with settlers. The action of each has to
be considered as a spoke in the hub - there being a rim to
bind all the spokes together in a single conspiracy.
24. The aforesaid decisions, weighty as they are, lead us to
conclude that to establish a charge of conspiracy knowledge
about indulgence in either an illegal act or a legal act by
illegal means is necessary. In some cases, intent of
unlawful use being made of the goods or services in question
may be inferred from the knowledge itself. This apart, the
prosecution has not to establish that a particular unlawful
use was intended, so long as the goods or service in
question could not be put to any lawful use. Finally, when
the ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions, it
would not be necessary for the prosecution to establish, to
bring home the charge of conspiracy, that each of the
conspirators had the knowledge of what the collaborator
would do, so long as it is known that the collaborator would
put the goods or service to an unlawful use.
When can charge be framed ?
25. This legal question is not as knotty as the first one.
This is for the reason that there are clinching decisions of
this Court on this aspect of the matter.
26. Shri Ram Jethmalani has urged that despite some
variation in the language of three pairs of sections, which
deal with the question of framing of charge or discharge,
being relatable to either a sessions trial or trial of
warrant case or summons case, ultimately converge to a
single conclusion, namely, that a prima facie case must be
made out before charge can be framed. This is what was
stated by a two-Judge Bench in R.S. Naik vs. A. Antulay 1986
(2) SCC 716.
27. Let us note the three pairs of sections Shri Jethmalani
has in mind. These are sections 227 and 228 An so far as
sessions trial is concerned; sections 239 and 240 relatable
to trial of warrant Cases; and sections 245 and (2) qua
trial of summons cases. They read as below:
"Section 227: Discharge - If, upon
consideration of the record of the
case and the documents submitted
therein, and after hearing the
submissions of the accused and the
prosecution in this behalf, the
Judge considers that there is not
sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused, he shall
discharge the accused and record
his reasons for so doing.
Section 228: Framing of Charge -
(i) If, after such consideration
and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge
is of opinion that there is ground
for presuming that the accused has
committed an offence which
(a) is not exclusively
triable by the Court of Session,
he may frame a charge against the
accused and, by order, transfer
the case for trial to the
Chief Judicial Magistrate
and thereupon the Chief Judicial
Magistrate shall try the offence
in accordance with the
procedure for trial of warrant-
cases instituted on a police
report;
(b) is exclusively trial by
the Court, he shall frame in
writing a charge against the
accused.
(2) Where the Judge frames
any charge under clause (b) of
sub-section (1), the charge shall
be read and explained to the
accused and the accused shall
be asked whether he pleads
guilty of the offence charged or
claims to be tried.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 239: When accused shall be
discharged - If, upon considering
the police report and the document
sent with it under Section 173 and
making such examination, if any, of
the accused as the Magistrate
thinks necessary and after giving
the prosecution and the accused an
opportunity of being heard, the
Magistrate considers the charge
against the accused to be
groundless, he shall discharge the
accused, and record his reasons for
so doing.
Section 240: Framing of charges if,
upon such consideration,
examination, if any, and hearing
the Magistrate is of opinion that
there is ground for presuming that
the accused has committed an
offence triable under this Chapter,
which such Magistrate is competent
to try and which, in his opinion,
could be adequately punished by
him, he shall frame in writing a
charge against the accused
(2) The charge shall then be read
and explained to the accused, and
he shall be asked whether he pleads
guilty of the offence charged or
claims to be tried.
Section 245: When accused shall be
discharged-(1) If, upon taking all
the evidence referred to in Section
244, the Magistrate considers, for
reasons to be recorded, that no
case against the accused has been
made cut which, if unrebutted,
would warrant his conviction, the
Magistrate shall discharge him.
(2) Nothing in this section shall
to deemed to prevent a Magistrate
from discharging the accused at any
previous stage of the case if, for
reasons to be recorded by such
Magistrate, he considers the charge
to be groundless."
Before adverting to what was stated in Antulay's case,
let the view expressed in State of Karnataka vs. L.
Muniswamy), 1977 (3) SCR 113 be noted. Therein,
Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) speaking fore a three Judge
Bench stated at page 119 that at the stage of framing
charge the Court has to apply its mind to the question
whether or not there is any ground for presuming the
commission of the offence by the accused. As framing of
charge affects a person's liberty substantially, need for
proper consideration of material warranting such order
was emphasised.
29. What was stated in this regard in Street Atyachar
Virodhi Parishad's case. Which was quoted with approval in
paragraph 76 of State of west Bengal vs. Mohd. Khalid, 1995
(1)SCC 684 is that what the Court has to see, while
considering the question of framing the charge, is whether
the material brought on record would reasonably connect the
accused with the crime. No more is required to be inquired
into.
30. In Antulay's case, Bhagwati, CJ., opined, after noting
the difference in the language of the three pairs of
section, that despite the difference there is no scope for
doubt that at the stage at which the Court is required to
consider the question of framing of charge, the test of
"prima facie" case has to be applied. According to Shri
Jethmalani, a prima facie case even be said to have been
made out when the evidence, unless rebutted, would make the
accused liable to conviction. In our view, better and
clearer statement of law would be that if there is ground
for presuming that the accused has committed the offence, a
court can justifiably say that a prima facie case against
him exists, and so, frame charge against him for committing
that offence".
31. Let us note the meaning of the word "presume". In
Black's Law Dictionary it has been defined to mean "to
believe or accept upon probable evidence". (Emphasis ours).
