IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1489 OF 2004
Ashok Kumar ....Appellant
Versus
State of Haryana ....Respondent
JUDGMENT
Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. Inter alia but primarily the appellant has raised a question of law in
the present appeal. The contention is, that every demand by the
husband or his family members cannot be termed as `dowry
demand' within the meaning of Section 2 read with Section 4 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short referred to as `the Act') and
consequently, the death of the deceased cannot be termed as a
`dowry death' within the ambit and scope of Section 304-B of the
Indian Penal Code (for short `the Code') and, as such, the
1
conviction and order of sentence passed against the appellant is
liable to be set aside.
2. It is a settled canon of criminal jurisprudence that the question of
law has to be examined in light of the facts and circumstances of a
given case. Thus, reference to the facts giving rise to the present
appeal would be necessary.
3. Vipin @ Chanchal @ Rekha, the deceased and Ashok Kumar, the
appellant herein, were married on 9th October, 1986. Harbans Lal,
the father of the deceased had given sufficient dowry at the time of
her marriage according to his means, desire and capacity. But,
the appellant and his family members i.e. Mukesh Kumar, the
brother of the appellant and Smt. Lajwanti, the mother of the
appellant were not satisfied with the dowry. They allegedly used
to harass and maltreat the deceased and used to give her
beatings. They had demanded a refrigerator, a television etc.
One week prior to the date of occurrence, the deceased came to
the house of her father at Kaithal and narrated the story. She
specifically mentioned that her husband wanted to set up a new
business for which he required a sum of Rs. 5,000/-. The
2
father of the deceased could not manage the same due to which
the appellant and his family members particularly, Lajwanti and
Mukesh alleged to have burnt the deceased by sprinkling
kerosene oil on her as a result of which the deceased died in the
hospital at about 4.00 p.m. on 16.05.1988. The father of the
deceased received information of the incident from his sister's son
Subhash Chand. Neither the appellant nor his family members
informed him about the said demise.
The father of the deceased moved a complaint (Ex. PA) before
SI Randhir Mohan who made endorsement (Ex. PA/1) on the basis of
which FIR (Ex. PU) was recorded. This was done by SI Randhir
Mohan on the basis of ruqa (Ex. PQ) received on 16.05.1988 at about
5.45 p.m. The deceased was brought to the hospital as a burnt case
in gasping condition and she expired in casualty. The said officer
went to the General Hospital, completed the proceedings under
Section 174 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short `the Cr.PC')
and during those proceedings he recorded the statements of
Lajwanti, mother in law of the deceased, Ram Lal, father in law of the
deceased, Khem Chand, Harbans Lal and one Arjun Dass.
Thereafter, the body was sent for postmortem which was handed
3
over to Hanbans Lal, after the post mortem. The complaint was
made by Harbans Lal (PW-1) on 17th May, 1988. Site Plan (Ex. PW)
as well as the photographs (Ex. P-14 to P-17) and their negatives
(Ex. P-18 to P-21) were prepared by Photographer Satish Kumar
(PW-10). Ex. P6 was also taken into possession which was half
burnt small tin, containing 3 litres of kerosene oil under Ex. PH which
was sealed. Certain other goods like hammer (Ex. PK), broken piece
of a wooden door (Ex. P-11), half burnt match stick, match box etc
(Ex. P-12) were also taken into possession.
4. After completing the investigation of the case and recording the
statements of the relevant witnesses, the Investigating Officer
submitted the charge sheet in terms of Section 173 of the Cr.PC.
The case was committed to the Court of Sessions by the learned
CJM vide his order dated 18th October, 1988 which framed the
charge under Section 304-B of the Code read with Section 34 of
the Code. Upon completion of the evidence of prosecution,
statement of the accused under Section 313 of Cr.PC was
recorded.
4
5. The learned Trial Court by a detailed judgment dated
13.01.1989/16.01.1989 held all the three accused viz., Ashok
Kumar, Mukesh Kumar and Lajwanti, guilty of the offence
punishable under Section 304-B of the Code and vide order of the
same date, sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a term of 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.
1,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo
rigorous imprisonment for 3 months.
6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of sentence
passed by the Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal before the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, which was
partially accepted. Lajwanti and Mukesh, the mother and brother
of the accused Ashok Kumar, were acquitted of the offence under
Section 304-B of the Code while the conviction of Ashok Kumar,
accused was upheld and the order of sentence was also
maintained by the High Court.
7. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court dated 16th December,
2003, Ashok Kumar, the appellant herein, has filed the present
appeal. While impugning the judgment under appeal and besides
5
raising the legal contention afore noticed, it is also contended that
the Courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in its
correct perspective. The evidence brought on record clearly show
that there was no connection between the death of the deceased
and the alleged dowry demands or alleged cruelty. Further, it is
contended that there was delay in registration of the FIR and no
explanation has been rendered whatsoever in that behalf. The
occurrence was dated 16.05.1988 at 4.00 p.m. and the FIR was
lodged on 17.05.1988, while the deceased died in the hospital on
16.05.1988. Unexplained and inordinate delay in lodging FIR (Ex.
PU) creates a serious doubt on the case of the prosecution. There
were no specific allegations made in the FIR with regard to dowry
and the allegations made, in any case, did not specify the basic
ingredients of dowry demand. While criticizing the serious
contradiction between the statements of prosecution witnesses, it
is also contended that the prosecution has failed to prove its case
beyond any reasonable doubt particularly, keeping in view the
letters written (Ex. DB to DJ), no offence could be established
against the accused and, as such, he is entitled to be acquitted.
6
8. On the contrary, it is argued on behalf of the State that by virtue of
cumulative effect of the statements of Harbans Lal, the father of
the deceased (PW-1), Krishna Rani, the mother of the deceased
(PW-2) and Subhash Chand (PW-3) read in conjunction with
documentary evidence and the statement of the Investigating
Officer, the prosecution has been able to prove the charge beyond
any reasonable doubt. It is contended that one witness, produced
by the accused himself, has fully corroborated the case of the
prosecution and, as such, the appellant was rightly convicted and
sentenced by the Courts below and the judgment under appeal
does not suffer from any legal or other infirmity. According to the
prosecution, the appeal should be dismissed.
9. At the very outset, we would proceed to deal with the legal
submissions made on behalf of the appellant. But before that, we
must notice that the appellant was neither charged with the
offence under Section 4 of the Act nor he has been found guilty of
the said offence. Thus, the submissions have to be examined only
from the point of view that the appellant has been convicted for an
offence under Section 304-B of the Code and the provisions of the
Act are relevant only for examining the merit or otherwise of the
7
contention raised that the expression `dowry', as per explanation to
the provisions of Section 304-B of the Code, has to be given the
same meaning as in Section 2 of the Act.
10. The appellant was charged with an offence under Section 304-B of
the Code. This penal section clearly spells out the basic
ingredients as well as the matters which required to be construed
strictly and with significance to the cases where death is caused
by burns, bodily injury or the death occurring otherwise than under
normal circumstances, in any manner, within 7 years of a
marriage. It is the first criteria which the prosecution must prove.
Secondly, that `soon before her death' she had been subjected to
cruelty or harassment by the husband or any of the relatives of the
husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry then
such a death shall be called `dowry death' and the husband or the
relative, as the case may be, will be deemed to have caused such
a death. Explanation to this section requires that the expression
`dowry' shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Act.
The definition of dowry under Section 2 of the Act reads as under :
8
"In this Act, "dowry" means any property or
valuable security given or agreed to be given
either directly or indirectly--
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other
party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parent of either party to a marriage
or by any other person, to either party to the
marriage or to any other person,
at or before [or any time after the marriage]
[in connection with the marriage of the said
parties, but does not include] dower or mahr in
the case of persons to whom the Muslim
Personal Law (Shariat) applies.
Explanation II.--The expression "valuable
security" has the same meaning as in section
30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
11. From the above definition it is clear that, `dowry' means any
property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either
directly or indirectly by one party to another, by parents of either
party to each other or any other person at, before, or at any time
after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said
parties but does not include dower or mahr under the Muslim
Personal Law. All the expressions used under this Section are of
a very wide magnitude. The expressions `or any time after
marriage' and `in connection with the marriage of the said parties'
were introduced by amending Act 63 of 1984 and Act 43 of 1986
9
with effect from 02.10.1985 and 19.11.1986 respectively. These
amendments appear to have been made with the intention to
cover all demands at the time, before and even after the marriage
so far they were in connection with the marriage of the said
parties. This clearly shows the intent of the legislature that these
expressions are of wide meaning and scope. The expression `in
connection with the marriage' cannot be given a restricted or a
narrower meaning. The expression `in connection with the
marriage' even in common parlance and on its plain language has
to be understood generally. The object being that everything,
which is offending at any time i.e. at, before or after the marriage,
would be covered under this definition, but the demand of dowry
has to be `in connection with the marriage' and not so customary
that it would not attract, on the face of it, the provisions of this
section.