In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary it has been mentioned
that in law "presume" means "to take as proved until
evidence to the contrary is forthcoming" , Stroud's Legal
Dictionary has quoted in this context a certain judgement
according to which "A presumption is a probable consequence
drawn from facts (either certain or proved by direct
testimony) as to the truth of a fact alleged." (Emphasis
supplied). In Law Lexicon by P. Ramanath Aiyer the same
quotation finds place at page 1007 of 1987 edition.
32 The aforesaid shows that if on the basis of materials
on record, a court could come to the conclusion that
commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case
for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the
Court were to think that the accused might have committed
the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction
the conclusion is required to be that the accused has
committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of
framing of charge, probative value of the materials on
record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record
by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage.
What is the effect of lapse of TADA ?
-------------------------------------
33. In the written submissions filed on behalf of appellant
Moolchand, it has been urged that TADA having lapsed,
section 1(4) which saves, inter alia, any investigation
instituted before the Act had expired, itself lapsed because
of which it is not open to the prosecution to place reliance
on this sub-section to continue the proceeding after expiry
of TADA.
34. We find no force in the aforesaid submission and would
refer in this connection to a recent three-Judge Bench
decision of this Court in Mohd. Iqbal Vs. State of
Mahasrashtra, JT 1996 (1) SC 114, in which it has been
clearly held that in view of section 1(4) of the Act, the
farmers of the Act had desired that even after its expiry,
the proceeding initiated under the Act should not come to an
end without the final conclusion and determination, which
have, therefore, to be continued in spite of the expiry of
the Act. According to the Bench, there is indeed no scope
for a controversy as to whether any investigation, inquiry,
trial in respect of any offence alleged under TADA shall
come to end as subsection (4) of section (1) protects and
keeps alive such investigation and trial.
FACTUAL ASPECTS OF THE APPEALS
------------------------------
35. The Legal question having been examined, we may advert
to the facts of each appellant to decide whether a prima
facie case against him exists, requiring framing of charge,
as has been ordered. Before we undertake this exercise, it
may be pointed out that the learned Designated Court in his
impugned judgment, instead of examining the merits of the
prosecution case qua the charged accused, has given reasons
as to why he discharged 26 accused. A grievance has,
therefore, been made by all the learned counsel appearing
for the accused that this was not the legal approach to be
adopted. We find merit in this grievance inasmuch as the
impugned order ought to have shown that the Designated
Court applied its judicial mind to the materials placed on
record against the charged accused. This was necessary
because framing of charge substantially affects the liberty
of the concerned person. Because of the large number of
accused in the case (and this number being large as regards
charged accused also), the court below might have adopted
the approach he had done. But we do not think it was right
in doing so. Be that as it may, now that we have been
apprised by the prosecution regarding all the materials
which were placed before the Designated Court against each
of the appealing accused, we propose to examine, whether on
the basis of such materials, it can reasonably be held that
a case of charge exists. We would do so separately for each
of the appellants.
36. At this stage, it may be pointed out that the trial
court has, apart from framing individual charge, framed a
general charge. Which, after naming all the 127 charged
accused, reads as under :
"During the period from December,
1992 to April, 1993 at various
places in Bombay, District Raigad
and District Thane in India and
outside India in Dubai (U.A.E.)
Pakistan, entered into a criminal
conspiracy and/or were members of
the said criminal conspiracy whose
object was to commit Terrorist Acts
in India and that you all agreed to
commit following illegal acts
namely to commit terrorist acts
with an intent to overawe the
Government as by Law established,
to strike terror in the people,
to alienate sections of the people,
to adversely affect the harmony
amongst different sections of the
people i.e. Hindus and Muslims by
using bombs, dynamites handgranades
and other explosives substances
like RDX or inflammable substances
or fire-arms like AK-56 rifles,
Carbines, Pistols and other lethal
weapons in such a manner as to
cause or as likely to cause death
of or injuries to any person or
persons, loss of, damage to and
destruction of private and public
properties and disruption of
supplies of services essential to
the life of the community, and to
achieve the objectives of the
conspiracy, you all agreed to
smuggle fire-arms, ammunition,
detonators handgranades and high
explosives like RDX into India and
to distribute the same amongst
yourselves and your men of
confidence for the purpose of
committing terrorist acts and for
the said purpose to conceal and
store all these arms ammunition and
explosives at such safe places and
amongst yourselves and with your
men of confidence till its use for
committing terrorist acts and
achieving the objects of criminal
conspiracy and to dispose off the
same as need arises. To organise
training camps in Pakistan and in
India to import and undergo weapon
training in Handling of arms,
ammunitions and explosives to
commit terrorist acts. To harbour
and conceal terrorists/co-
conspirators, and also to aid, abet
and knowingly facilitate the
terrorist acts and/or any act
preparatory to the commission of
terrorist acts and to render any
assistance financial or otherwise
for accomplishing the object of the
conspiracy to commit terrorist
acts, to do and commit any other
illegal acts as were necessary for
achieving the aforesaid objectives
of the criminal conspiracy and
that on 12.3.1993 were successful
in causing bomb explosions at Stock
Exchange Building, Air India
Building, Hotel Centaur at
Santacruz, Zaveri Bazar, katha
Bazar, Century Bazar at Worli,
Petrol Pump adjoining Shiv Sena
Bhavan, Plaza Theatre and in
lobbing handgranades at Macchimar
Hindu Colony, Mahim and at Bay-52,
Sahar International Airport which
left more than 257 persons dead,
713 injured and property worth
about Rs. 27.0 Crores destroyed,
And attempted to cause Bomb
explosions at Naigaum Cross Road
and Dhanji Street, all in the city
of Bombay and its suburbs i.e.
within Greater Bombay.
And thereby committed offences
punishable under Section 3(3) of
TADA (P) Act, 1987 and Section 120
(B) of Indian Penal Code read with
Sections 3(2) (i), (ii), 3(3),
3(4), 5 and 6 of TADA (P) Act, 1987
and read with Sections 302, 307,
326, 324, 427, 435, 436, 201 and
212 of Indian Penal Code and
offences under Section 3 and 7
read with Section 25 (1A), (1B),
(a) of the Arms Act, 1959, Section
9-B(1), (a), (b), (c) of the
Explosives Act, 1884. Section 3,
4(a), (b), 5 and 6 of the Explosive
Substances Act, 1908 and Section 4
of Prevention of Damage to Public
Property Act, 1984 and within my
cognizance.
Abu Asim Azmi
37. The specific charge relating to this appellant is as
below :
"In addition to Charge First you
accused Abu Asim Azmi is also
charged for having committed the
following offences in pursuance of
the criminal conspiracy in Charge
First.
SECONDLY that you Abu Asim
Azmi in pursuance of the aforesaid
criminal conspiracy conspired
advocate advised abetted and
knowingly facilitated the
commission of terrorists act and
acts preparatory to terrorists act
i.e. bomb blast and such other act
which were committed in Bombay and
its suburbs on 12.3.93 by agreeing
to do any by doing the following
overt acts.
(a) That you sent Sultan-E-Rome
Ali Gul, Mohmed Iqbal Ibrahim,
Shakeel Ahmed, Shah Nawaz Khan s/o
Faiz Mohmed Khan, Abdul Aziz,
Manzoor Ahmed Mohmed Qureshi,
Shaikh Mohmed Ethesham and Mohmed
Shahid Nizamuddin Qureshi, to
undergo weapon training at Pakistan
in furtherance of the objectives of
the aforesaid criminal conspiracy
by booking their tickets out of
your own funds through M/s. Hans
Air Services which was done by your
firm M/s. Abu Travels and that you
thereby committed an offence
punishable under section 3(3) of
TADA (P) Act, 1987 and within my
cognizance."
38. The aforesaid shows that the individual charge against
bu is that he had done the act of booking the tickets of the
persons named in the charge; and this was done from his own
funds through M/s. Hans.Air Services. Learned Addl.Solicitor
General states that the financial assistance by this
appellant would attract the mischief of Section 3(3) of TADA
which, inter alia, punishes abetment of a terrorist act.
This would be so because of the enlarged definition of
"abet" as given in section 2 (1) (a), whose clause (iii)
makes rendering of any assistance, whether financial or
otherwise, to a terrorist, an act of abetment. Our attention
is also invited to section 21(2) which has provided that in
a prosecution for an offence under section 3(3) of the Act,
if it is proved that the accused rendered any, financial
assistance to a person accused of, or reasonably suspected
of, an offence under that section, the Designated Court
shall presume, unless the contrary is proved, that such
person has committee of the offence under that provision.
39. Shri Rajinder Singh, appearing for this appellant, did
not consider it necessary to contest the aforesaid legal
position. His sole contention is that the materials sought
to be relied on by the prosecution in alleging that Abu had
booked tickets out of his own funds, which is the gravamen
of the charge, has no legs to stand inasmuch as there are
materials galore to show that the fund for booking the 11
air tickets for Dubai had come, not from the fund of the
appellant, but the money had been made available to the firm
of the appellant, named Abu Travel Agency, by one Maulana
Bukhari about which Shamim Ahmed working as cashier in the
firm has stated. His statement during investigation was that
on 21.1.1993 two persons had come to his office and handed
over a sum of Rs.1.15 lacs along with 11 passports by saying
"Bukhari Saheb Ne Bheja Hai"(Bukhari Saheb has sent). This
was pursuant to the talk Shamim earlier had with Bukhari who
had inquired as to whether the firm of the appellant could
arrange for 11 air tickets to Dubai, which was answered in
affirmative. The firm of M/s. Hans Air Services was
thereafter contacted and a sum of Rs. 38.000/- was paid in
cash by the appellant and Rs. 73,000/- through drafts whose
numbers are on record. It, however, happened that one
ticket had to be cancelled on 11.3.1993; and because of this
an amount of Rs.9,939/- was credited in the account of
appellant's firm in the books of M/s. Hans Air Services. It
is really this entry which has been pressed into service by
Shri Tulsi to contend that the money for the journey had
really been paid by the appellant's firm.
40. According to Shri Rajinder Singh, the fact of aforesaid
credit was not brought to the notice of the appellant's
firm. Then, as the bomb blasts took place an the next date
i.e. 12th March and as Bukhari was shot dead in the
meantime, the money could not have been returned to Bukhari.
It is, therefore, urged that - the mere fact of the
aforesaid amount having been credited in the name of the
appellant's firm in the books of M/s. Hans Air Services
cannot at all suggest, in view of the aforesaid statement of
Shamim, which wag duly corroborated by Iftikhar, who was
working at the relevant time as a clerk in M/s. Abu Travels,
that the air journey of the 11 persons was financed by this
appellant. The learned counsel has also submitted that as
the Bombay Police had not asked Shamim during interrogation
about the source of money which had been paid to Hans Air
Services, Shamim had made no statement regarding that, which
he had subsequently made when interrogated by the C.B.I.