12. At this stage, it will be appropriate to refer to certain examples
showing what has and has not been treated by the Courts as
`dowry'. This Court, in the case of Ram Singh v. State of Haryana
[(2008) 4 SCC 70], held that the payments which are customary
payments, for example, given at the time of birth of a child or other
10
ceremonies as are prevalent in the society or families to the
marriage, would not be covered under the expression `dowry'.
Again, in the case of Satbir Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 2001 SC
2828], this Court held that the word `dowry' should be any property
or valuable given or agreed to be given in connection with the
marriage. The customary payments in connection with birth of a
child or other ceremonies are not covered within the ambit of the
word `dowry'. This Court, in the case of Madhu Sudan Malhotra v.
K.C. Bhandari [(1988) Supp. 1 SCC 424], held that furnishing of a
list of ornaments and other household articles such as refrigerator,
furniture and electrical appliances etc., to the parents or guardians
of the bride, at the time of settlement of the marriage, prima facie
amounts to demand of dowry within the meaning of Section 2 of
the Act. The definition of `dowry' is not restricted to agreement or
demand for payment of dowry before and at the time of marriage
but even include subsequent demands, was the dictum of this
Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Raj Gopal Asawa
[(2004) 4 SCC 470].
13. The Courts have also taken the view that where the husband had
demanded a specific sum from his father-in-law and upon not
11
being given, harassed and tortured the wife and after some days
she died, such cases would clearly fall within the definition of
`dowry' under the Act. Section 4 of the Act is the penal Section
and demanding a `dowry', as defined under Section 2 of the Act, is
punishable under this section. As already noticed, we need not
deliberate on this aspect, as the accused before us has neither
been charged nor punished for that offence. We have examined
the provisions of Section 2 of the Act in a very limited sphere to
deal with the contentions raised in regard to the applicability of the
provisions of Section 304-B of the Code.
14. We have already referred to the provisions of Section 304-B of the
Code and the most significant expression used in the Section is
`soon before her death'. In our view, the expressions `soon before
her death' cannot be given a restricted or a narrower meaning.
They must be understood in their plain language and with
reference to their meaning in common parlance. These are the
provisions relating to human behaviour and, therefore, cannot be
given such a narrower meaning, which would defeat the very
purpose of the provisions of the Act. Of course, these are penal
provisions and must receive strict construction. But, even the rule
12
of strict construction requires that the provisions have to be read in
conjunction with other relevant provisions and scheme of the Act.
Further, the interpretation given should be one which would avoid
absurd results on the one hand and would further the object and
cause of the law so enacted on the other.
15. We are of the considered view that the concept of reasonable time
is the best criteria to be applied for appreciation and examination
of such cases. This Court in the case of Tarsem Singh v. State of
Punjab [AIR 2009 SC 1454], held that the legislative object in
providing such a radius of time by employing the words `soon
before her death' is to emphasize the idea that her death should,
in all probabilities, has been the aftermath of such cruelty or
harassment. In other words, there should be a reasonable, if not
direct, nexus between her death and the dowry related cruelty or
harassment inflicted on her. Similar view was expressed by this
Court in the case of Yashoda v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2004)
3 SCC 98], where this Court stated that determination of the period
would depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case.
However, the expression would normally imply that there has to be
reasonable time gap between the cruelty inflicted and the death in
13
question. If this is so, the legislature in its wisdom would have
specified any period which would attract the provisions of this
Section. However, there must be existence of proximate link
between the acts of cruelty along with the demand of dowry and
the death of the victim. For want of any specific period, the
concept of reasonable period would be applicable. Thus, the
cruelty, harassment and demand of dowry should not be so
ancient whereafter, the couple and the family members have lived
happily and that it would result in abuse of the said protection.