Another contention to be advanced is that if the action of
booking the tickets in question would have been a part of
tainted activity, the sum of Rs.73,000/- would not have been
transmitted to Hans Air Services through drafts.
41. Though it appears intriguing as to why only part of the
money was sent through bank and that too by more than one
draft, the aforesaid facts brought to our notice by Shri
Rajender Singh do show that the only incriminating material,
namely, crediting the amount of Rs.9,939/- in the account of
the appellants' firm in the books of M/s Hans Air Services,
is a weak circumstance to say that the appellant might have
abetted the offences in question, which is the real charge
against him. We may state that as framing of charge affects
a person's liberty substantially, as pointed out in
Muniswamy's case (supra), the materials on record must
satisfy the mind of the Court framing the charge that the
commission of offence by the accused in question was
probable. We do not think if a conclusion can
reasonably be drawn only from the above-noted incriminating
fact pressed into service by the prosecution that the
appellant might have abetted the offences in question. There
being no material to frame individual charge under section
3(3) of TADA, we are of the opinion that the general charge
qua this appellant has also to fail, as the only overt act
attributed to him is the aforesaid activity of booking
tickets.
42. We, therefore, allow the appeal of this appellant,
which arises out of SLP(Crl.) No.3305 of 1995, and order for
his discharge.
Amjad Aziz Meharbaksh
43. The individual charge against with appellant reads as
below :
"In addition to Charge First. you
Amjad Abdul Aziz Meherbux is also
charged for having committed the
following offences in pursuance to
the criminal conspiracy -described
in Charge First :-
SECONDLY :- that you Amjad
Abdul Aziz Meherbux in pursuance of
the aforesaid criminal conspiracy
and during the period January, 1993
to February, 1993 knowingly
facilitated the commission of
terrorist act and acts preparatory
to terrorist act i.e. bomb blast
and such other acts which were
committed in Bombay and its suburbs
on 12.3.1993 by doing the following
overt acts :-
That you permitted your co-
accused Yakoob Abdul Razak Memon to
park motor vehicles laden with
arms, ammunition and explosives
which were part of the consignment
smuggled into the country for
committing terrorist act by Mushtaq
@ Ibrahim @ Tiger Abdul Razak Memon
and his associates and were brought
to your premises by co-accused
Abdul Gani Ismail Turq, Asgar Yusuf
Mukadam and Rafiq Madi and also
handed over suit cases containing
hand granades and detonators to
your co-accused Altaf Ali Mustaq
Sayed at the instance of Yakoob
Abdul Razak Memon and thereby you
committed an offence punishable
under section 3(3) of TADA (P) Act,
1987 and within my cognizance.
THIRDLY :- That you Amjad
Abdul Aziz Meherbux in pursuance of
the aforesaid criminal conspiracy
and during the period 3.2.1993
onwards when arms, ammunition and
explosives were smuggled into the
country for committing terrorist
act by Tiger Memon and his
associates were in possession of
part of the consignment i.e, arms,
ammunition, handgranades and
explosives which were brought in
motor vehicles and which were
parked in your compound at the
instance of your co-accused Yakoob
Abdul Razak Memon and. therefore,
you were in possession of these
arms, ammunition, hand granades and
explosives unauthorisedly in
Greater Bombay with an intent to
aid terrorists by contravening the
provisions of Arms Act, 1959,
Explosives Act, 1884, Explosives
Substances Act, 1908 and Explosives
Rules, 1983 and thereby you
committed an offence punishable
under section 6 of TADA (P) Act,
1987 and within my cognizance.
AND I HEREBY direct that you
all be tried by me on the said
First Charge and Charges framed for
the over acts committed by you in
curse of the same transaction i.e,
in pursuance of the
44. A perusal of the aforesaid charge shows that the
allegation against Amjad is that he had permitted co-accused
Yakoob Abdul-Razak Memon to park motor vehicles laden with
arms, ammunition and explosives in his premises; and that he
was possession of the same. Shri Tulsi contends that this
possession was "conscious" and as such in view of what has
been held by the Constitution Bench in Sanjay Dutt's case,
1994 (5) SC 910, the appellant was rightly charged under
section 3(3) of TADA. Our attention is invited by the
learned Addl. Solicitor General to the decisions of this
Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Abdul Hamid Haji Mohammed,
1994 (2) SCC 664 and state of West Bengal vs. Mohd. Khalid
etc., 1995 (1) SCC 684, wherein possession of bomb AK-56 was
held sufficient to attract mischief of TADA.
45. In refuting the aforesaid contentions, Shri Jain
submitted that the materials on record show the after this
appellant came to know about the parking of the vehicles,
which were loaded with arms and ammunition, he immediately
asked Yakoob to remove tho jeep from his compound, as has
been mentioned by the designate Court itself in his order
dated 25th September, 1993 by which he had released this
appellant on bail. The Designated Court had further observed
in this connection that this conduct showed that the
appellant was not agreeable to allow Yakoob to park his
vehicles in his compound, which showed that he had not
intentionally aided Yakoob. The Designated Court had taken
this view by relying on what had been stated by this
appellant in his confession, which was sufficiently
corroborated by confession of the co-accused.
46. Shri Jain has, therefore, submitted, and rightly, that
the conduct of the appellant is clearly indicative of the
fact that he was neither in conscious possession of the
arms, ammunition etc. nor had he aided Yakoob Memon in any
way in the terrorist act. We would, therefore, order for the
discharge of this appellant also by allowing his appeal
numbered as Criminal Appeal 810 of 1994. The general charge
would also fail qua this appellant for the reason given
while dealing with the case of the appellant Abu.
Raju @ Rajucode Jain
47. We may note the individual charge against this appellant
which reads as below
"In addition to charge First, you
accused Raju Laxmichand Jain @ Raju
Kodi, is also charged for having
committed the following offence in
pursuance to the criminal
conspiracy described in Charge
first:-
SECONDLY:- That you accused
Raju Laxmichand Jain @ Raju Kodi in
pursuance of the aforesaid criminal
conspiracy and during the period
from December, 1992 to April, 1993
abetted and knowingly facilitated
the commission of terrorists act
and act preparatory to terrorist
act i.e. serial bomb blast and such
other acts which were committed in
Bombay and its suburbs on 12.3.1993
by agreeing to do and by doing the
following overt acts:-
(a) That you are a close associate
of Mushtaq @ Ibrahim @ Tiger Abdul
Razak
(b) That you participated in
smuggling, landing and
transportation
and explosives (RDX) which were
smuggled into the country by
Mushtaq @ Ibrahim @ Tiger Abdul
Razak Memon and his associates
which landed at Shekhadi on 3rd and
7th February, 1993 by sending your
men and 4 jeeps for facilitating
landing, transportation and
distribution of arms, ammunition
and explosives;
(C) That you lent Motor Scooter
No.MP-14-B-5349 which was purchased
by you in the name of your ex-
employee P.B. Bali to Mushtaq @
Ibrahim @ Tiger Abdul Razak Memon
and his associates which was
planted as Motor Scooter bomb at
Katha Bazar on 12.3.1993 and
exploded at about 14.15 hours
resulting in death of 4 persons,
inuring 21 and huge loss of
property worth 40 lacs;
and that you thereby committed an
offence punishable under Section
3(3) of the TADA (P) Act, 1987 and
within my cognizance."
48. Shri Tulsi has urged that there are sufficient materials
on record to bring home the aforesaid charge. We were handed
over a summary of these materials reading as below:
i) Association with Tiger Memon:
Raju Kodi, being the man of
confidence of Tiger Memon, was
dealing in disposal of smuggled
gold and silver since long.
He purchased M/scooter in
April- 1992 and lent the same to
Tiger Memon for smuggling
activities and the same scooter was
used as scooter Bomb and exploded
at Kathya Bazar.
The Registration papers of the
said scooter were recovered at the
instance of the Raju Kodi under a
Panchanama dt. 12/07/1993.
Raju Kodi deposited
Rs.1,61,48,000/- in the 'Hathi'
account maintained by co-accused
Mulchand Shah and belonging to
Tiger Memon during the period from
07/11/1992 to 4/12/1992. The same
amount was subsequently used by
Tiger Memon for blast purpose. (the
'Hathi' account note was recovered
at the instance of co-accused
Mulchand Sampatraj Shah.
Raju Kodi purchased the said
M/Scooter and 3 Jeeps under
fictitious names.
Raju Kodi gave his men and
four Jeeps for transportation of
Arms, Ammunition and RDX landed by
Tiger Memon. These Jeeps were
provided with special cavities to
conceal the arms, ammunition and
RDX. These Jeeps were recovered at
his instance under Panchanama dated
1/06/1993. These Jeeps were found
with "traces of RDX vide F.S.L.
Reports.
ii) The accused Azgar Yusuf Mukadam
is narrating in his confessional
statement about the association of
the appellant with Tiger Memon and
dealing with him in smuggling
activities and Hawala money
iii) The co-accused Mulchand
Sampatraj Shah is narrating in his
confessional statement about the
association of the appellant with
Tiger Memon and dealing with him in
smuggling activities and Hawala
money.
iv) The co-accused Salim Mira
Moinddin Shaikh is narrating in his
confessional statement about tie
association with Tiger Memon and
his smuggling activities.
v) the co-accused viz. Abdul Gani
Ismail Turk is narrating in his
confession about association of the
appellant with co-accused Tiger
Memon and dealing in smuggling
activities and Hawala money.
vi) The co-accused Imtiyaz
Yunusmiya Ghavate is narrating in
his confession about association of
the appellant with Tiger Memon and
dealing in smuggling activities and
Hawala Money."
May it be stated that for the purpose of the present
case, we cannot enter into the probative value of the
statements made by different persons in this regard tending
to support the above.
49. The Sola submission of Shri Jethmalani was that even if
this appellant had knowledge about transportation of arms,
ammunition and RDX brought by Tiger Memon, it cannot be held
in law that he played a part in the conspiracy, and so, the
charge under section 3(3) to the Act has to fail. The
materials do not establish even statement. We are afraid
this submission cannot be accepted because of the concept of
conspiracy explained by us above. Any reasonable person
knowing about transportation of materials like RDX has to be
imputed the intent of its use for illegal purpose there
being no material to show that RDX can be put to any Jegal
use. Further, as already held, the prosecution has no
obligation under the law to establish that the appellant had
know that the RDX, and for that matter other objectionable
materials would be used for the purpose of blasts which had
taken place in Bombay. The alleged fact that the jeeps
provided by the appellant had cavities to conceal arms,
ammunition and RDX. and that the Jeeps were recovered at the
instance of the appellant on 1.6.1993 in which were found
traces of RDX. would prima facie show that the appellant
had aided the terrorist act in question , even as per the
definition of the word "abet" given in section 109 of the
Penal Code. The alleged financial assistance provided would
attract the enlarged definition of abetment given in section
2(1)(a)(ii) of the Act.