Such demand or harassment may not strictly and squarely fall
within the scope of these provisions unless definite evidence was
led to show to the contrary. These matters, of course, will have to
be examined on the facts and circumstances of a given case.
16. The cruelty and harassment by the husband or any relative could
be directly relatable to or in connection with, any demand for
dowry. The expression `demand for dowry' will have to be
construed ejusdem generis to the word immediately preceding this
expression. Similarly, `in connection with the marriage' is an
expression which has to be given a wider connotation. It is of
some significance that these expressions should be given
14
appropriate meaning to avoid undue harassment or advantage to
either of the parties. These are penal provisions but ultimately
these are the social legislations, intended to control offences
relating to the society as a whole. Dowry is something which
existed in our country for a considerable time and the legislature in
its wisdom considered it appropriate to enact the law relating to
dowry prohibition so as to ensure that any party to the marriage is
not harassed or treated with cruelty for satisfaction of demands in
consideration and for subsistence of the marriage.
17. The Court cannot ignore one of the cardinal principles of criminal
jurisprudence that a suspect in the Indian law is entitled to the
protection of Article 20 of the Constitution of India as well as has a
presumption of innocence in his favour. In other words, the rule of
law requires a person to be innocent till proved guilty. The
concept of deeming fiction is hardly applicable to the criminal
jurisprudence. In contradistinction to this aspect, the legislature
has applied the concept of deeming fiction to the provisions of
Section 304-B. Where other ingredients of Section 304-B are
satisfied, in that event, the husband or all relatives shall be
deemed to have caused her death. In other words, the offence
15
shall be deemed to have been committed by fiction of law. Once
the prosecution proves its case with regard to the basic ingredients
of Section 304-B, the Court will presume by deemed fiction of law
that the husband or the relatives complained of, has caused her
death. Such a presumption can be drawn by the Court keeping in
view the evidence produced by the prosecution in support of the
substantive charge under Section 304-B of the Code.
18. Of course, deemed fiction would introduce a rebuttable
presumption and the husband and his relatives may, by leading
their defence and proving that the ingredients of Section 304-B
were not satisfied, rebut the same. While referring to raising of
presumption under Section 304-B of the Code, this Court, in the
case of Kaliyaperumal v. State of Tamil Nadu [AIR 2003 SC 3828],
stated the following ingredients which should be satisfied :
"4...................
1) The question before the Court must be whether
the accused has committed the dowry death of
a woman. (This means that the presumption
can be raised only if the accused is being tried
for the offence under Section 304-B, IPC).
2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or his relatives.
16
3) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry.
4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before
her death."
19. In light of the above essential ingredients, for constituting an
offence under Section 304-B of the Code, the Court has to attach
specific significance to the time of alleged cruelty and harassment
to which the victim was subjected to and the time of her death, as
well as whether the alleged demand of dowry was in connection
with the marriage. Once these ingredients are satisfied, it would
be called the `dowry death' and then, by deemed fiction of law, the
husband or the relatives would be deemed to have committed that
offence. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant, while
relying upon the case of Tarsem Singh (supra), contended that the
concept of `soon before the death' is not attracted in relation to the
alleged harassment or cruelty inflicted upon the deceased, in the
facts of the present case. The oral and documentary evidence
produced by the prosecution does not suggest and satisfy the
essential ingredients of the offence.
17
20. Similarly, reference was also made to the judgment of this Court in
the case of Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 9 SCC
721], to substantiate the contention that there was no co-relation
between giving or taking of the property with the marriage of the
parties and, as such, the essential ingredients of Section 2 of the
Act were missing. Accordingly, it is argued that there was no
demand of dowry by the appellant but it was merely an
understanding that for his better business, at best, the amounts
could be given voluntarily by the father of the deceased. This fact
was further sought to be substantiated while referring to the
following abstracts of the judgment in the case of Appasaheb
(supra):
"6........The learned trial Judge then sought
clarification from the witnesses by putting the
following question:
"Question: What do you mean by `domestic
cause'?
Answer: What I meant was that there was a
demand for money for defraying expenses of
manure, etc. and that was the cause."