50. Apropos the case of the persecution that this appellant
kept silence despite knowing about the aforesaid
transportation form his driver, the submission of Shri
Jethmalani is that there is nothing to show as to when the
appellant had know form his driver about this fact. The
learned counsel asked whether the information was given
immediately after the driver had come back or after the bomb
blasts had taken place or after he was arrested ? May we
mention that the fact of knowledge of the aforesaid
transportation was know as per the confessional statement of
the appellant from his driver. The further statement in this
context is that despite knowing this he had not disclosed to
anybody about transportation , which according to the
appellant was due to the fear of police. Shri Jethmalani
asked the just mentioned questions to persuade us to hold
that there was no criminality in the silence of the
appellant in not informing the police about the
transportation. Even if some allowance is made to this part
of the submission of the learned counsel, the law of
conspiracy. being as explained above, a prima facie case
against this appellant under section 3(3) of the Act does
exist. The individual charge as well as the general charge,
therefore, must be maintained in so far as he is concerned.
So his appeal- the same being criminal appeal 793/95 stands
dismissed.
Somnath Thapa
51. This appellant's role in the tragedy is of a higher
order inasmuch as being an Addl. Collector of Customs,
Preventive, the allegation is that he facilitated movement
of arms, ammunition and explosives which were smuggled into
India by Dawood Ibrahim, Mohmed Dosa, Tiger Memon and their
associates, The Addl. Solicitor General was emphatic that a
full proof case relating to framing of charge against him
does exist. Shri Shirodkar was equally emphatic in
submitting that materials on record fall short of
establishing a prima facie case against this appellant.
52. Let the additional charge framed against him be noted:
"The you Somnath Kakaram Thapa
during the period you were posted
as Additional Collector of Customs,
Preventive, Bombay and particularly
during the period January, 1993 to
February, 1993 in pursuance of the
aforesaid criminal conspiracy and
in furtherance of its object
abetted and knowingly facilitated
the commission of terrorists' acts
and preparatory to terrorists'' act
i.e. bomb blast and such other acts
which were committed in Bombay and
its suburbs on 12.3.93 by
intentionally aiding and abetting
Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, Mohmed Dosa
and Mushtaq @ Tiger Abdul Razak
Memon and their associates and
knowingly facilitated smuggling of
arms, ammunition and explosives
which were smuggled into India by
Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, Mohmed Dosa
Mushtaq @ Ibhrahim @ Tiger Abdul
Razak Memon and their associates
for the purpose of committing
terrorists acts by your non
interference inspite of the fact
that you had specific information
and knowledge that arms ammunition
and explosives are being smuggled
into the country by terrorists
Preventive you were legally bound
to prevent it and that you thereby
committed an offence punishable
under Section 3(3) of TADA (p) Act,
1987 and within my cognizance.
53 According to Shri Tulsi the following materials make out
the prima facie case against this appellant:
(i) Association with Mohd.Dosa:
S.N. Thapa has been an
associate of absconding accused
Mohd. Dosa, who has played a major
role in the conspiracy to cause
bomb blasts. The Tel. Nos. (RES. &
official) of S.N. Thapa have been
found entered in the Tel. diary
seized form Mohd. Hanif @ Raju, an
employee of Mohd. Dosa.
(ii) Association with Tiger Memon:
S.N. Thapa has been an
associate of Tiger Memon the prime
accused in the bomb blast case, who
is still absconding. He has been
facilitating the smuggling
activities of Tiger Memon against
illegal gratification.
(iii) Meeting with Tiger Memon and
Gist of Conversation recorded on
Micro cassettes:
An absconding accused Yakub Abdul
Razak Memon was arrested at New
Delhi on 5.8.94. From his
possession a number of include a
manuscript of gist of conversation
recorded on May 19, 1994 on Sony
Micro cassettes, in the garden of
the house of Yakub Memon in Karachi
(Pakistan). Accused Yakub Memon,
Syed Arif (Pakistani National) Hazi
Taufique Jaliawala (Pakistani
National) Tiger Memon, Suleman
Memon and Yub Memon had
participated in the conversation.
This gist of conversation refers to
various matter which show close
association of Tiger Memon with Sh.
Thapa. In the gist of conversation
there is reference of ISI of
Pakistan and Tiger Memon speaking
that one day Sh. Thapa had arrived
at sea shore at the time of illegal
landing and that Tiger Memon had
paid him Rs.22 lacs for allowing
the smuggling.
The investigation had established
that the said gist of conversation
is in the hand-writing of
accused Yakub Memon. Independent
witnesses and the handwriting
expert have proved his handwriting.
(iv) Statement of L.D. Mhatre,
Mhatre Customs Inspr.:
L.D. Mhatre introduced a
source (witness code No.Q-3360)
to S.N. Thapa and it was decided
that the source would pass on
information about the illegal
landings at Shekhadi to Sh.Thapa,
through Mhatre and on receipt
of the information Nakabandi may
be kept at "Sai Morba-Goregoan
Junction" because that was the
main exit point after the
landing. The source gave an
information of the landing to
Mhatre on 29.1.93 and it was
passed on to Sh.Thapa by
Mhatre. Thapa kept Nakabandi on
the right of 30 & 31st Jan. 1993 at
Purar Phata and Behan Phata on
Mhasla-Goregoan Road leaving
another route open for the escape
of smuggled goods. He did not keep
Nakabandi at the pre-arranged
point. He lifted the Nakabandi
after two days without any
specific reasons.