In the very next paragraph she stated as
under:
"It is not true to suggest that in my statement
before the police I never said that ill-treatment
was as a result of demand for money from us
and its fulfilment. I cannot assign any reason
18
why police did not write about it in my
statement."
xxx xxx xxx xxx
9. Two essential ingredients of Section 304-B
IPC, apart from others, are (i) death of woman
is caused by any burns or bodily injury or
occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances, and (ii) woman is subjected to
cruelty or harassment by her husband or any
relative of her husband for, or in connection
with, any demand for "dowry". The explanation
appended to sub-section (1) of Section 304-B
IPC says that "dowry" shall have the same
meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
11. In view of the aforesaid definition of the
word "dowry" any property or valuable security
should be given or agreed to be given either
directly or indirectly at or before or any time
after the marriage and in connection with the
marriage of the said parties. Therefore, the
giving or taking of property or valuable
security must have some connection with the
marriage of the parties and a correlation
between the giving or taking of property or
valuable security with the marriage of the
parties is essential. Being a penal provision it
has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly
well-known social custom or practice in India.
It is well-settled principle of interpretation of
statute that if the Act is passed with reference
to a particular trade, business or transaction
and words are used which everybody
conversant with that trade, business or
transaction knows or understands to have a
particular meaning in it, then the words are to
be construed as having that particular
meaning. (See Union of India v. Garware
Nylons Ltd. and Chemical and Fibres of India
19
Ltd. v. Union of India[(1997) 2 SCC 664].) A
demand for money on account of some
financial stringency or for meeting some
urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing
manure cannot be termed as a demand for
dowry as the said word is normally
understood. The evidence adduced by the
prosecution does not, therefore, show that any
demand for "dowry" as defined in Section 2 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the
appellants as what was allegedly asked for
was some money for meeting domestic
expenses and for purchasing manure. Since
an essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC
viz. demand for dowry is not established, the
conviction of the appellants cannot be
sustained."
21. On the contrary, the learned counsel appearing for the State while
relying upon the judgment of this Court in Devi Lal v. State of
Rajasthan [(2007) 14 SCC 176], argued that the relatives and,
particularly the father of the deceased, had specifically mentioned
the acts of harassment and, in any case, the statement of the
sister of the deceased, who was produced by the accused as his
defence witness, itself clinches the entire issue and, therefore, the
offence under Section 304-B of the Code is made out. It was also
contended that an absolute accuracy in the statement of witnesses
is not a condition precedent for conviction. He relied upon the
following dictum of the Court in Devi Lal's case (supra) :
20
"25. Indisputably, before an accused is found
guilty for commission of an offence, the court
must arrive at a finding that the ingredients
thereof have been established. The statement
of a witness for the said purpose must be read
in its entirety. It is not necessary for a witness
to make a statement in consonance with the
wording of the section of a statute. What is
needed is to find out as to whether the
evidences brought on record satisfy the
ingredients thereof."
22. Now we may proceed to discuss the evidence led by the
prosecution in the present case. In order to bring the issues raised
within a narrow compass we may refer to the statement of the
accused made under Section 313, Cr.PC. It is a settled principle
of law that dual purpose is sought to be achieved when the Courts
comply with the mandatory requirement of recording the statement
of an accused under this provision. Firstly, every material piece of
evidence which the prosecution proposes to use against the
accused should be put to him in clear terms and secondly, the
accused should have a fair chance to give his explanation in
relation to that evidence as well as his own versions with regard to
alleged involvement in the crime. This dual purpose has to be
achieved in the interest of the proper administration of criminal
justice and in accordance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C.
21
Furthermore, the statement under Section 313 of the Cr.PC can be
used by the Court in so far as it corroborates the case of the
prosecution. Of course, conviction per se cannot be based upon
the statement under Section 313 of the Cr.PC.
23. Let us examine the essential features of this section and the
principles of law as enunciated by judgments of this Court, which are
the guiding factor for proper application and consequences which
shall flow from the provisions of Section 313 of the Cr.PC. As already
noticed, the object of recording the statement of the accused under
Section 313 of the Cr.PC is to put all incriminating evidence to the
accused so as to provide him an opportunity to explain such
incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence of
the prosecution. At the same time, also permit him to put forward his
own version or reasons, if he so chooses, in relation to his
involvement or otherwise in the crime. The Court has been
empowered to examine the accused but only after the prosecution
evidence has been concluded. It is a mandatory obligation upon the
Court and besides ensuring the compliance thereof, the Court has to
keep in mind that the accused gets a fair chance to explain his
conduct. The option lies with the accused to maintain silence
22
coupled with simplicitor denial or, in the alternative, to explain his
version and reasons, for his alleged involvement in the commission of
crime. This is the statement which the accused makes without fear or
right of the other party to cross-examine him. However, if the
statements made are false, the Court is entitled to draw adverse
inferences and pass consequential orders, as may be called for, in
accordance with law. The primary purpose is to establish a direct
dialogue between the Court and the accused and to put every
important incriminating piece of evidence to the accused and grant
him an opportunity to answer and explain. Once such a statement is
recorded, the next question that has to be considered by the Court is
to what extent and consequences such statement can be used during
the enquiry and the trial. Over the period of time, the Courts have
explained this concept and now it has attained, more or less, certainty
in the field of criminal jurisprudence. The statement of the accused
can be used to test the veracity of the exculpatory of the admission, if
any, made by the accused. It can be taken into consideration in any,
enquiry or trial but still it is not strictly an evidence in the case. The
provisions of Section 313 (4) of the Cr.PC explicitly provides that the
answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in
23
such enquiry or trial and put in as evidence for or against the accused
in any other enquiry or trial for any other offence for which, such
answers may tend to show he has committed. In other words, the
use of a statement under Section 313 of Cr.PC as an evidence is
permissible as per the provisions of the Code but has its own
limitations. The Courts may rely on a portion of the statement of the
accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence
against him led by the prosecution, however, such statements made
under this Section should not be considered in isolation but in
conjunction with evidence adduced by the prosecution. Another
important caution that Courts have declared in the pronouncements is
that conviction of the accused cannot be based merely on the
statement made under Section 313 of the Cr.PC as it cannot be
regarded as a substantive piece of evidence. In the case of
Vijendrajit Ayodhya Prasad Goel v. State of Bombay [AIR 1953 SC
247], the Court held as under:
"3. ..........As the appellant admitted that he
was in charge of the godown, further evidence
was not led on the point. The Magistrate was
in this situation fully justified in referring to the
statement of the accused under Section 342
as supporting the prosecution case
concerning the possession of the godown.
24
The contention that the Magistrate made use
of the inculpatory part of the accused's
statement and excluded the exculpatory part
does not seem to be correct. The statement
under Section 342 did not consist of two
portions, part inculpatory and part exculpatory.
It concerned itself with two facts. The
accused admitted that he was in charge of the
godown, he denied that the rectified spirit was
found in that godown. He alleged that the
rectified spirit was found outside it. This part
of his statement was proved untrue by the
prosecution evidence and had no intimate
connection with the statement concerning the
possession of the godown."
24. From various answers given by the accused to the Court in his
statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., it appears that
the death of the deceased is not disputed. The allegation with regard
to cruelty was denied. However, besides denying the case of the
prosecution, the appellant took the stand that he was falsely
implicated in the crime. According to him, the deceased was not
happy with the marriage inasmuch as she was in love with some
other boy and wanted to marry him which was not permitted by her
family and that is why she committed suicide. As would be evident
from this admitted position, the death of the deceased by burning is
not an issue. The limited question was whether the deceased
committed suicide simplicitor for the reasons given by the accused or
25
in the alternative, the prosecution story, that it was a dowry death
relatable to the harassment and cruelty inflicted upon her by the
accused and his family members, is correct.