The source later on informed
Thapa through Mhatre that on the
night of 3.2.93 instead of silver
same chemicals had landed at
Shekhadi. Sh.Thapa did not contact
the source to ascertain further
details. Nor did he inform about it
to his senior officers. He also
did not submit the Operations
Report, as was required.
(v) Statement of Sh.R.K. Singh:
Shri R.K. Singh in his
confession, has stated that on the
night of 1.2.93 at about 2.00 At
Sh.Thapa gave him a telephonic
message saving that something had
happened beyond bankot in
thelimits of Pune Customs and
that he should personally verify.
R.K. Singh, deputed custom
officers for this job. On 4.2.93
another accused M.S. Syed,
Customs Superintendent informed
R.K. Singh that the smuggled goods
and already passed. R.K. Singh
received Rs.3 lacs as illegal
gratification for the landing out
of which he gave Rs.1 lacs to
Sh.S.N. Thapa.
(v) Awareness about landing :
Sh.S.K. Bhardwaj, Collector of
Customs,(Prev.) issued a letter dt.
25.1.93 addressed to Sh.R.K.
Singh and A.K. Hassan
Asstt.Collectors of Customs,
mentioning that intelligence had
been received that big quantity of
weapons would he smuggled into
India by ISI alongwith gold and
silver and these were likely to be
landed in next 15-30 days around
Bombay, Shrivardhan, Bankot and
Ratnagiri etc. The Collector of
Customs had directed the
subordinate officers to keep a
close watch & that all-time alert
may be kept. The copy of this
letter was also endorsed to
Sh.Thapa, who had seen it on
27.1.93.
In addition to the aforesaid
letter from the statements of the
customs officer, who had
accompanied Sh. Thapa for
akabandi on 30th & 31st Jan.,
1993, it is clear that
Sh.Thapa had knowledge that arms
were likely to he smuggled by Tiger
Memon. He had infact disclosed this
information to the subordinate
officers at the time of nakabandi.
Sh.Thapa was conveyed by
Sh.V.M. Doyphode, another
Addl.Collector of Customs that
landing of smuggled
contrabants was about to take
place near Mhaysla on the night
of 2.2.93 Sh. Thapa intentionally
sent a mis-leading wireless message
that something had happened at
Bankot therefore, maximum alert to
be Wept in Alibagh region.
Bankot is in a different
direction and far away from
Mhasala. Sh.Doyphode had not
mentioned about Bankot.
(vii) Vehicle and Vessel Log Book :
When Nakabandi was kept on
30.1.95 by Sh.Thapa, the Govt.
Maruti van No.MH-01-8579 was also
taken by Sh.Thapa with him.
However, the investigation had
disclosed that the pages of the
109 book for the period 26.1.93
to 16.2.93 were missing from the
log book, as these had been torn
from it.
In Alibagh Div. of Customs
Deptt. one patrol vessel Al-
Nadsem is provided.
A logbook is maintained for
the vessel. The investigation had
disclosed that an entry dt. 2.2.93
has been made in the logbook
showing the accused J.K. Gurav,
Customs Inspr. alongwith
subordinate staff did see
patroling from Shrivardhan to
Bankot from 2100 hrs of 2.2.93 to
0070 hrs of 3.2.93. The entry is
made by J.K. Gurav, which is
not correct because when compared
with the entries made in the
wireless logbook of Shrivardhan
Customs office it is seen that
patrolling commenced at 2345 hrs.
on 2.2.93 and not on 2100 hrs.
Inspr. Gurav is also an accused in
the case, and had actively
conspired alongwith accused S.N.
Thapa and other customs officers."
54. From the above gist it appears that the main allegation
to establish the case against Thapa is his allowing the
smuggling of the aforesaid goods by not doing Nakabandi at
the pre-arranged point but at some distance therefrom
leaving an escape route for the smugglers to carry the goods
upto Bombay. To appreciate this case of the prosecution, it
would be useful to know the topography of the area, as would
appear from the following rough sketch handed over by Shri
Tulsi:-
55. Shri Tulsi contended that Thapa had been forewarned by
a communication of Shri S.K. Bhardwaj, Collector of Customs
(Preventive) dated 25.1.93 addressed to S/Shri R.K. Singh
and A.K. Hassan, Asstt. Collectors of Customs, that
intelligence had been received that big quantity of weapons
would be smuggled into India by Ist alongwith gold and
silver which were likely to land in next 15-30 days around
Bombay, Shrivardhan, Bankot and Ratnagiri etc., a copy of
which was endorsed to Thapa, who had seen the same. In fact
he disclosed this information to his subordinate officers
also. (The fact that Thapa had received a copy of the
letter, about which Shri Shirodkar mentioned many a time,
has no significance as copy was apparently sent to apprise
Thapa of the contents, requiring him to take such steps as
would have been within the ken and competence of a high
custom official on the preventive side like him). It
deserves to be noted that the information was not only about
smuggling of gold and silver alone, but of weapons and that
too by the ISI-an agency alleged to be extremely inimical to
India. This is not all. Indeed, there are material on record
to show that Thapa had information about landing of RDX
(described as 'Kala Sabun' in the under-world) at Shekhadi
and Shrivardhan on 3.2.93. According to Addl. Solicitor
General, Thapa had facilitated the movement or be used to
receive fat sum of money from Tiger Memon as quid pro quo
for help in his smuggling activities.