25 In the postmortem report it was noticed that the cause of death
was shock and dehydration which resulted from extensive burn
injuries, which were ante-mortem. The postmortem report (Ex. PO)
and the body sketch (Ex. PO/1) clearly demonstrate that practically
the entire body had been affected by the burn injuries. The
prosecution had examined Harbans Lal, the father of the deceased
(PW-1), who stated that immediately after the marriage of deceased
with the accused, both were living happily and he had given dowry
according to his capacity, but six months after her marriage, her
husband and her in-laws started teasing her and giving taunts that
she had not brought T.V. and Fridge etc. in the dowry and whenever
she used to come to him she mentioned about the same and 20 days
prior to her death she had told him that she was being troubled for a
sum of Rs. 5,000/- so that her husband could change to a new
business and while consoling her, he told her that he would arrange
for the money in some time and took her at the house of her in-laws
7-8 days prior to her death. He also stated that Ashok Kumar, the
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accused, Lajwanti, the mother-in-law of the deceased and Mukesh,
brother-in-law of the deceased, used to give her beatings and he had
filed the complaint (Ex.PA). Ex.PB and Ex. PC were the letters which
he had given to the police, however, this witness was cross-examined
and confronted with Ex. PA, where the allegation about T.V. and
Fridge etc. had not been recorded. He voluntarily stated that his son-
in-law (the accused) used to deal in vegetables but he wanted to
change to Kariyana business, and that is why he wanted a sum of
Rs. 5,000/-. Smt. Krishna Rani, the mother of the deceased, was
examined as PW-2. She admitted that a child was born from the
marriage. She had also corroborated the statement of PW 1.
According to her, Lajwanti told that the deceased had expired.
Subhash Chand (PW-3) stated that he had informed Harbans Lal
(PW-1) about the death of the deceased due to burn injuries and
stated that they (the husband of the deceased and her in-laws) used
to ill-treat the deceased and were demanding dowry. However, he
did not refer to the demand of Rs. 5,000/-, as stated by other
witnesses. To prove the case Karta Ram, SI (PW-6), Darshan Lal,
H.C. (PW-7), Ranbir Mohan, SI (PW-8), the police officials, were also
examined by the prosecution apart from Kharati Lal, Kariyana
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Merchant (PW-4). Dr. Manjula Bansal, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital,
Jind (PW-5), was examined to prove the death of the deceased which
was caused by burn injuries.
26. The accused had led defence and examined as many as six
witnesses. Dr. Bhushan Aggarwal, Incharge Swami Salagram
Ashram Charitable Hospital, Jind (DW-1) was examined to primarily
show that a child was born on 30th August, 1987. Vijay Laxmi (DW-3)
and Lekh Raj (DW-4) were examined to show that there were no
dowry demands and Harbans Lal, the father of the deceased had not
complained to them about the same at any point of time. But, the
most important witness examine by the accused was Vijay Laxmi
(DW-3), who is the daughter of Harbans Lal, aged about 14 years.
She mentioned that the letter (Ex. DJ) was written by her and she
stated that sometimes Ashok Kumar, the accused used to take the
deceased to her father's house. She admitted that two days prior to
writing of the letter (Ex. DJ), her sister and sister's son had come to
her house and she stated that whatever is written in the letter is
correct. But, in her cross-examination, she stated as under:
"Whenever my sister visited our home after
marriage, she would complain that her
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husband and in-laws demanded dowry and
also they used to give her beating. She came
to our home 20 days prior to her death. At
that time she told that her in-laws etc. were
demanded a T.V. and Rs.5,000/-. My father
took her to her husband's home. My sister
was not suffering from my disease. She was
having good health."
27. The above statement of this witness (DW-3) in cross-
examination, in fact, is clinching evidence and the accused can hardly
get out of this statement. The defence would be bound by the
statement of the witness, who has been produced by the accused,
whatever be its worth. In the present case, DW-3 has clearly stated
that there was cruelty and harassment inflicted upon the deceased by
her husband and in-laws and also that a sum of Rs. 5,000/- was
demanded. The statement of this witness has to be read in
conjunction with the statement of PW-1 to PW-3 to establish the case
of the prosecution. There are certain variations or improvements in
the statements of PWs but all of them are of minor nature. Even if,
for the sake of argument, they are taken to be as some contradictions
or variations in substance, they are so insignificant and mild that they
would no way be fatal to the case of the prosecution.
29
28. This Court has to keep in mind the fact that the incident had
occurred on 16.05.1988 while the witnesses were examined after
some time. Thus, it may not be possible for the witnesses to make
statements which would be absolute reproduction of their earlier
statement or line to line or minute to minute correct reproduction of
the occurrence/events. The Court has to adopt a reasonable and
practicable approach and it is only the material or serious
contradictions/variations which can be of some consequence to
create a dent in the case of the prosecution. Another aspect is that
the statements of the witnesses have to be read in their entirety to
examine their truthfulness and the veracity or otherwise. It will
neither be just nor fair to pick up just a line from the entire statement
and appreciate that evidence out of context and without reference to
the preceding lines and lines appearing after that particular sentence.