56. Shri Shirodkar strongly refuted the contentions of the
Addl.Solicitor General and, according to him, Nakabandi had
been done at the places suggested by the local officers like
Inspectors Agarkar and Kopikar, who had better knowledge of
the place of the Nakabandi, and therefore, no fault can be
found with Thapa for having done Nakabandi at a wrong place.
As to the motive ascribed, the submission was that to
sustain the same the only matter is of conversation found
from the possession of absconding accused Yakub Memon who
was arrested at New Delhi on 5.8.94. The conversation itself
was recorded on a cassette, which, according to Shri
Shirodkar, was not at all audible as was certified by the
Doordarshan Center of Bombay. The learned counsel would also
require us to bear in mind that Thapa had been granted bail
not only by this Court on 5.9.1994, but subsequently by the
Designated Court on 7.2.1795, which had been done bearing in
mind the materials which had come on record till then.
57. A perusal of the statement made by aforesaid two
Inspectors shows that they had made two statements at two
points of time. The first of these has been described as
"original statement' by Shri Shirodkar in his written note
and the second as "further statement". In the original
statement, these two Inspectors are said to have told Thapa,
on being asked which would be crucial places for laying
trap, that the same were Purar Phata and Behan Phata, at
which places trap was in fact laid. But then, in the further
statement the Inspectors are said to have opined that watch
should be kept at Sai-Morba-Goregoan junction, because that
was the main exit point for smuggling done at Shrivardhan
and Shekhadi. Shri Shirodkar would not like us to rely on
what was stated subsequently by these Inspectors, as that
was under pressure of investigation undertaken subsequently
by the C.B.I. We do not think that the law permits us to
find out at this stage as to which of the two versions given
by two Inspectors is correct. We have said so because at the
stage of framing of charge probative value of the statement
cannot be gone into, which would come to be decided at the
close of the trial. There is no doubt that if the subsequent
statement be correct, Nakabandi was done not at the proper
place, as that left Sai-Morba Road free for the smugglers to
carry the goods upto Bombay.
58. Shri Shirodkar submitted that the Nakabandi was
organised at Purar Phata and Behan Phata also because a trap
has to be laid at a little distance from the crucial point
so that it may not come to the notice of all and sundry,
which may prove abortive, as information about the same may
be passed on to the smugglers. We do not propose to express
any opinion on this submission also, as this would be a
matter to be decided at the trial when defence version of
the case would be examined.
59. As to the motive sought to be established on the basis
of a gist of the taps recorded conversation said to have
been recovered from absconding accused Yakub Memon, which
contained the statement that one day Thapa had arrived at
sea shore at the time of illegal landing and Tiger Memon had
paid him Rs. 22 lacs for allowing the smuggling, the
submission of the learned counsel is that it is hard to
believe that Yakub Memon would have carried in his pocket a
gist like the one at hand. Even if we were to give some
benefit to the appellant on this score, that would tend to
demolish the case of the prosecution mainly relatable to
motive, which is not required to be established to bring
home an accusation. As to Thapa, the allegation relates to
facilitating movement of arms, RDX etc., which act would
amount to abetment, as it would be an assistance, which
would attract clause (iii) of section 2(i)(a) of the Act,
defining the word 'abet'. It may be noted that the
individual charge against Thapa is for commission of offence
under section 3(3) of TADA, which, inter alia, makes
abetment punishable.
60. Shri Shirodkar submitted that the investigating agency
wanted to rope in Thapa any how, which was apparent from the
fact that it took recourse to even manufacturing of
evidence, as telephone number of Dawood Ibrahim was fed in
the digital diary found at the residence of this appellant
on search being made. Shri Tulsi explained as to how this
aspect of the matter, except observing that investigation at
times is either sluggish or over zealous - it may over shoot
also.
61. All told, we are satisfied that charges were rightly
framed against Thapa. This takes us to the State's appeal
arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2196 of 1995 in which the
prayer is to cancel the bail of Thapa, which was ordered by
this court on April 5, 1994 and then by the Desingated Court
by its order dated February 7, 1995. A perusal of this
Court's order shows that when it had examined the matter,
charge-sheet had not been submitted. It was, therefore,
desired that the Designated Court should reconsider in
matter with a view to finding out whether the evidence
collected in the course of investigation showed his
involvement. A perusal of Designated Court's order shows
that though according to it a case was made out by the
prosecution against Thapa, it took the view that there was
want of material which could be tendered as substantive
evidence to prove association of Thapa with Tiger Memon and
his associates. And so, it allowed Thapa to continue on
bail. On these special facts, we are not satisfied if a case
for cancellation of bail has been made out, despite our
taking the view that charges were rightly framed against
him. The State's appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
Conclusion
62. To conclude, appeals of Abu Asim Azmi and Amjad Aziz
Meherbux are allowed and they stand discharged. Appeals of
Raju @ Rajucode Jain and Somnath Thapa are dismissed. The
appeal of State is also dismissed.
63. Before parting, we may say that alongwith these appeals
we had heard the case of one Mulchand Shah, being covered by
SLP (Crl. ) No.894 of 1995. But, by an order passed on
31.1.1996 that SLP had been delinked from these cases, on
the prayer of counsel for Shah and was ordered to be listed
separately. So we have not dealt with that SLP.
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