It is always better and in the interest of both the parties that the
statements of the witnesses are appreciated and dealt with by the
Court upon their cumulative reading.
29. As already noticed, the expression `soon before her death' has
to be accorded its appropriate meaning in the facts and
circumstances of a given case. In the present case, there is definite
30
evidence to show that nearly 20-22 days prior to her death the
deceased had come to her parental home and informed her father
about the demand of Rs. 5,000/- and harassment and torture to
which she was subjected to by the accused and her in-laws. Her
father had consoled her ensuring that he would try to arrange for the
same and thereafter took her at her matrimonial home 7-8 days prior
to the incident.
30. On face of the aforesaid evidence read in conjunction with the
statement of DW-3, we are convinced that ingredients of Section
304B have been satisfied in the present case. It was for the accused
to prove his defence. He had taken up the stand that the deceased
was in love with another boy and did not want to marry the accused
and the marriage of the deceased with the accused being against her
wishes was the real cause for her to commit the suicide. However,
he has led no evidence in this regard and thus, the Court cannot
believe this version put forward by the accused.
31. The argument raised on behalf of the appellant that there was
inordinate and unexplained delay in registering the FIR is without any
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substance. The incident occurred at 4.00 p.m. on 16.05.1988
whereafter the family of the deceased was informed. It is a normal
conduct of a normal person that the entire concentration would be
upon looking after and saving the deceased rather than to run up to
the police or other persons instantaneously. Unfortunately, she died
at 9.00 p.m. on the same day and the FIR was lodged on the next
day i.e. on 17.05.1988. The purpose of raising such a contention is
to show and prove that there was a planned effort on the part of the
complainant or the prosecution to falsely implicate the accused.
Here, such a situation does not exist. We have already noticed that
the complaint (Ex.PA) has been lodged resulting in registration of FIR
(Ex. PU) at 7.30 p.m. on 17.05.1988 which obviously means that the
complainant had reached the police station even prior thereto. The
conduct of the complainant and the witnesses is in line with the
behaviour of a person of common prudence and the facts and
circumstances of the case clearly demonstrate proper exercise of due
diligence on the part of these witnesses. Firstly, the complainant
family got the information of the death of the deceased from a relative
named Subhash Chand (PW-3) and, thereafter, they must have tried
to get the body subjected to the postmortem and have the same
32
released for performing the last rites. The incident occurred on
16.05.1988 and the FIR was registered on 17.05.1988, therefore,
there was no abnormal or inordinate delay in lodging the FIR in the
facts of this case. Even if we presume the delay, it is not of such a
nature that would entail any benefit to the accused. Thus, in our
view, there is no inordinate or unexplained delay in lodging the FIR.
32. Having found no infirmity in the concurrent judgments of the
learned Sessions Judge and the High Court, we see no reason to
interfere in these judgments in law or on facts. Thus, we sustain the
conviction of the accused.
33. Coming to the question of quantum of punishment, there are
few factors of which we must take note of. It is not even the case of
the prosecution that at the time of occurrence, the accused-appellant
was present at home and he failed to protect or save the deceased
from burning which caused her death. Secondly, the marriage itself
has survived for a short period of nearly one and a half year. The
cruelty and harassment to the deceased was stated to be caused by
Lajwanti, the mother in law of the deceased and Mukesh, the brother
in law of the deceased. As already noticed, Lajwanti and Mukesh
33
have been acquitted by the High Court for total lack of evidence.
Neither the State nor the complainant has preferred an appeal
against judgment of acquittal. The accused is a young person of 48
years. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and
in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to
do complete justice, we are of the considered view that ends of
justice would be met by awarding him the minimum sentence
provided in law, i.e. 7 years of rigorous imprisonment. Resultantly,
the appeal is partially accepted and the accused-appellant is awarded
sentence of 7 years rigorous imprisonment for an offence under
Section 304-B of the Code.
34. The appeal is disposed off in the above terms.
35. The accused is on bail. His bail bonds and surety stand
discharged. He be taken into custody to undergo the remaining
period of his sentence.
.........................................J.
[ DR. B.S. CHAUHAN ]
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.........................................J.
[ SWATANTER KUMAR]
New Delhi
July 8, 2010
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